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Introduction
The chapters in this dissertation are all related to the optimal regulatory design
of banks in transition economies. The contributions in this dissertation are mainly
empirical, but also contain some significant theoretical insights. The countries under
investigation are Russia (Part I) and Central and Eastern Europe (Part II).
In a first chapter we address questions related to the optimal design of a central
bank. In this chapter we consider the special case of Russia. The Central Bank of
Russia (CBR) assumes a wide range of functions not traditional to a central bank. In
addition to the daily conduct of monetary policy, it acts as a regulator and supervisor
of the banking sector, is responsible for the implementation of a deposit insurance
scheme and is the main owner of Russia’s largest commercial bank, Sberbank. We
empirically evaluate the current financial supervisory authority arrangement within
the central bank, investigating whether the CBR uses its supervisory information to
complement monetary policy. We find indications that the CBR uses its hands-on
supervisory information to maintain financial stability and to accommodate state-
owned banks’ balances.
In a second chapter, we empirically study the bank licensing policy of the CBR.
We focus on the conflict between two central bank objectives - individual bank
stability and systemic stability - and the regulatory forbearance that follows from
it. Although we find enforcement of some prudential regulations, our results suggest
forbearance for a majority of other regulations. The type of banks that are protected
from license withdrawal suggests a tacit concern for systemic stability. Specifically,
banks in highly concentrated bank markets, large banks, and banks that are active
on the interbank market enjoy protection from license withdrawal. The CBR is also
reluctant to withdraw licenses when there are ‘too many banks to fail’ and from large
deposit banks as this conflicts with the CBR objective to secure depositor confidence
and systemic stability.
A third chapter assesses how the interplay between a system of repressive re-
serve requirements and capital requirements can impact bank risk behavior. We
xv
xvi INTRODUCTION
first model the interaction and eﬀects on risk-taking theoretically and provide an
empirical illustration for the assertions made in the theoretical model for the Russian
banking sector. The theoretical model indicates that the reduction of financial re-
pression may increase risk behavior, while the introduction or enforcement of a
capital requirement can be useful in reducing gambling behavior. When introduc-
ing capital requirements into a financially repressed economy, risk taking will be
reduced, as long as banks behave suﬃciently myopic. However, in an environment
characterized by a high cost of capital and a high default probability of loans, the
introduction of a risk-based capital requirement may not succeed in reducing gam-
bling. This suggests that as long as capital is costly, financial repression can be more
successful in reducing risk compared to a capital requirement. Before introducing
a capital requirement, measures aimed at lowering the cost of capital should be a
primary focus. Only when capital requirements can successfully reduce bank risk
behavior, can financial repression harmlessly be diminished. Data for the Russian
banking sector indicate that this was not yet the case by the end of 2003.
A fourth and fifth chapter shift attention away from Russia and prudential reg-
ulation towards the economies of Central and Eastern Europe and bank market
structure. In chapter four, we investigate the determinants of bank interest margins
in Central and Eastern Europe. We assess to what extent the relatively high bank
margins in Central and Eastern Europe can be attributed to low eﬃciency and non-
competitive market conditions, or to regulatory reforms. We systematically compare
Central and Eastern European banks with Western European banks. Our results
indicate that banking in Central and Eastern Europe is on a virtuous path; increased
eﬃciency benefits customers, while capital adequacy ensures systemic stability.
In a fifth and last chapter, we study the eﬀect of diﬀerent entry modes on the
interest rate for loans in a model where domestic banks possess private information
about their incumbent clients but foreign banks have better screening skills. Theory
predicts that foreign-acquired banks charge higher lending rates for new customers
than foreign de novo banks. Our empirical evidence shows that in 10 Central and
Eastern European countries, the average lending rate of foreign-acquired banks may
initially however be lower. One reason for this is that a bank that has a majority of
existing firm-bank relationships in its portfolio, has less asymmetric information on
borrowers than when it has to screen all new credit applicants. On average, it can
therefore charge lower lending rates. We further find that competition is stronger if
market entry occurs through a greenfield investment and therefore domestic banks’
interest rates are lower. Thus, the mode of entry does not only impact firms’ access
to credit but also lending conditions. Consequently, governments play an important
xvii
role in deciding how to let foreign banks enter their markets.
xviii INTRODUCTION
Part I
Russia
1

Chapter 1
In search of monetary policy.1
1.1 Introduction
When discussing the optimal conduct of monetary policy, many authors take the
view that central banks’ objectives should consist exclusively of keeping inflation low,
ensuring stable economic growth and maintaining financial stability — with emphasis
on the first two, particularly inflation fighting. As a result, much of the literature
on monetary policy discusses ways to achieve low inflation through improvements
in institutional design and promotion of central bank independence.2 In reality,
many central banks do not consistently adhere to the policy guidelines set out by
e.g. Mishkin (2000a) in their daily conduct of monetary policy, mainly because they
assume a grab bag of regulatory functions not generally seen as central to monetary
policy, which moreover may conflict with monetary policy objectives. The Central
Bank of Russia (CBR) is a prime example of a central bank that governs a wide
range of often-conflicting functions. Besides the daily conduct of monetary policy,
the CBR acts as a regulator and supervisor of the banking sector, assumes single
licensing and closure authority over banks and acts as a lender of last resort (LLR)
for imperilled banks. The CBR is also presently implementing a deposit insurance
scheme (DI), and is the country’s single largest creditor and main owner of Sberbank,
Russia’s largest bank. Thus, the multi-tasked CBR faces abundant opportunities for
conflicts of interest as it engages in its various functions.
This chapter explores how the CBR’s “in-house” bank supervision function may
impact the central bank’s other functions and objectives. It provides an empirical
1An adapted version of this chapter appeared as: Claeys, Sophie (2005), “Optimal Regulatory
Design for the Central Bank of Russia,” BOFIT Discussion Paper 7/2005.
2For a discussion on the need for central bank independence in achieving inflation targets, see
Cukierman (1994) and references therein.
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evaluation of the current financial supervisory authority (FSA) arrangement within
the central bank, investigating whether the CBR uses its “hands-on” supervisory
information to complement monetary policy. Supervisory information can be par-
ticularly useful to a central bank in times of bank distress, since monetary policy
can be used to accommodate bank balances and avoid financial turmoil. To the
extent that this does not undermine the financial supervisory authority, supervisory
information then complements monetary policy. Using a simple Taylor rule frame-
work, we find indications that the CBR uses its hands-on supervisory information
to maintain financial stability and to accommodate state-owned banks’ balances.
The chapter is organized as follows. We begin section 2 with a brief review of
the literature on the optimal allocation of regulatory powers within a central bank
and apply select insights to an appraisal of potential alterations to the CBR’s regu-
latory design. The discussion in section 3 then turns to the CBR’s role of regulator
and supervisor of the banking sector. We empirically investigate the usefulness of
supervisory information for the conduct of monetary policy and analyze whether the
current design of supervision contributes to our understanding of the central bank’s
monetary policy behavior through monetary policy rules. Section 4 concludes.
1.2 A review of the literature on regulatory design and
lessons for the CBR
The CBR presently assumes a wide range of functions. Because of the inconsistencies
they potentially generate, this has implications on how smoothly the central bank
operates. The literature suggests that the current regulatory design impairs the
CBR’s ability to adequately achieve all its objectives. This section briefly surveys
the literature on optimal design of banking regulation and relates it to the current
functions taken on by the CBR.
Introduction
Until the end of the 19th century, central banks did not generally assume an
explicit role of lender of last resort nor shoulder supervisory and regulatory tasks.
The subsequent changes in banking (and financial markets more generally), however,
necessitated a lender-of-last-resort (LLR) function.3 Central banks now often act
3See e.g. Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995) and Goodhart (2000) on how the changing nature
of the financial system has aﬀected the functions and objectives of central banks. Capie et al. (1994)
describe how central bank functions have evolved over time.
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as LLRs for otherwise economically sound banks with liquidity problems.4 The
specific nature of commercial banking, where banks are mainly involved in granting
long-term (illiquid) loans and receiving short-term (liquid) deposits from the public,
makes the banking sector particularly vulnerable to shocks. The main risks that
arise from transforming deposits into long-term credit portfolios are interest-rate
risk (due to the maturity mismatch) and liquidity risk (due to the possibility of
unexpected withdrawals by depositors). In the event of multiple withdrawals by
depositors, a bank will be unable to fully service all depositors at the same time.
When a bank is hit by such a liquidity shock and is unable to extract funds via the
interbank market, the bank may turn to the LLR to meet the liquidity demands of
its depositors.
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) show that banks can be protected from bank runs
through the government provision of depositor insurance (DI). While DI may solve
the coordination failure between a large group of small depositors (and thus lower
systemic risk), it can also increase the moral hazard present on the banks’ side
by removing the incentive for depositors to monitor their banks. Moreover, the
bank’s own profitability concerns create moral hazard problems in choosing its asset
portfolio. In the presence of DI, risk-taking behavior on behalf of the bank can be
heightened by limiting the liability the bank faces in the event of default. Such
increased risk-taking increases the probability of bank failures.
In general, bank stability is aﬀected by vulnerability to individual runs and
systemic risk on the liability side and bank risk-taking behavior on the asset side.
Most safety and soundness regulatory instruments in the banking industry aim at
reducing the perverse incentives banks face when composing their asset portfolios
through banking regulation and prudential supervision.5
Supervision and systemic stability
Countries may use a number of arrangements for the allocation of bank supervi-
sion.6 If a central bank is concerned with systemic stability and acts as a LLR, one
4Bagehot (1873) put forward the rules for extending LLR funds for the Bank of England to
“distinctly acknowledge that it is its duty to support the market in times of panic” by lending to
“illiquid but solvent banks” but at “penalty rates.”
5Much of the focus of prudential regulation has been on bank solvency via capital adequacy
requirements. These requirements are intended to reduce the gambling behavior of banks by putting
bank equity at risk (see e.g. BIS Core Principles for eﬀective banking supervision (1997) and
Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) for a more general discussion). See also Mishkin (2000b) and Summer
(2002) on the need for prudential supervision and banking regulation.
6For example, the US Federal Reserve assumes supervisory functions, but shares them with other
supervisory agencies. In the Netherlands, supervision has always been a central bank function. In
Finland and the UK, the financial supervisory authorities are separate from the central bank, but
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can argue that supervision should be in the hands of the central bank to facilitate
its LLR functions. Since only those banks whose solvency is at doubt typically come
to the central bank for help, as LLR, the central bank will only be inclined to lend
when the bank’s failure poses a threat to financial system stability - a judgement
that can be facilitated on the basis of “in-house” supervisory information. When
there is a well-functioning interbank market, however, solvent banks can get loans
elsewhere when they need extra liquidity. Private supervisory information may then
be useful in gauging a bank’s solvency.
When a central bank’s primary concern is maintaining financial stability, it may
be reluctant to close down a large bank and resort to regulatory forbearance.7 On
the other hand, if banks assume forbearance will be forthcoming, they may increase
their risk-taking behavior and produce precisely the outcome the central bank hoped
to avoid. Already we can see that combining LLR and supervisory functions may
be incongruent within the central bank’s objective function.
Moreover, focusing on reducing moral hazard runs the danger of distracting the
financial supervisory authority from assessing how its actions impact the economy.
A unified regulator must be willing to grapple with the conflict between strict en-
forcement and maintaining systemic stability.
These conflicts are real and cannot simply be avoided through institutional de-
sign. Claeys et al. (2005a) empirically investigate the degree of bank supervisory
forbearance for the Russian banking market. The evidence suggests that prudential
regulations in Russia are not eﬀectively enforced because they conflict with other
objectives inherent to the CBR’s objective function. To the extent that regulatory
forbearance impacts the risk-taking behavior of banks, these results provide some
empirical support for separating bank supervision and LLR functions. Nonetheless,
a single authority may be preferable when conflicts intensify, because it can adhere
to its internal hierarchy of LLR and supervisory functions and let the hierarchy
depend on the situation at hand to reach an eﬃcient outcome.8
Supervision, deposit insurance and lender of last resort
Much of the theoretical literature focuses on specific aspects of banking supervi-
work in close cooperation. In Russia, supervision and prudential regulation are housed within the
CBR.
7For example, because of reputational issues or because the central bank wants to maintain
a well-functioning payments system when the large bank is an important player in the interbank
market.
8See Wall and Eisenbeis (1999) for a general discussion on how regulatory structure impacts
priority choices among conflicting public policy goals. Eisenbeis (2004) discusses agency problems
and goal conflicts in designing a financial regulatory structure with a special focus on the EMU.
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sion. One strand of the literature analyses the usefulness of capital adequacy rules as
part of prudential regulation in reducing moral hazard problems in banking.9 Some
authors focus on how deposit insurance schemes (DI) may aﬀect moral hazard and
how DI should be optimally designed.10 A small group of papers address the ques-
tion of how diﬀerent regulatory functions should be optimally coordinated to avoid
inconsistent policy.
A relatively new strand of investigation deals with the “LLR-DI-FSA nexus,”
i.e. analyzing the optimal allocation of the lender-of-last resort, deposit insurance
and supervisory functions.11 Using an incomplete contracts setting, Repullo (2000)
considers who should act as LLR: the central bank or a deposit insurance agency
(DIA)? His results indicate that the LLR function should be allocated contingent
upon the size of the liquidity shock banks are facing. He further assumes that
supervisory information can be shared and that the agency in charge of LLR collects
it. This information is assumed to contain qualitative information that enables the
supervisor to generate an assessment of the bank’s assets, although this information
is not verifiable. As a result, a solvent bank can be denied a loan and an insolvent
bank can get a loan. This is important because of the imparity between the agencies’
objective functions and the social welfare function. A central bank is assumed to
care about the impact of a bank failure on systemic stability, while a deposit insurer
is assumed to care about the impact of a bank failure on reimbursement of insured
depositors. The main results suggest a role for both the central bank and the DIA as
LLR; the central bank for small liquidity shocks, the DIA for large liquidity shocks.
When applying this setting to the CBR, one can assume that part of the super-
visory information available to the central bank cannot be observed by outsiders.
Further, the CBR’s main objective is somewhat clouded as it also happens to be
the main owner of Russia’s largest commercial bank. In addition to the expected
pay-oﬀ from the loan of last resort, systemic and individual bank stability, as well
as the repayment of insured depositors enter the equation.
Repullo (2000) suggests a way to determine who should be responsible for bank
supervision. When small liquidity shocks are more frequent than large ones, his
model suggests that the central bank should be in charge of supervision. This ar-
9See e.g. the Journal of Banking and Finance,Volume 19, Issues 3-4, pp. 393-741 (June 1995)
on “The Role of Capital in Financial Institutions.”
10See e.g. Prescott (2002), Cordella and Yeyati (2002) and Morrison and White (2004). Demirgüç-
Kunt and Kane (2001) empirically review deposit insurance design across countries. Demirgüç-Kunt
and Detragiache (2002) empirically analyse the impact of deposit insurance on banking system
stability.
11Others analyze the issue of how regulation should be optimally designed more generally. Mayes
(2005) presents an enlightening discussion of the issues at hand.
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gument, however, is limited to the consideration that when the costs of transferring
information are high, the agency that uses the information most should be in charge
of supervision. It ignores the impact of possible conflicts of interest on risk-taking
behavior of banks, as well as the costs of increased risk-taking created by a) the
presence of a LLR, or b) low enforcement of prudential regulation, in the objective
functions of the diﬀerent agencies. The propensity for risk-taking could be incor-
porated into the analysis by assuming that a supervised bank has opportunities
to divert funds to more risky projects and that the probability that the bank will
gamble depends on which body assumes the LLR and supervisory functions. In con-
structing the payoﬀs for deciding whether a loan of last resort should be granted, one
would then also take into account how the design of the regulatory scheme aﬀects a
bank’s risk-taking choices.
In a subsequent paper, Repullo (2005) takes up the issue of the extent to which
the presence of a LLR enhances bank risk-taking. He finds that the presence of a
LLR in itself does not necessarily imply greater risk-taking, but rather that a bank’s
appetite for risk-taking is stepped up when penalty rates are charged. Again, the
paper says little about supervision as such. There is only a consistently enforced
capital rule. Unsurprisingly, the fact that the Russian banking market is subject to
prudential rules carries little weight in bank portfolio decisions when banks do not
expect that the rules will be enforced. In other words, an increase in enforcement is
one straightforward way to get banks to incorporate supervision into their decision
making and diminish their propensity for risk-taking.
Kahn and Santos (2005) parallel the argument in Repullo (2000) and use the as-
sumption that banks have the discretion to divert funds to more risky investments.
In a setting with a unified regulator, the authors find a) excessive regulatory forbear-
ance, b) insuﬃcient monitoring and c) sub-optimal investment in loans. One crucial
assumption is that the single regulator lacks the arbitrary authority to close a bank.
A bank is only closed when the regulator decides not to lend to the bank when it
faces a liquidity shortfall. When the regulator has full authority to close banks (on
top of the power to extract rents from the bank under all circumstances), the bank
loses all incentives to invest in illiquid assets. The authors argue that regulatory
forbearance can be reduced by setting specified loan rates for the LLR and giving
the DIA authority to shut down banks. Alternatively, they suggest both the central
bank and the DIA could act as a LLR (see Repullo, 2000). The first solution does
not clarify to what extent banks will be tempted to take on more risk, nor what
happens with the degree of bank monitoring by the supervisory agency.
The results in Kahn and Santos (2005) oﬀer some insights into the implications
1.2. A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 9
of the CBR’s arrangements. They argue that when the central bank assumes all
responsibilities, including the authority to close banks (as the CBR), there will
be excessive regulatory forbearance, insuﬃcient monitoring and a sub-optimal level
of lending. This is a valid appraisal of the current situation in Russia. Lending
figures remain low by international standards12 and empirical evidence suggests low
levels of monitoring and enforcement of regulations (Claeys et al., 2005a). The
emphasis, therefore, needs to go to regulatory enforcement. In fact, if the regulator
fails to credibly commit to closing banks, risk-taking behavior increases regardless of
which agency assumes authority.13 Indeed, when banks can count on the regulatory
forbearance of the central bank, they are prone to assume risk and expect to be
bailed out when they get into trouble. This is costly in terms of failure of loans or
investments, which inevitably entails a loss of funds that could have been allocated
more eﬃciently.
Supervision and monetary policy
The potential conflict between monetary policy and supervision arises when su-
pervisory information impacts monetary policy so that decisions defy (or follow)
what is commanded by economic conditions and favor (or disfavor) bank balances.
Such a conflict becomes apparent, e.g. when monetary policy needs to be tightened,
but bank balances are weak. However, the financial condition of bank balances will
mostly deteriorate during times of economic distress. While an independent FSA
will then put extra pressure on banks to improve their solvency (procyclical behav-
ior), the central bank will ease monetary policy by injecting funds into the economy
(countercyclical behavior) (Ioannidou, 2005). A unified regulator may therefore be-
have diﬀerently to bank stress due to these conflicts.
On the other hand, when the central bank has an external monetary objec-
tive such as an exchange rate target, its policy may harm individual bank stability
(Goodhart, 2000). This is clearly the case when monetary policy is used to hold
depreciation pressure at bay by increasing interest rates. Indeed, this characterizes
much of the CBR’s policy in the post-1998 crisis period, when ruble depreciation
against the USD forced the CBR to keep interest rates high. More recently, high
oil prices and a declining USD led to ruble appreciation, and motivated the Russian
12See e.g. the data on loans in Tompson (2004) and Chowdhury (2003).
13 In general, these papers do not consider the conflicts of interest arising from assuming all
three functions of a supervisory authority (LLR, deposit insurer and closure authority). To look
at the conflict-of-interest problem, one needs to define which aspect of policy holds top priority
for the central bank — something that is not always immediately apparent. Only when the relative
importance of diﬀerent functions is defined can one interpret or build an appropriate utility function.
Obviously, priorities can also shift over time.
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government in April 2004 to impose a limit on the appreciation of the real eﬀective
exchange rate. With an appreciating currency, interest rates can be lowered, even
if internal inflationary pressures suggest a higher rate is necessary. Such a stance
helps banks without endangering their individual stability.
If monetary policy transmission is assumed to work through the bank channel,
the conflicts that arise will be more acute. Particularly in the case where bank loan
portfolios are characterized by a massive maturity mismatch, so that any increase
in interest rates negatively impacts bank profitability. On the other hand, when
banks are mainly financed with retail deposits, conflicts are less likely since these
interest rates are unlikely to follow large short-term swings in the money market.
The potential conflict between supervision and monetary policy therefore depends
on the structure of the banking system. Russian bank portfolios are characterized
by their short-term nature in both assets and liabilities (see e.g. Chowdhury, 2003).
Although the term structure of loans to the private sector is gradually lengthening,
short-term loans must often be rolled over because of the lack of long-term funding.14
Despite the low level of long-term loans, the inability of Russian banks to attract
long-term liabilities generates a maturity mismatch that makes the sector vulnerable
to interest rate changes.
Next to the conflicting objectives of exchange rate stability and low inflation, the
combination of supervisory powers and monetary policy may change expectations
with respect to the stance of monetary policy, which in turn impacts how banks
behave. Combining the tasks of supervision and monetary policy may of course
have its advantages and can be used to maintain financial stability. CBR concerns
about financial stability may explain why it has resorted to regulatory forbearance
in its supervisory function. When banking market stability becomes a target on its
own, this should be visible in the CBR’s conduct of monetary policy. We empirically
investigate this notion in section 3.
Lessons for the CBR
The theoretical literature on regulatory structure has to be interpreted carefully
in the developing market cases such as Russia. The quality of published information
is often quite poor and the legal system may be too weak to coordinate the various
functions of the central bank and the supervisor. When accounting rules are inad-
equate and give rise to window-dressing and creative accounting, regulations may
turn out to be meaningless and supervision void altogether, no matter where it is
14This is because all deposits, regardless of their maturity, are demand deposits by law. The CBR
is looking into a law that would make term deposits possible (Tompson, 2004).
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done. In such a situation, one needs to assess how supervision can be rendered ef-
fective before addressing the optimal allocation of regulatory powers. Given the low
enforcement of prudential regulation in Russia, one can arguably defend keeping a
FSA in-house the CBR. However, when supervisory information adequately reflects
banking sector health, a central bank can use this information to carry out its mon-
etary policy decisions and to optimally balance its act as a LLR. The supervisory
authority can therefore be delegated to an outside oﬃce which is less prone to po-
litical pressure nor suﬀers from an inherent inconsistency in its objective function,
while allowing the central bank access to this information. This should improve
diﬃculties in enforcement and allow a central bank to preserve financial stability. In
a fragile banking system, this may be one of the central bank’s primary concerns.
In Russia, however, it might turn out that the CBR is more concerned with the
stability of state-owned banks.
Empirical assessment of inconsistencies
To date, empirical assessments of the possible costs of improperly designing a
central bank’s powers or functions are fairly limited. The main questions that need
to be addressed are:
1. Does the current design lead to regulatory forbearance?
2. Does regulatory forbearance lead to increased risk-taking by banks?
3. What are the benefits of “in-house” supervisory information for LLR functions?
4. How does “in-house” supervisory information benefit monetary policy?
Claeys et al. (2005a) empirically investigate how well the CBR enforced its pru-
dential regulations and provide evidence of a significant degree of regulatory forbear-
ance (see chapter 2). Claeys et al. (2005b) investigate theoretically and empirically
how the interplay between a repressive form of monetary policy and supervision can
negatively impact risk behavior of Russian banks (see chapter 3). Goodhart and
Schoenmaker (1995) analyze whether supervision should be separated from mone-
tary policy through the investigation of bank failures under diﬀerent regimes. Their
empirical evidence suggests that a system of combined arrangement experiences sig-
nificant fewer failures compared to a separate arrangement (although the question
remains as whether such a system is more eﬃcient). Di Noia and Di Giorgio (1999)
find that inflation rates are higher and more volatile in countries where supervisory
functions are housed entirely inside the central bank. Ioannidou (2005) finds that
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the monetary policy responsibilities of the Federal Reserve alter its bank supervisory
behavior. Specifically, the Federal Reserve tends to be less strict in supervision when
monetary policy is strenghtened. Peek et al. (1999) investigate the role of supervi-
sion in central banking for the United States. Their results indicate that while in-
flation and unemployment forecasts can be improved using supervisory information,
the latter does not aﬀect the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy through staﬀ fore-
casts. Supervisory information does, however, significantly influence the monetary
decisions made through voting behavior by members of the Federal Open Market
Committee. This chapter follows a similar approach and addresses the question of
whether supervisory information significantly influences the conduct of monetary
policy in Russia. Since the CBR does not report any inflation or unemployment
forecasts nor publishes any decision discussions or votes of members of its mone-
tary board, we only investigate whether supervisory information contributes to the
understanding of observed monetary policy behavior in Russia.
1.3 Is supervision central to the Central Bank of Rus-
sia?
This section provides a preliminary and necessarily limited empirical answer to the
question of whether prudential supervision is useful for the conduct of monetary
policy in the Russian Federation. Does “hands-on” supervisory information guide
monetary policy decisions of the Russian central bank? Does supervisory information
add significantly to our understanding of central bank behavior by improving the
performance of benchmark rules based on this wider information set?
A simple Taylor rule can often be used as a benchmark to assess the monetary
policy decisions made by the central bank.15 In the first step, we analyze whether
the policy of the CBR can be described adequately using modified versions of the
original Taylor rule. In the second step, we investigate whether banking system sta-
bility is an explicit target of monetary policy by including supervisory information
in the benchmark policy rule. For this purpose, we assume that the central bank ob-
serves current and past inflation, interest rates, actual and potential output and the
exchange rate. We assess how this information aﬀects the forward-looking behavior
of the central bank.16 The CBR additionally has access to supervisory information,
15This has been extensively documented for the US and later Germany and the Euro Area. See
e.g. Clarida and Gertler (1996), Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998), Rudebusch and Svensson (1998)
and Peersman and Smets (1999).
16Assuming forward-looking behavior on the part of the CBR may be overdoing it for some parts
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available to the public only with a lag.
1.3.1 A Taylor rule tailored to the CBR
Methodology
Given that the CBR has an explicit exchange rate stability objective, we apply
an open economy version of the Taylor rule.17 Based on Taylor’s original rule (1993)
and interest rate smoothing, we assume that the following equation describes central
bank behavior in the Russian Federation:
it = (1− λ) · i0t + λ · it−1 + νt, (1.1)
i0t = i
∗ + γ1 · [Et {πt+n}− π∗] + γ2 · [Et {yt − y∗t }] + γ3 · et, (1.2)
in which it is the central bank’s instrument rate and i∗ is the long-term nominal
equilibrium interest rate, consistent with the inflation target π∗. Et {πt+n} is the
expected annual inflation rate for the period between t and t+n, conditional upon the
information set available at time t, yt (y∗t ) is the log of monthly (potential) GDP
18
and et is the log of the monthly real eﬀective exchange rate.19 Following Clarida and
Gertler (1996) and Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998), i0t is the central bank’s target
rate which reacts to changes in expected inflation,20 the output gap and the eﬀective
exchange rate. νt can be interpreted as a shock parameter which prevents the CBR
from setting the rate according to the rule or as a deliberate policy shock by the
CBR which wants to deviate from the rule. According to equation (1.1), we assume
that each month the central bank sets the interest rate as a convex combination of
the target rate and the lagged interest rate to capture how the actual rate partially
adjusts towards the target.
of the estimation sample. We characterize monetary policy as if the CBR was forward-looking in
its policies throughout the entire sample period.
17 In 2003, the real exchange rate became one of the main targets of monetary policy. Since then,
the CBR has set upper limits for real eﬀective exchange rate appreciation and announced it will
oﬀset any real appreciation of the ruble (CBR Annual Reports).
18We obtain a monthly series of the real GDP index by extrapolating the quarterly index of
real GDP (Goskomstat) and using monthly observations of industrial production (Goskomstat) and
unemployment (Rosstat) as indicators. We apply an adapted version of the procedure developed in
Chow and Lin (1971) to obtain the extrapolated series.
19We use the real eﬀective exchange rate, but investigate the impact of changes in the nominal
eﬀective exchange rate as well.
20This is a generalization of the original rule first proposed by Taylor (1993), whereby the central
bank responds to lagged inflation rather than to expected inflation. Clarida et al. (1998) argue that
an advantage of this specification is that it implicitly reflects the reality of policymaking, namely
that a central bank takes into account the broadest set of information available.
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For estimation purposes, equation (1.1) is rewritten as follows:
it = (1− λ) · [γ0 + γ1 · πt+n + γ2 · (yt − y∗t ) + γ3 · et] + λ · it−1 + µt, (1.3)
in which µt = − (1− λ) [γ1 (πt+n −Et {πt+n}) + γ2 (yt − y∗t −Et {yt − y∗t })] + νt,
γ0 = i
∗ − γ1 · π∗. Given that µt is a linear combination of forecast errors, it is
orthogonal to all variables known by the CBR at time t when setting the interest
rate. Further assume that ivt is a vector of variables within the central bank’s
information set such that Et [µt|ivt] = 0 holds.
Monetary policy in Russia
We use monthly data for the period (1996:01—2005:08). We assume that the
CBR’s monetary policy stance is reflected in movements of the money market rate.
Figure 1.1 graphs the CBR’s refinancing rate together with movements in the money
market rate. The money market rate almost always falls below the refinancing rate
set by the CBR (with the exception of 1997:12 and 1998:9—1998:10). After the 1998
crisis, the gap is gradually reduced. The money market rate may not perfectly reflect
monetary policy as intended by the CBR but we consider it the best reflection of
the monetary policy stance.21
We follow a number of natural steps to derive our baseline specification. We
use the annual monthly inflation rate for consumer prices as the CBR’s inflation
target (adapted from Goskomstat) and assume that the CBR is concerned with the
one-year ahead inflation rate, n = 12, rather than the month-to-month variation
in inflation.22 We include several measures for the output gap. First, we use a
Hodrick-Prescott smoothing filter to detrend GDP in order to obtain an estimate of
potential GDP, y∗t . Second, we regress monthly GDP on a linear trend to obtain an
estimate of the long-term trend component y∗t . Third, we obtain a measure for the
output gap by detrending monthly GDP using a quadratic trend (following Clarida
et al., 1998). Table 1.1 shows the estimation results for (1.3) when using the log
diﬀerence of the real eﬀective exchange rate as the CBR’s external monetary policy
target. The first three lines show the estimation results when using an extrapolated
monthly GDP series to construct the output gap. Because we use an extrapolated
GDP series to subsequently estimate the output gap, our coeﬃcient estimates for γ2
21Others have estimated monetary policy rules for the CBR for several subperiods assuming
alternative instruments. See e.g. Esanov et al. (2005).
22We use data up to 2005:08 for this purpose. The CBR started reporting target rates for inflation
from 1997, when the shift to a form of inflation targeting oﬃcially started (see CBR annual reports).
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Figure 1.1: Refinancing rate and money market rate, percentage (1996:1—2005:8).
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics.
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may be biased. In the last three lines of Table 1.1, we therefore show the estimation
results when monthly observations of industrial production are used to construct an
approximation of the output gap.
Because of a possible endogeneity bias,23 we use a (non-linear) GMM estimation
procedure to estimate the coeﬃcients. Although this estimation method is standard
procedure for estimating Taylor rules and establishing causal relations in monetary
policy (see Clarida and Gertler (1996) and Clarida et al. (1998), Peersman and
Smets (1999)), it has not received the appropriate attention by Esanov et al. (2005)
or others authors referenced in that study that estimate Taylor rules for Russia. The
non-linear estimator also allows for a correct interpretation of the CBR’s smoothing
behavior with respect to lagged interest rates and the elasticities of the target rate
with respect to the diﬀerent targets.
23The CBR may react to changes in inflation and output by adjusting the interest rate, which
may in turn impact how these variables behave.
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Table 1.1: CBR reaction functions: Forward-looking Taylor rules using diﬀerent
measures for the output gap.
λ γ0 γ1 γ2 γ3
GDP
Hodrick-Prescott (14400) 0.43 0.41 0.53 -0.58 -0.84
0.01 0.40 0.02 0.09 0.06
Linear Trend 0.41 0.50 0.50 -0.58 -0.92
0.01 0.25 0.02 0.03 0.03
Quadratic Trend 0.44 0.45 0.54 -0.25 -0.91
0.01 0.38 0.02 0.05 0.07
Industrial Production
Hodrick-Prescott (14400) 0.43 0.52 0.53 -0.47 -0.90
0.01 0.38 0.02 0.07 0.06
Linear Trend 0.42 0.66 0.51 -0.40 -0.98
0.01 0.37 0.02 0.04 0.05
Quadratic Trend 0.43 1.17 0.51 -0.37 -0.90
0.01 0.38 0.02 0.04 0.05
Estimated equation:
it = (1− λ) · [γ0 + γ1 · πt+n + γ2 · (yt − y∗t ) + γ3 ·∆et] + λ · it−1 + µt
Note: The dependent variable is the monthly average of the daily money market rate (IFS). We ob-
tained a monthly series for GDP by extrapolating the quarterly index of real GDP (Goskomstat),
using monthly observations of industrial production (Goskomstat) and unemployment (Rosstat)
as indicators, following the procedure developed in Chow and Lin (1971). The estimates are ob-
tained by GMM estimation. The optimal weighting matrix was obtained from first step two-stage
least squares parameter estimates. For each element z in the instrument set ivt we include lags:
zt−1, ..., zt−12. The instrument set ivt includes lagged values of inflation, output gap, exchange
rate, federal funds rate and money market rate. Using a J-statistic, we can never reject the null hy-
pothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are satisfied. All equations include a dummy variable
that accounts for the August 1998 crisis. The sample period is 1996:01 - 2005:8. The number of
observations in the estimation sample is 81. Standard errors are reported in italics. Bold numbers
indicate significance at the 1 percent level.
The results in Table 1.1 are based on monthly data (1996:01—2005:08).24 The
coeﬃcients for the output gap are always found to be negative and significant, what
would indicate that the CBR displays pro-cyclical interest rate behavior. These
24Both inflation and interest rates are I(0). DF tests of the null of I(1) or non-stationarity are
always rejected.
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results are corroborated when using diﬀerent estimates for the output gap, either
based on GDP or industrial production. Because the CBR has started to publish
target rates for GDP growth in 1997, this seems very unlikely. The CBR may
however be more concerned with deviations of real GDP growth from the potential
growth rate. Therefore, in stead of including the output gap as a monetary policy
target, we include the deviation of annual real GDP growth from the annual growth
rate of potential GDP as a target in our regressions, ∆12yt−∆12y∗t . Table 1.2 shows
the results, again for diﬀerent estimates of the output gap based on either GDP
or industrial production. The coeﬃcient estimates for γ2 are now always positive,
at least for output gap growth using monthly GDP data. The CBR will increase
the target interest rate by 7 to 14 basispoints following a 1 percent increase in real
GDP output gap growth. The results can only be corroborated for the growth in
the output gap when industrial production is detrended using a quadratic trend.
In what follows, we retain the specification for estimating γ2 that uses a quadratic
trend to detrend monthly GDP.
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Table 1.2: CBR reaction functions: Forward-looking Taylor rules using diﬀerent
measures for output gap growth.
λ γ0 γ1 γ2 γ3
GDP
Hodrick-Prescott 0.47 0.12 0.55 0.13 -1.05
0.01 0.28 0.02 0.02 0.09
Linear Trend 0.46 0.02 0.55 0.07 -1.05
0.01 0.30 0.02 0.02 0.08
Quadratic Trend 0.47 0.07 0.55 0.14 -1.08
0.01 0.28 0.02 0.03 0.09
Industrial Production
Hodrick-Prescott 0.45 0.49 0.53 -0.05 -1.09
0.01 0.32 0.02 0.02 0.05
Linear Trend 0.46 0.54 0.53 -0.03 -1.09
0.01 0.33 0.02 0.02 0.06
Quadratic Trend 0.46 0.30 0.54 0.03 -1.11
0.01 0.30 0.02 0.01 0.07
Estimated equation:
it = (1− λ) · [γ0 + γ1 · πt+n + γ2 · (∆12yt −∆12y∗t ) + γ3 ·∆et] + λ · it−1 + µt
Note: The dependent variable is the monthly average of the daily money market rate (IFS). We ob-
tained a monthly series for GDP by extrapolating the quarterly index of real GDP (Goskomstat),
using monthly observations of industrial production (Goskomstat) and unemployment (Rosstat)
as indicators, following the procedure developed in Chow and Lin (1971). The estimates are ob-
tained by GMM estimation. The optimal weighting matrix was obtained from first step two-stage
least squares parameter estimates. For each element z in the instrument set ivt we include lags:
zt−1, ..., zt−12. The instrument set ivt includes lagged values of inflation, output gap, exchange
rate, federal funds rate and money market rate. Using a J-statistic, we can never reject the null hy-
pothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are satisfied. All equations include a dummy variable
that accounts for the August 1998 crisis. The sample period is 1996:01 - 2005:8. The number of
observations in the estimation sample is 81. Standard errors are reported in italics. Bold numbers
indicate significance at the 1 percent level.
Next, we assess the CBR’s exchange rate stability objective by including diﬀer-
ent measures for the exchange rate target. Since 2003, the CBR has set maximum
appreciation rates for the real eﬀective exchange rate (REER). Figure 1.2 shows the
evolution of the REER. In August 1998, the CBR had to devalue the ruble and aban-
doned its crawling peg policy with respect to the Rb/USD exchange rate, following
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Figure 1.2: Monthly log of the real eﬀective exchange rate of the ruble (1996:1—
2005:8). Source: IMF International Financial Statistics.
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speculative attacks and the Russian government’s default on its treasury bills. Be-
cause of increasing oil prices, the CBR started to put more weight on retaining the
currency from further appreciating and set upper limits to real appreciation (Esanov
et al., 2005).
First, we include the log of the real eﬀective exchange rate. The coeﬃcient γ3
then indicates whether the CBR reacts to deviations of the long-run, steady-state
values of the REER. Second, we allow for somewhat more complex dynamics, by
including both the current and the one-period lagged log of the REER. A higher
than normal exchange rate would lead the CBR to relax monetary policy by lowering
the short-term interest rate today (γ3 < 0), but partially oﬀset its initial reaction
in the next period (γ4 > 0; |γ3| > |γ4|) (Taylor, 2001). The results in Table 1.3
however indicate that the CBR does not react to exchange rate deviations from the
target rate (line 1) but rather adjusts the short-term interest rate following changes
in the REER. Indeed, the coeﬃcient estimates in line 2 indicate that γ3 < 0 and
γ3 ≈ −γ4, such that the inclusion of the log diﬀerence in the REER in line 3 as a
target seems more appropriate. A 1 percent appreciation of the REER induces a
1.08 percent reduction in the CBR’s target rate (1.08*0.47 percent reduction in the
money market rate). Moreover, the high coeﬃcient estimates for γ0 in lines 1 and
2 suggest that there is some misspecification when not including the change in the
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REER. The estimation results presented in lines 4 to 6 in Table 1.3 corroborate these
results for the nominal eﬀective exchange rate. Our baseline estimation is therefore
shown in line 3 in Table 1.3. First, the estimates for the smoothing parameter,
λ, indicate that the CBR attaches a relatively high weight to the target rate, and
therefore smooths its interest rate decisions less gradually compared to what is found
in the literature for other countries. Specifically, a 1 percent increase in the target
rate leads to a 53 basispoint increase in the money market rate, but increases the
next periods interest rate with only 47 basispoints compared to over 90 basispoints in
e.g. the US and Germany in 1979-1993 (Clarida et al., 1998). The coeﬃcient on the
inflation gap, γ1, indicates that a 1 percent rise in one year ahead expected inflation
will induce the CBR to raise nominal interest rates by 55 basis points. The CBR
does not seem to succeed in raising real rates in response to inflationary pressures.25
Taken together, the estimates for the inflation gap, γ1, and the change in the REER,
γ3, indicate that the CBR prefers not to let its currency appreciate, even at the cost
of not meeting its inflation target. Figure 1.3 plots the actual money market rate
versus the implied target rate for the baseline equation.
25This is because γ1 is not significantly larger than 1. This is consistent with the findings in
Esanov et al. (2005).
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Table 1.3: CBR reaction functions: Forward-looking Taylor rules using diﬀerent
exchange rate targets.
λ γ0 γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4
Real eﬀective exchange rate
(1) 0.49 2.48 0.56 0.08 -0.01
0.01 3.41 0.02 0.02 0.01
(2) 0.46 7.87 0.55 0.11 -1.08 1.07
0.01 4.82 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.09
(3) 0.47 0.07 0.55 0.14 -1.08
0.01 0.28 0.02 0.03 0.09
Nominal eﬀective exchange rate
(1) 0.49 7.00 0.59 0.08 -0.02
0.01 5.04 0.02 0.02 0.01
(2) 0.49 -37.88 0.43 0.34 -0.75 0.83
0.01 6.38 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.10
(3) 0.47 -1.05 0.57 0.23 -0.72
0.01 0.31 0.02 0.03 0.08
Estimated equation:
(1)
it = (1− λ) · [γ0 + γ1 · πt+n + γ2 · (∆12yt −∆12y∗t ) + γ3 · et] + λ · it−1 + µt
(2)
it = (1− λ) · [γ0 + γ1 · πt+n + γ2 · (∆12yt −∆12y∗t ) + γ3 · et + γ4 · et−1] + λ · it−1 + µt
(3)
it = (1− λ) · [γ0 + γ1 · πt+n + γ2 · (∆12yt −∆12y∗t ) + γ3 ·∆et] + λ · it−1 + µt
Note: The dependent variable is the monthly average of the daily money market rate (IFS). We ob-
tained a monthly series for GDP by extrapolating the quarterly index of real GDP (Goskomstat),
using monthly observations of industrial production (Goskomstat) and unemployment (Rosstat)
as indicators, following the procedure developed in Chow and Lin (1971). The estimates are ob-
tained by GMM estimation. The optimal weighting matrix was obtained from first step two-stage
least squares parameter estimates. For each element z in the instrument set ivt we include lags:
zt−1, ..., zt−12. The instrument set ivt includes lagged values of inflation, output gap, exchange
rate, federal funds rate and money market rate. Using a J-statistic, we can never reject the null hy-
pothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are satisfied. All equations include a dummy variable
that accounts for the August 1998 crisis. The sample period is 1996:01 - 2005:8. The number of
observations in the estimation sample is 81. Standard errors are reported in italics. Bold numbers
indicate significance at the 1 percent level.
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Figure 1.3: Target rate (γ0 + γ1 · πt+n + γ2 · (∆12yt − ∆12y∗t ) + γ3 · ∆eet) versus
actual money market interest rate, percentage (1996:1 - 2004:08).
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1.3.2 Bank supervision and monetary policy
To capture the CBR’s prior knowledge of individual bank health acquired through
supervision, we construct several monthly aggregate “bank sector indices” (BSI) that
reflect the banking sector’s health. We assume that in each month t, the CBR uses
the widest information set possible to gauge individual and aggregate bank health.
Figure 1.4 illustrates the sequence of information arrival at the CBR.
At the beginning of each month t, the CBR observes financial information of all
banks at time t0 which reflects balance sheet and income statement information for
the previous month t−1. At the end of each month t, at time te, the number of bank
failures for month t is known. At time te all information from month t can be used
to calculate an individual bank’s failure probability. Based on the estimation results
of an aggregate failure prediction model we obtain:26
1. an aggregate coeﬃcient vector, βˆ, which we use to construct
2. bank-specific failure probabilities, pˆi,t (predicted failure probabilities scaled
between 0 and 100), which reflect each bank i’s failure probability at time t,
based on financial information FI of month t−1 observed at t0.
26More detailed information on the estimation results for the failure prediction model is presented
in appendix 1.A.
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Figure 1.4: Sequence of information arrival at the CBR.
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To obtain an aggregate bank “stress” indicator, we first construct an unweighted
average of the bank-specific failure probabilities:
Pt =
1
It
ItP
i
pˆi,t, (1.4)
in which It is the number of banks still operative in month t. Higher levels of
Pt will indicate higher average vulnerability of the banking sector. Of course, it
is unlikely that the CBR would take such an average at face value in assessing the
banking sector’s health. More likely, we surmise that the CBR considers the size and
interbank linkages of banks most likely to fail. We therefore construct an aggregate
indicator that takes into account the CBR’s concern over those banks that are most
likely to fail and represent some sort of systemic threat in the event of their failure.
Banks that represent a large share of the banking market’s total assets may be
very costly to close down, and therefore receive most attention by the CBR when
assessing the banking’s sector aggregate health. Assume that the CBR focuses on
the cumulative market share of bank assets held by banks most likely to fail and
define:
BSIt =
∀i∈BADi,tP
i
MSi,t ∗
pˆi,t
100
, (1.5)
in which BADi,t =
©
i|pˆi,t > 90th percentile of pˆt
ª
, pˆt = {pˆ1,t, pˆ2,t, ..., pˆIt,t} and
MSi,t is the market share of bank i in month t in total bank assets. BSIt then
captures the cumulative market share of the 10 percent of banks most likely to fail.
When the CBR uses this information in the conduct of monetary policy, higher values
for BSIt are expected to lead to lower interest rates to ease bank balances. Similarly,
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the CBR may attach greater importance to banks that are active on the interbank
market or represent a large market share of deposits. We therefore include three
indices in which MSi,t either reflects market shares in total bank assets, interbank
liabilities or deposits. Finally, we include a measure that only evaluates the aggregate
failure probability of the state-owned banks (SOBs): Sberbank, Vneshtorgbank and
Vnesheconombank, and their regional branches:
SOBt =
1
St
StP
i
pˆi,t ∗ S,
in which S is a dummy variable that is one if a bank is state-owned, zero otherwise,
and St is the number of SOBs operating in month t.
To test the hypothesis that the CBR is using supervisory information in its
conduct of monetary policy, we include another target variable, BSI, with coeﬃcient
γ4 in our regressions. Table 1.4 presents the results for the benchmark Taylor rule
when including supervisory information through diﬀerent measures of poor bank
health, and adds an extra line that only takes into account the SOBs’ average failure
probability (as opposed to overall banking sector vulnerability). Line 1 reproduces
the baseline estimation that includes the output gap growth rate and the monthly
change in the real eﬀective exchange rate. Lines 2 to 4 present the results when
aggregate bank health is proxied by the cumulative market share of banks most likely
to fail. The results indicate that a rise in BSI through increased asset shares of the
most troubled banks significantly reduces the money market rate. Specifically, if the
market share held by the 10 percent most vulnerable banks increases by 1 percent,
this leads to a monetary easing of 1.14 percent through the CBR’s target rate. This
suggests that a deterioration in bank health of those banks with systemic importance
(in terms of assets or regional coverage) results in an easing of monetary policy by
the CBR. This is in line with the results of Peek et al. (1999) for the US Federal
Reserve. However, the results for interbank liability and deposit shares in lines 3 and
4 seem to suggest otherwise. A worsening of bank health in these regressions leads
to no change or even a strengthening of monetary policy. Nonetheless, when only
including the SOB’s average health (see line 5 in Table 1.4), the results indicate that
the CBR puts particular emphasis on SOBs’ balance health and thereby impacts
monetary policy. If the average failure probability of SOBs increases by 1 percent,
the CBR reduces the target rate with 11 percent.
The empirical evidence presented shows indications that monetary policy has
been eased somewhat to favor bank balances solely to accommodate sizeable banks
and state-owned banks with high failure probabilities. The results for the other
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measures capturing commercial bank health suggest that the CBR is otherwise not
particularly prone to ease monetary policy to promote banking sector stability.
Table 1.4: CBR reaction functions: The role of supervisory information in monetary
policy.
λ γ0 γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4
Baseline1 0.47 0.07 0.55 0.14 -1.08
0.01 0.28 0.02 0.03 0.09
Including:
BSI
assets 0.47 0.79 0.63 0.25 -1.05 -1.14
0.01 0.25 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.16
interbank liabilities 0.46 0.75 0.55 0.09 -1.07 -0.35
0.01 0.24 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.24
deposits 0.45 0.02 0.48 0.02 -1.02 1.62
0.01 0.25 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.20
SOB 0.48 1.62 0.58 0.26 -1.05 -11.82
0.01 0.33 0.02 0.04 0.07 2.56
Estimated equation:
it = (1− λ) · [γ0 + γ1 · πt+n + γ2 · (∆12yt −∆12y∗t ) + γ3 ·∆et + γ4 ·BSIt]
+λ · it−1 + µt
1The baseline specification includes: 12 month ahead annual inflation rates; the growth rate of the
output gap, estimated by detrending monthly GDP using a quadratic trend; and the log diﬀerence
of the monthly real eﬀective exchange rate.
Note: The dependent variable is the monthly average of the daily money market rate (IFS). We ob-
tained a monthly series for GDP by extrapolating the quarterly index of real GDP (Goskomstat),
using monthly observations of industrial production (Goskomstat) and unemployment (Rosstat)
as indicators, following the procedure developed in Chow and Lin (1971). The estimates are ob-
tained by GMM estimation. The optimal weighting matrix was obtained from first step two-stage
least squares parameter estimates. For each element z in the instrument set ivt we include lags:
zt−1, ..., zt−12. The instrument set ivt includes lagged values of inflation, output gap, exchange
rate, federal funds rate and money market rate. Using a J-statistic, we can never reject the null hy-
pothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are satisfied. All equations include a dummy variable
that accounts for the August 1998 crisis. The sample period is 1996:11 - 2003:8. The number of
observations in the estimation sample is 68. Standard errors are reported in italics. Bold numbers
indicate significance at the 1 percent level.
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1.3.3 Extensions for future research
In all estimations, we assume that the CBR’s monetary policy can be best under-
stood via forward-looking versions of the Taylor rule using ex post realized values
for inflation rather than inflation forecasts. One alternative procedure adds forward-
looking measures of inflation directly into the equation. Here, one could use actual
forecasts rather than assuming (less realistically) rational expectations on behalf of
the CBR. Inflation forecasts can be generated under the assumption that the CBR
uses the widest information set available by estimating a macroeconomic model of
the Russian economy through e.g. SVAR analysis. Identification of the empirical
model, however, requires imposing restrictions on the dynamic behavior of structural
shocks. Furthermore, the reliability of the SVAR analysis hinges upon the absence
of structural breaks and relative long data availability — two conditions hardly met
by Russia at this time. Thus, an intriguing question remains: How useful would
supervisory information be to the CBR if it were to use inflation forecasts?
1.4 Concluding Remarks
The empirical results in this chapter suggest that although supervisory information
may be useful for monetary policy behavior, it only marginally improves our un-
derstanding of what determines monetary policy in Russia. Do these results help
answer the question of where supervision eﬀorts should be directed? And more
importantly, even when supervision can potentially contribute to monetary policy,
how successful has the CBR been in maintaining financial stability through its use
of supervisory information in the conduct of monetary policy? The CBR has mainly
pursued an exchange rate stability target — to the detriment rather than improve-
ment of bank balances — and has only recently started to target inflation seriously.
Using a simple Taylor rule framework, we found indications that the CBR uses its
“hands-on” supervisory information to maintain overall financial stability, and to
accommodate state-owned banks’ balances. The evidence indicates that the CBR
essentially caters to the needs of larger banks (particularly regionally important and
state-owned banks), revealing a conflict within the CBR’s objective function. More-
over, despite privatization commitments, state shareholdings in the banking sector
rose after the 1998 crisis and the decision to privatize Sberbank and Vneshtorgbank
was postponed until 2007. In addition, low enforcement of prudential regulation
and the CBR’s inability to maintain banking system stability (e.g. the 1998 finan-
cial crisis and deposit runs in the summer of 2004) call into question the rationale
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for keeping supervision “in-house” at the CBR.
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1.A Constructing an aggregate Russian Bank Sector In-
dex (BSI)
We estimate a failure probability model to identify a set of variables (with their
respective weights) that capture the financial soundness of banks. The US Federal
Reserve determines a CAMEL rating for banks as part of its early warning system
to reflect the degree of individual bank health. CAMEL ratings are based upon
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Figure 1.5: Monthly number of failures (license withdrawals) within the sample
(1995:11-2003:8). Source: Mobile and CBR.
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a set of variables that reflect a bank’s Capital adequacy, Asset quality, general
Management and governance, Earnings and Liquidity management. Based on the
monthly Mobile database for the period 1995:11—2003:8, we construct a number
of variables that reflect the CAMEL rating categories as closely as possible. Our
choice of variables is, however, restricted due to the need for monthly frequency and
subsequent availability of the data. The variables which are included for estimating
the failure probability model using logit estimation are described in Table 1.5. The
dependent variable in the logit regression is a dummy variable, failure, which equals
one if a bank’s license is revoked before 2003:8, and zero otherwise. Because there
can be a significant lag between economic failure and regulatory failure (following
the CBR’s de-licensing behavior),27 we restrict the estimation sample to banks which
have positive equity and a non-working assets ratio below 100 percent. We further
assume, after estimation, that those banks which have negative capital have a failure
probability of 0.99. Summary statistics of the variables in the estimation sample are
presented in Table 1.6 for private and state-owned banks (SOBs) separately. Next to
CAMEL related variables, we also include a market share and concentration measure
in the specification. Figure 1.5 plots the monthly number of failures included in the
estimation sample.
27Licenses were often not withdrawn until the banks were already illiquid and stripped of assets
(Schoors, 1999).
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The variable set should be based on the widest information set available to the
CBR as well as capture the CBR’s private knowledge of bank health compared to
public awareness. One drawback of the current variable set is that it cannot appro-
priately account for qualitative measures such as the management and governance
policy of a bank (information which is typically obtainable in conjunction with on-
site examinations by the supervisory authority). Unfortunately, since the CBR does
not publish bank ratings, we cannot extract this private information. Because we
estimate the weights based on the whole period for which we observe the variables
(1995:11 - 2003:8), we implicitly assume that the CBR does not only have prior infor-
mation compared to the public, but also has forward-looking information on banks’
balances. The estimation results for the logit model are summarized in Table 1.7.28
The coeﬃcients of the model are used as weights to predict monthly, bank-specific,
failure probabilities and are assumed to reflect individual bank health based on the
CBR’s knowledge at the end of each month.
Table 1.5: Description of variables used for the logit model1.
Capital/assets The capital-to-assets ratio of bank i in month t (%).
Non-working assets/assets The ratio of non-working assets in total assets
of bank i in month t (%).
Return on assets The ratio of monthly net income to two-month
average of assets of bank i in month t (%).
Liquidity The ratio of liquid assets in total assets of bank i
in month t (%).
Non-government claims/assets The ratio of non-government securities in total
assets of bank i in month t (%).
Loans/assets The loans (to non-financial institutions)-to-assets
ratio of bank i in month t (%).
Size (log assets) The log of assets of bank i in month t.
Regional2 market share (assets) The regional market share in assets, calculated as the
ratio of bank i’s individual assets to the sum of bank
assets for region j in month t (between 0 and 100).
Regional2 Herfindahl (assets) The regional Herfindahl index, calculated as the
sum of squared regional market shares for each
region j in month t (between 0 and 10000).
1 Source: Own calculations based on Mobile database.
2 Note: We use 80 regions for the calculation of regional market shares.
28 In contrast to the default models for Russian banks estimated in Peresetsky et al. (2004),
we use the entire time series to estimate the weights for the calculation of individual bank failure
probability.
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Table 1.6: Summary statistics (percentage of total assets).
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
SOB Private SOB Private SOB Private SOB Private
Capital 22.40 28.63 17.49 19.29 0.04 0 94.95 99.60
Non-working assets 11.79 10.61 11.41 11.67 0 0 65.25 98.12
Net return on assets 0.06 0.07 1.03 1.95 -13.50 -46.38 14.95 141.34
Liquidity 16.14 19.94 14.63 17.73 0.02 0 89.51 99.71
Government securities 9.15 5.29 13.72 10.61 0 0 78.75 98.10
Loans 36.36 36.58 19.38 21.85 0.01 0 96.56 99.99
Size (log assets) 6.84 4.77 3.31 2.02 -1.12 -2.24 15.83 12.53
Regional market share 17.87 5.07 28.34 13.29 0 0 100 100
Regional Herfindahl index 3735 2900 2437 1889 241 241 10000 10000
Source: Own calculations based on Mobile database. Note: We use 80 regions for the calculation of regional
market shares. Number of observations for state-owned banks (SOBs) is 1,890. Number of observations
for private banks is 102,200. Sample period is 1995:11 - 2003:8.
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Table 1.7: Estimation Results for the Logit Model.
Coeﬃcient Odds Mean
Estimates Ratios Values
Capital to assets -0.0146*** 0.9855 28.52
[0.0030]
Non working assets to assets 0.0014 1.0014 10.63
[0.0034]
Net return to assets -0.0144*** 0.9857 0.07
[0.0052]
Liquid to total assets ratio -0.0551*** 0.9464 19.87
[0.0055]
Government securities to assets ratio -0.0342*** 0.9664 5.36
[0.0049]
Loans to assets -0.0093*** 0.9908 36.58
[0.0023]
Size (log assets) -0.2250*** 0.7985 4.81
[0.0337]
Regional market share in assets -0.0237*** 0.9766 5.31
[0.0079]
Regional Herfindahl index for assets -0.0001*** 0.9999 2915
[0.0000]
Constant 1.1710***
[0.2123]
Observations 104090
Number of banks 1770
Number of months 94
Pseudo R2 0.12
Wald chi2 326.36
P-Value 0
The dependent variable in the logit regression is a dummy variable, failure, which equals one if the
bank’s license was revoked before 2003:8 and zero otherwise. Sample period is 1995:11 - 2003:8.
The positive (negative) predictive value of the model is 60 percent (89 percent). 88 percent of the
observations are correctly classified. The logit estimations are performed over the pooled sample.
Robust standard errors are given in brackets (clustered on banks). *, ** and *** indicate significance
levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively.
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Chapter 2
Bank supervision Russian style:
Rules versus enforcement and
tacit objectives.1
2.1 Introduction
Considerable attention has been paid to the various roles of central banks — setter
of monetary policy, lender of last resort, banking supervisor, and maintainer of the
payments system and financial stability — and to the complementarities and conflicts
arising out of these multiple functions.2 In this chapter, we devote attention to the
conflict between systemic stability and individual bank stability, which are explicit
objectives for many central banks, and to the scope for regulatory forbearance that
may follow from it. To assure systemic stability, central banks typically take on the
role of lender of last resort. This comes at the cost of moral hazard by individual
banks. This problem can be mitigated through adequate prudential regulation and
control (see Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994), which in several countries is in the
hands of the central bank too. Bank supervision is meant to give individual banks
1An adapted version of this chapter appeared as: Claeys, Sophie, Gleb Lanine, and Koen Schoors
(2005), “Bank Supervision Russian Style: Rules versus Enforcement and Tacit Objectives,” BOFIT
Discussion Paper 10/2005, and William Davidson Institute Working Paper 778.
2Peek et al. (1999) conclude for example that the implementation of monetary policy may benefit
from information obtained by prudential supervision and control of the banking system. Reversely,
monetary policy responsibilities may alter bank supervisory behavior as found by Ioannidou (2005).
This finding has heated the debate as to whether bank supervision should be assigned to the central
bank or not (Di Noia and Di Giorgio, 1999). The possible conflicts arising from the coexistence of
lender-of-last-resort and deposit insurance functions have also been studied (e.g. Sleet and Smith,
2000; Repullo, 2000; Kahn and Santos, 2005).
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an incentive to take less risk and thereby alleviate the moral hazard of individual
banks that are confronted with a lender of last resort. Rule-based bank supervision
may however endanger systemic stability and draw the regulator to a policy of
regulatory forbearance. This could for example occur when the regulatory failure
of a large deposit bank threatens to aﬀect trust in the deposit market, giving rise
to contagion and inflating the risk of systemic instability. This inherent conflict
between individual and systemic bank stability is even present in central banks that
have neither systemic nor individual bank stability as explicit objectives3 — all central
banks need a stable banking system to be able to conduct eﬀective monetary policy
— and it may cause regulatory forbearance.
The economic literature often refers to this tension created by bank supervision
and lender-of-last-resort functions, yet there is no conclusive theory that explains
how these roles should be balanced.4 Central banks also have more obscure incentives
for regulatory forbearance. Boot and Thakor (1993) show that regulatory discretion
urges reputation-seeking regulators to show more-than-optimal forbearance, since
they want to leave their jobs with a clean slate. This tendency to résumé polishing
suggests that a rule-based prudential control might be better. Mailath and Mester
(1994), on the other hand, show that if regulators cannot commit themselves, tem-
porary forbearance may be the equilibrium outcome. In this vein, Acharya (1996)
finds that regulatory forbearance may be optimal if the dead-weight losses of closure
are important. Kane (2000) suggests that some banks may simply be too big to
discipline adequately (TBTDA), which can lead to undesired de facto forbearance.
Heinemann and Schüler (2004) analyze how there may be a problem of regulatory
capture (see also Laﬀont and Tirole, 1991) by specific interest groups, which implies
that the enforcement of prudential rules is not necessarily optimal for welfare even
3 In developed economies, bank supervision has tended in recent years to increasingly fall under
the auspices of a single authority without central bank involvement. Of course, it is not inconceivable
that this trend might reverse in the long run.
4The quaint Bagehot rule of 1873 (“lend freely to illiquid but solvent banks at a penalty rate”)
is still defended by many authors. Goodhart (1988, 1995) puts forward that liquidity should not be
denied to any bank a priori, since the diﬀerence between illiquidity and insolvency is sometimes hard
to discern. Goodhart and Huang (1999) propose that central banks should reduce the moral hazard
of individual banks by employing a policy of constructive ambiguity in the bail-out decision. Other
authors claim that softer policies will induce truthful reporting of asset quality and ultimately lead to
cheaper bank rescues and higher systemic stability (see Povel, 1996; Aghion et al., 1999). Cordella
and Yeyati (2003) claim that an ex ante central bank commitment to a bail-out contingent on
adverse macro-shocks is welfare-superior to a policy of constructive ambiguity. Freixas et al. (2000)
show that, when all banks are solvent, it is optimal for the central bank to prevent a speculative
gridlock in the payments system by guaranteeing the credit lines of all banks. They also show that
it may be optimal for the central bank to show forbearance towards money-center banks, which is
their interpretation of the too-big-to-fail hypothesis (see Wall and Peterson, 1990).
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in a situation of unthreatened systemic stability.
We look into the question of regulatory forbearance from an empirical angle by
analyzing one of the most intriguing cases of central banking in recent history —
Russia. The Central Bank of Russia (CBR) is a young central bank. Since its estab-
lishment in 1990, it was entrusted with the role of monetary policy, bank regulation,
and bank supervision. The CBR also plays a central role in the money circulation
and the payments system and has frequently acted as lender of last resort to secure
systemic stability.5 In our data window, the CBR was active as a commercial bank
through its giant subsidiaries, Sberbank and Vneshtorgbank. Hence, its objectives
and the potential conflicts arising among them are manifold. We specifically exam-
ine the CBR’s supervision of Russian commercial banks. The CBR both designs
the rules within the framework of the banking law and has sole authority to enforce
them. This arrangement, in principle, should prevent turf wars between competing
regulatory agencies. However, the design and enforcement of regulatory standards
may involve certain trade-oﬀs and conflicts that may lead to excessive regulatory
forbearance (Kahn and Santos, 2005). In April 1996, the CBR announced a set of
new and revised prudential regulations with which banks had to comply to maintain
their bank license. By setting bank standards, the CBR seeks to create incentives
for banks to eschew risk. However, such bank standards can only induce the desired
eﬀect on bank risk-taking if banks expect enforcement. Proper enforcement dictates
license withdrawal as the ultimate penalty for banks that repeatedly and severely
violate the rules. We refer to this as the regulatory failure of a bank. Regulatory
forbearance by the CBR would impair the credibility of its own bank standards,
resulting in soft legal constraints (see Perotti 2002).
We therefore empirically investigate two hypotheses: 1) is CBR de-licensing ac-
tivity is only driven by enforcement of its own prudential bank standards or also by
tacit objectives related to the systemic stability of the banking system and 2) do
conflicts between the enforcement of prudential bank standards and tacit systemic
stability objectives induce regulatory forbearance. We employ a quarterly panel of
Russian banks for the period 1999—2002 and relate license withdrawal to compliance
with bank standards and to tacit objectives of the CBR in the large domain of sys-
temic stability. Economic bank failure only enters our analysis as a control variable.
Controlling for economic failure, our results suggest that systemic stability objectives
skew the license withdrawal decision of the CBR and show regulatory forbearance
5 In the Banking Supervision Report of 2004, the CBR explicitly acknowledges that one of its
key objectives is to “maintain the stability of the Russian banking system and guarantee protection
of the interests of creditors and depositors”.
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for certain bank standards. More specifically, our results indicate regulatory for-
bearance by the CBR for large deposit banks (safeguarding depositor trust), banks
that are active on the interbank market (safeguarding interbank market stability),
and banks that operate in highly concentrated regional bank markets (safeguarding
minimal bank competition). Furthermore, the CBR will be less inclined to withdraw
individual bank licenses when there are ‘too many banks to fail’. Hence, we can
infer that the systemic stability objectives of the CBR conflict with its rule-based
bank supervision. Indeed, some of the tacit objectives even increase regulatory for-
bearance. The observed biases in the CBR’s de-licensing behavior are therefore best
understood as the result of conflicting objectives at the heart of the CBR rather
than as a case of pure regulatory discretion.6 This does not only shed light on the
behavior of the CBR, but more generally reveals that the conflict between individual
and systemic bank stability can induce regulatory forbearance.
The next section gives an overview of the Russian banking sector and the process
of bank creation and destruction in Russia during the last 15 years. Section 3 ex-
plains our empirical approach, focusing consecutively on the estimation methodology,
the data and the empirical hypotheses. In section 4, we estimate a panel logit model
and interpret the results. In section 5, we discuss a number of robustness checks.
Section 6 concludes.
2.2 The Russian banking sector in a nutshell
2.2.1 Problems of the Russian banking sector
The Russian commercial banking sector suﬀered from serious problems in its first
decade of existence. And even today, Russian commercial banks have yet to ade-
quately take up the role of intermediation between savings and investments.
Early in transition, banks clearly preferred speculation to lending (Schoors,
2001). Lending to the economy as a percentage of total banking assets sank year
after year until 1999 and has not spectacularly improved since then. In 2003, bank
assets reached only 42.1% of GDP and loans to the non-financial sector were still
just 17.0%. Bank credits financed as little as 4.8% of fixed investment in 2003.7
Yet this behavior appears quite rational in hindsight. Bank lending was depressed
by huge information asymmetries between banks and their prospective customers,
and by the lack of screening and monitoring skills in the banks themselves and the
6Malyutina and Parilova (2001) argue that the CBR bases its closure policy on discretion rather
than on its prudential regulations. We argue other “tacit” objectives are at stake.
7Data from the CBR Bulletin of Bank Statistics.
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economy at large. Banks were unable to identify good potential borrowers (Brana,
Maurel and Sgard, 1999), so they preferred not to lend at all. Moreover, the vast
amount of tiny banks and the lack of a transparent information system about credit
histories may also have depressed lending (Pyle, 2002).
The little lending that did take place was mainly to connected parties or to
the government (under various forms), as witnessed in the August 1998 crisis when
several large banks became illiquid and insolvent overnight after the government
defaulted on its treasury bills. The widespread connected lending is partly explained
by historical factors. The successors of the former specialized state banks were
reluctant to restructure and continued to lend passively to their owners (Schoors,
2003). Moreover, many of the newly founded private banks had been captured
by their dominant shareholders. Such “pocket banks” operated as treasuries for a
firm or a group of firms rather than independent banks; they preferred “putting
their money where their mouth is” to normal relationship lending. This made the
problem of connected lending or insider lending omnipresent in Russia. Most banks
now predominantly lend to connected agents, regardless of the viability of the lending
project, and have very weak monitoring incentives (Laeven, 2001). Note that the
government, too, is to some extent a connected party, because several banks are
owned by local, regional, or national governments. At the start of 2003, Russia had
23 banks in which the state (federal or regional authorities) held majority stakes, the
regional authorities held minority stakes in many more banks and a large number of
state-controlled enterprises were part-owners of banks (Tompson, 2004).
Loan quality problems have been endemic from the start. The problem of con-
nected lending, the softness of legal constraints, the presence of large information
asymmetries and the lack of screening and monitoring skills implied that the Russian
banking sector was riddled by bad loans well before the 1998 crisis. A leaked analysis
of Russian banks after the crisis of August 1998 shows that the major cost for banks
was not the devaluation loss or the government default on treasury bills (GKOs),
but bad loans abandoned years earlier.8 The banks had merely hidden these bad
loans. Schoors and Sonin (2005) explain that the Russian banking system was stuck
in a passivity trap in which it was rational for banks to hide bad loans rather than
attempt to collect them. The real growth that has taken place since 1999 has allowed
Russian banks to “grow” their way out of bad loans. Nevertheless loan quality is a
flow, rather than a stock variable. It does not improve unless the nature of the flow
changes.
8See “The newly-wed and the nearly dead,” Euromoney, June 1999.
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The Russian banking sector has also suﬀered from poor capitalization, especially
considering the poor quality of assets and the large exposure to exchange rate risk.9
This overexposure was revealed when the devaluation in August 1998 changed capital
of many Russian banks from positive to negative overnight (Perotti, 2002). The
CBR has steadily raised capital standards since 1999, but bank capitalization is
still substantially lower in Russia than in developed banking markets. Our data
reveal that average capitalization is substantially higher than the weighted average
capitalization, indicating that the largest banks have the weakest capitalization —
not exactly a comforting finding. The diﬀerence is most pronounced when total
bank deposits are used as weights, implying that the buﬀer of capital is lowest in
the banks that need it most.
The above-mentioned factors (poor capitalization, excessive speculative risk, en-
demic bad loans, connected lending, etc.) led to a large number of bank failures.
The extremely soft legal constraints faced by banks encouraged asset stripping by
management and owners, leaving the creditors to bear the brunt of the cost of failure
(Perotti, 2002). In addition there was a large number of financial scandals and scams
in which depositors were cheated by crooks who fled with their money. As a result,
popular distrust of the banking system grew and depositors shifted their money to
Sberbank and Vneshtorgbank — two banks that are still largely in state hands. As
a result, Sberbank and Vneshtorgbank continue to dominate a highly concentrated
deposit market (OECD, 2004).
In the period under study, the Russian banking market consisted of a number of
separated regional markets. Some regions enjoyed an acceptable amount of competi-
tion, while other regions exhibited high concentration. The average region has only
two bank branches per 100,000 inhabitants10, which is quite low by European stan-
dards. The large regional diﬀerences can also be seen from the summary statistics
on regional Herfindahl indices for bank assets in Table 2.2a, and from the substantial
diﬀerences in regional interest rates and even exchange rates (see Figures 3 and 4).11
Restructuring of the banking sector was clearly long overdue already in 1998.
Several observers and notably the IMF repeatedly expressed hope that the 1998
crisis would finally urge the CBR to undertake serious bank restructuring. In the
immediate aftermath of the crisis, the CBR indicated it expected 400 to 600 banks
to disappear. These expectations were quickly dashed, mainly because the banks
9See, for example, Buch and Heinrich (1999).
10Own calculations, based on data from the CBR (bank branches per region) and Goskomstat
(population in thousands).
11These numbers can be found in the CBR publication Bulletin of Bank Statistics, available in
English on the CBR website.
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Figure 2.1: Bank creation and bank destruction in Russia (monthly data). Bank
creation is defined as the number of licenses issued; bank destruction is defined as
the number of licenses withdrawn. Source: CBR.
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themselves faced soft legal constraints. Many of the Russian banking system’s most
salient characteristics persist to this day.
2.2.2 An overview of bank creation and bank destruction in Russia
Before analyzing the bank licensing behavior of the CBR, an introductory description
of the main trends in CBR bank licensing is appropriate.
Figure 2.1 shows the detailed dynamics of monthly bank creation and destruc-
tion in Russia. It is based on data posted on the CBR website. The solid line shows
new bank registrations, while the dotted line shows bank license withdrawals in a
given month. There is a striking peak of bank creation at the end of 1990: 228
banks were created in October 1990, 347 in November 1990, and 269 in December
1990. This peak is to a large extent explained by the secessionist privatization of
the former state banks (spetsbanki) that started in 1988 (i.e. well before the collapse
of the Soviet Union in December 1991) and yielded over 600 often unrecognizable
state bank successors (Schoors, 2003). At the same time, individuals, governments,
corporations, and other organizations created a number of new banks. Bank cre-
ation by economic agents other than former state banks took oﬀ spectacularly in
1992—1994. Many of these new private banks, so-called “pocket banks”, were cap-
tured by their dominant shareholders. This made the problem of connected lending
omnipresent, leaving commercial banks with only very weak monitoring incentives
42 CHAPTER 2. RULES VERSUS ENFORCEMENT
(Laeven, 2001). In addition, many of these new banks were more like casinos than
banks and preferred speculation to lending. The vast amount of tiny banks and the
lack of a transparent information system about credit histories may have further
depressed lending (Pyle, 2002). The hike in bank creation partly reflected the re-
laxed bank supervision under Viktor Gerashenko. He was the last president of the
defunct Gosbank, the former state monobank that ceased to exist, along with the
Soviet Union, at the end of December 1991. He became president of the CBR in the
summer of 1992 after the hard-nosed, but inexperienced, CBR president Matyukhin
had been outmaneuvered by the industrial lobby. The exchange rate crisis in Octo-
ber 1994 cost Gerashenko his position as president; he was replaced with the more
reform-minded Tatiana Paramonova. The bank creation numbers suggest that bank
supervision was tightened after 1995 under her reign. She was replaced by Dubinin
in early 1996. With Sergei Dubinin at the helm of the CBR, stricter minimum
capital requirements were introduced in April 1996. The process of bank creation
dropped sharply and remained very low from 1996 onward. Bank creation did not
revive until 2001.
Figure 2.1 illustrates how bank destruction follows a diﬀerent pattern altogether.
There is a peak of license withdrawals in the first half of 1992 when the CBR was
headed by Matyukhin. After his replacement in mid-1992 with Gerashenko, the
number of license withdrawals dropped substantially. From mid-1992 to end-1994,
the CBR had a very relaxed policy towards bank licensing and bank refinancing
(Schoors, 2001). This left Russia with well above 2,000 banks at the end of 1994.
Paramonova’s first sweep of the banking sector in early 1995 targeted cleaning up
the exchange-rate crisis mess. The second wave of license withdrawals peaked in
November 1995 in the aftermath of the meltdown on the Russian interbank money
market in August 1995. Apparently, the CBR reacted to crises by enforcing some
of its regulations ex post, a pattern of behavior it has repeated since. Once the new
chairman of the CBR, Dubinin, came into power he swept through licenses in May
1996 on the heels of new minimal capital requirements, then repeated this exercise
in March 1997. The majority of banks that lost their license under Paramonova and
Dubinin were tiny banks without political clout. In several cases, the de-licensed
bank was already bankrupt or looted by its directors. In this sense the CBR followed
events rather than anticipating them.
With the crisis of August 1998, Gerashenko was reinstalled at the helm of the
CBR. He achieved the stabilization of the banking system and unclogged the jammed
payments system by an unconditional bail-out of a number of banks. Oﬃcially, the
clean-up was led by the “Agency for the Restructuring of Credit Organizations”
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(ARCO).12 In fact, ARCO was underfunded and achieved little in the way of bank
restructuring. Figure 2.1 shows that the pace of license withdrawals did not pick
up, but rather fell precipitously. This not only reflected Gerashenko’s weak policy
but also resulted from a striking, but well-hidden, deficiency in Russian law — the
exemption of banks from the bankruptcy code, a dreary detail of which many for-
eign creditors were not fully aware. This ensured that creditors could not easily
enforce their claims on banks (Schoors and Sonin, 2005). The banking sector had
insisted on this exemption and thereafter was successful in blocking all draft laws
on bankruptcy of banks until “The Law on the Restructuring of Credit Organiza-
tions” entered into force in March 1999. This legal loophole gave less benevolent
banks the opportunity to loot creditors by stripping banks of their valuable assets
and transferring them to “bridge” banks, while leaving their liabilities in the de-
faulting or troubled institutions. This procedure was practiced on a grand scale in
the aftermath of the 1998 crisis. Foreign creditors were furious and when the March
1999 law came into force, the IMF strongly pressed the CBR to perform at least
some restructuring. As a consequence, several high profile banks lost their licenses,
including Promstroibank and Mosbusinessbank, two direct successors of the former
specialized state banks. These bankruptcies were however more symbolic than real
and convenient to everyone but the creditors. The March 1999 law provided that
creditors could only force a bank to bankruptcy after the CBR had withdrawn its
license. All too often licenses were only withdrawn after the bank was a stripped,
illiquid shell. This pattern was typical of the “mired restructuring” that took place
after 1998 (Schoors, 1999).
2.3 Empirical approach
We analyze the enforcement of bank regulations through the licensing behavior of the
CBR in the period 1999—2002. This period is chosen for four reasons. First, most
of the casinos, exchange oﬃces, tiny banks, and smartly clad crooks had already
disappeared from the system by virtue of the successive purges of bank licenses in
the period 1995—1997 (see previous section). Second, we consider a period with a
consistent regulatory policy, since earlier CBR chairmen had shown widely diﬀerent
supervisory preferences. During 1999—2002, bank licensing behavior is again in the
hands of Viktor Gerashenko, who emerged at the head of the CBR after the 1998
crisis. Third, the CBR introduced a new accounting system in 1998 that moved
12See Mizobata (2002) and Tompson (2002) for more on this topic.
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away from Russian accounting standards (RAS) towards international accounting
standards (IAS). Last and most important, the new law on bank restructuring that
came into eﬀect in March 1999 gave the CBR a central role in bank restructuring,
which was expected to strongly aﬀect the CBR’s licensing behavior.
We employ a panel logit model to empirically analyze our hypotheses. To in-
vestigate the first hypothesis, namely whether CBR de-licensing activity is not only
driven by enforcement of its own prudential bank standards but also by tacit stability
objectives, we estimate regressions of the following form:
Prob(license withdrawal)i,t = c+ α
0
i,t−1 (economic variables) +
β
0
i,t−1 (tacit stability objectives) +
γ
0
i,t−1 (regulatory breach measures) +
vi + εi,t. (2.1)
The dependent variable is a dummy variable which equals one in the quarter when
a bank loses its license, and zero otherwise. We relate license withdrawals to three
groups of variables: 1) violations of regulatory standards, 2) variables that capture
the tacit objectives of the CBR, and 3) economic (bank- and market-specific) vari-
ables. Although our focus is on regulatory failure, we introduce economic variables
to control for economic failure. Table 2.1 summarizes the definitions and sources of
all variables.
To investigate the second hypothesis, whether enforcement of prudential bank
standards and tacit systemic stability objectives conflict with one another, we esti-
mate the specification:
Prob(license withdrawal)i,t = c+ α
0
i,t−1 (economic variables) +
β
0
i,t−1 (tacit stability objectives) +
γ
0
i,t−1 (regulatory breach measures) +
δ
0
i,t−1 (breach) ∗ (tacit stability) +
vi + εi,t. (2.2)
If regulatory enforcement and tacit objectives conflict with one another, we ex-
pect that violating regulatory standards will lead to more license withdrawals, unless
tacit objectives skew the CBR’s de-licensing behavior towards regulatory forbear-
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ance. In both specifications, we allow for bank-specific unobserved heterogeneity,
since banks may diﬀer in ways not observed in our dataset. The logit model is
therefore estimated under a random eﬀects (RE) assumption.13 We use data from
three sources: Interfaks, Mobile, and the CBR. We describe the datasources in detail
in appendix A.
2.3.1 Measuring non-compliance with regulatory standards
The CBR imposes a number of bank standards with which banks need to comply in
each quarter (see appendices A and B for a detailed description). When banks do
not comply with one or more of these standards, the CBR applies the same actions
regardless of the standard breached. The CBR can impose financial fines for non-
compliance, but these are not readily observed. We therefore consider the CBR’s
ultimate penalty for non-compliance, namely license withdrawal. Regulatory en-
forcement should lead the CBR to withdraw a bank’s license if that bank repeatedly
and severely violates the rules. For each bank standard, we observe bank-specific
scores on a quarterly basis. When a score does not satisfy the standard, we say
the standard has been breached. We use this information on breaches to construct
several vectors of variables that measure compliance with CBR standards.
Based on the definition for each bank standard n and its regulatory minimum
or maximum imposed by the CBR, we define standard-specific breaches and count
breaches per bank and per bank standard. For each quarter, we then correct the
number of past breaches for two reasons. First, we want the number of breaches to
be time-varying, which implies that the total number of breaches will be higher for
later quarters. Second, some banks are created after tPR0 , the first quarter in which
we observe standards, which means that they will have fewer bank quarters in the
sample and ceteris paribus will register fewer breaches.14 ,15 Therefore, we correct
the simple sum of breaches for bank i until t by dividing it by the maximal number
of possible breaches at time t and multiplying it by the number of breaches that
13We assume that there exists some time-invariant bank-specific factor (for example, political
strings or managerial skills) that explain part of the license withdrawal probability.
14For most bank standards, tPR0 is in 1997:Q2. For N10.1 this is in 1997:Q3 and for N9.1 this is
in 1998:Q1 as these standards were introduced later. The data between 1997:Q2 and 1999:Q1 on
scores of banks on prudential bank standards were collected from Mobile. For 1999:Q2 -2002:Q4, the
scores on bank standards were collected from Interfaks. See appendix A for a detailed description
of the diﬀerent datasources available for the Russian banking sector and their compatibility.
15We evaluate the enforcement of bank standards in a period with stable supervisory regime -
1999-2002. Our compliance variables incoporate all information available to the CBR, including
information on compliance under previous regimes. This allows the CBR to incorporate the bank’s
full compliance record in its de-licensing decision.
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Figure 2.2: tPR0 marks the first quarter in which we observe bank-specific scores
on diﬀerent standards; tT marks the end of our sample (2002.4); tiiss marks the
quarter in which bank i’s license was issued; ti0 marks the first observation of bank i;
tT − tPR0 marks the sample period for observing bank standards; t−k is the number
of potential breaches at time t; t− tPR0 is the number of quarters used to correct for
“late entry” or “late license issuance”.
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is maximally possible for banks created before tPR0 and still operational at time t.
More specifically, we define for each standard n and for each bank i, the number of
past breaches at time t:
nbreachn,i,t =
Pt
z=k breachz
t− k (t− t
PR
0 ),
with breach equal to one when a bank violates the rule and zero otherwise, k the
start of observations for bank i and t the observed bank quarter for bank i. Figure
2.2 illustrates what this implies for banks with diﬀerent dates of entry.
In order to construct a first measure of regulatory (non-)compliance, we assume
that the CBR is likely to attach greater importance to current breaches than past
breaches. Put simply, a bank that has had two violations in the previous two quarters
has the same score on nbreach at time t as a bank with only two breaches in the
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past year, although one might expect the CBR at time t to attach more value to
the former than the latter. We therefore construct a vector of compliance variables
that discounts past breaches. Discounting past breaches additionally captures the
fact that the CBR draws from a larger action set than the observed withdrawing of
licenses alone.
Define the weights:
't = α(1− α)t, with
∞X
t=0
't = 1. (2.3)
Then the discounted number of breaches for each regulation n and a given bank i
at time t is:
dnbreachn,i,t =
Pt
z=k't(breachz)
t− k (t− t
PR
0 ).
In order to interpret dnbreach as the discounted version of nbreach and make com-
parison of these two measures more intuitive, we make one final adjustment. The
sum of the weights used to calculate dnbreach equals unity, while implicitly the sum
of the weights used to calculate nbreach equals t − k. In order to discount the po-
tential number of breaches too, we adjust the measure for dnbreach by multiplying
by t− k, which gives:
dnbreachn,i,t =
tX
z=k
't(breachz)(t− tPR0 ). (2.4)
To allow the CBR to be more concerned about the average severity of breaches
than the number of breaches, we construct a second variable for each standard n:
sbreachn,i,t =
Pt
z=k
³ |scorez−standardz |
standardz
´
t− k .
The deviation of the score from the standard is only counted in the case of a breach;
it equals zero otherwise. We take absolute values to ensure that the severity of a
breach is always defined as a positive number. Again, the CBR may care more about
the severity of current breaches than the severity of past breaches. The discounted
severity of breach is then defined as:
dsbreachn,i,t =
Pt
z=k't
³ |scorez−standardz |
standardz
´
t− k .
To ensure comparability of the coeﬃcients, we need again to multiply with t − k,
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which gives:
dsbreachn,i,t =
tX
z=k
't
µ |scorez − standardz|
standardz
¶
. (2.5)
There is a final twist in the measurement of compliance variables. For some
banks in some quarters, the scores on a number of bank standards are missing.
Apparently, banks sometimes fail to report some scores to the CBR. Since non-
reported bank scores may be interpreted by the CBR as compliance, non-compliance,
or something in between, we introduce a dummy variable for non-reported bank
scores in a given bank quarter as a separate variable in the regressions. If at least
one score is missing in a given bank quarter, the non-reported scores dummy equals
one and zero otherwise (see Table 2.1). In this way, we can explicitly test how the
CBR interprets non-reported scores.
2.3.2 Tacit stability objectives of the CBR
Regional banking coverage In the period surveyed, the CBR was worried that
banking had become too concentrated in some regions. ARCO indicated it supported
some banks with regional networks to avoid certain regions becoming underbanked
(Mizobata, 2002; Tompson, 2002). We therefore expect that banks in already highly
concentrated regional banking markets are less likely to lose their licenses compared
to identical banks in less concentrated regions. As a concentration measure, we use
the regional Herfindahl index. Regional banking coverage is very stable in our data
window, with some very poorly banked and some very well banked regions. The
low variability of this variable in our sample implies it is not suitable for explain-
ing quarter-specific variance in the bank license withdrawal behavior of the CBR.
Therefore, in the estimations we employ the average of this variable over time such
that we have one observation per region.
Systemic stability The CBR’s concern for systemic stability is likely to lead
to biases in its de-licensing behavior. The CBR may wish to protect banks that
are active on the interbank market to minimize the risk of contagion. As a proxy
for banks that are active on the interbank market, we use the ratio of interbank
liabilities to total liabilities. Activity on the interbank market may reflect general
bank transparency, safety and health, but we control for this by including the non-
reporting variable (see above), the compliance variables (see above) and the return-
to-assets ratio and loan quality (see below) in the variables list. Therefore, if the
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CBR shows more forbearance for banks with high interbank liabilities, it must be
because it cares about systemic stability and contagion.
The CBR may want to protect large deposit banks to avoid deposit runs and
maintain confidence in the banking sector.16 Interestingly, this can be measured by
the bank standard N11 (household deposits over capital). We expect therefore to see
forbearance of breaches of N11, since enforcement of this standard is not consistent
with other CBR objectives (see appendix B for a more detailed description of this
bank standard).
Political influence We include the ratio of government securities to total assets
to measure government capture. Banks that lend relatively more to the government
may have greater political clout and receive protection against de-licensing. When
a bank has a substantial amount of government securities in its portfolio, the CBR
might prefer not to close the bank if it has an interest in distributing these securities.
This was precisely the case for treasury bills (GKOs) prior to 1998 (Malyutina and
Parilova, 2001). On the other hand, holding a large share of assets in government
securities could be an indication of injuries suﬀered, because of the government’s
default on its GKO in August 1998. Note that the resolution of this crisis was not
handled even-handedly. Some banks were reimbursed relatively quickly at reason-
able discounts. Others had to wait, and were sometimes driven into bankruptcy
as a consequence. The non-transparent handling of the crisis does not allow us to
calculate the precise bank-specific harm done by the GKO default, but the amount
of government claims still in the books may partly reflect the remaining harm done
by the default.
The CBR may be less willing to restructure pocket banks, which are often domi-
nated by powerful but closed groups with considerable political clout. Pocket banks
tend to be isolated from the rest of the banking sector and rarely accept household
deposits. Therefore, from the standpoint of systemic stability, the CBR does little
harm by enforcing bank standards N9.1 and N10.1, but it may however have strong
political incentives to show forbearance for breaches of these particular standards
(see appendix B for a more detailed description of these bank standards).
Bank size Bank size may aﬀect bank failure for various reasons. Some banks may
be simply too big to fail. This can be justified on the grounds that the collapse of a
large bank poses a threat to the banking system as a whole (see Wall and Peterson,
16Models of bank runs include Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Postlewaite and Vives (1987), Wallace
(1990), Chari (1989), Champ et al. (1996), and Alonso (1996).
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1990). There is evidence that the CBR extended credit considerably to the largest
banks (Malyutina and Parilova, 2001). It is reasonable to assume that as the costs
of closure increased the idea of closing down these banks became more distasteful
to the CBR. In this sense, some banks may be too well connected to the CBR to
fail. Kane (2000) suggests that some banks may simply be too big to be disciplined
adequately (TBTDA), rather than too big to fail. Such situations create problems of
undesired de facto forbearance even in developed market economies such as the US.
This was undoubtedly a problem in Russia, where the understaﬀed and relatively
young department of bank supervision was not up to the task of inspecting the
intricate balance sheets of huge banks engaging in complex activities. We include
the variable size in our regressions to capture any of these eﬀects. Both theories
predict a negative relation between bank size (the log of total assets) and bank
license withdrawal probability.
Too many too fail When many banks breach the regulatory standards at the
same time, the CBR may find it optimal to refrain from withdrawing individual
bank licenses. When too many banks are found to be insolvent, a central bank
may prefer regulatory forbearance over the costly closure of a large number of banks
(Mitchell, 1998). We include the aggregate number of breaches as an extra variable
in the regressions to test this hypothesis.
2.3.3 Economic variables
To control for economic failure we include a set of bank- and market-specific vari-
ables. A high return-to-assets ratio should reduce license withdrawal probability.
The cost-to-assets ratio is expected to correlate positively with license withdrawal
probability. The ratio of interbank liabilities to total liabilities is an indicator of
the liquidity of liabilities and should correlate positively with license withdrawal
(Calomiris and Mason, 2000). Thus, either the CBR protects banks that are active
on the interbank market (as argued above) or highly liquid liabilities make banks
more vulnerable and therefore more likely to fail as suggested by Calomiris and Ma-
son (2000). The regional market share in bank assets is a proxy for market power.
In the structure-conduct-performance framework (Berger, 1995) the eﬀect of market
power on license withdrawal is expected to be negative. Poor loan quality, mea-
sured as the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans, should increase the license
withdrawal probability. The ratio of total reserves to total assets, as an indicator of
absolutely safe liquidity, should reduce license withdrawal probability. We control
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for inflation by including a deflator. We also include a dummy variable that equals
one when the bank is registered in the Moscow region, and zero otherwise. Com-
pared to other regions, Moscow-based banks face more competition which makes
them more vulnerable to economic failure. To illustrate this, Figures 2.3 and 2.4
show that intermediation as well as exchange rate spreads are significantly lower
in Moscow compared to the regional average. The Moscow dummy accounts for a
possible licensing bias for Moscow-based banks.
2.3.4 Summary statistics and correlations
Summary statistics for all variables are given in Table 2.2. Note that we exclude
Sberbank, Vneshtorgbank, Vnesheconombank, as well as their regional branches
from the sample. As they are totally dominated by the CBR, their survival is
ensured in any case. This leaves us with over 19,000 bank quarters of data available
for estimations. Table 2.2a shows summary statistics for the economic variables
and the variables that measure tacit CBR objectives. The Moscow control variable
reveals that 49% of bank quarters are from banks registered in the Moscow region.
All other variables show reasonable average values, although in some bank quarters
they reach the maximum of 100%.17 Note however in the last column of Table 2.2a
that the number of bank quarters with extreme observations is fairly limited. We
choose not to exclude any of these banks, since they are all subject to the same
bank standards, whose enforcement is under scrutiny in this chapter. We are only
interested in the question whether the CBR enforced its own bank standards and
whether other tacit objectives interfered with regulatory enforcement. The results
are however robust to the exclusion of these extreme observations.
The summary statistics of regulatory compliance variables in Table 2.2b reveal
that the maximum number of breaches is disconcertingly close to 23 for some bank
standards, i.e. the number of bank quarters used for the calculation of the com-
pliance variables. Apparently, some banks breached some standards in nearly all
bank quarters and still managed to keep their licenses. The most severely breached
bank standard is the deposits-to-capital ratio N11, closely followed by a number of
liquidity standards and the capital adequacy standard. Bank standard N11 (house-
holds’ deposits-to-capital ratio) is on average breached most often (on average in
1.52 quarters in a total of 23 quarters) and the breaches are on average relatively se-
vere (13% away from the standard). The capital adequacy standard is also breached
17 In three regions (Kursk Region, Republic of Karelia and Republic of Marii El), there is only one
bank active between 1999:Q3 - 2002:Q4. For these regions, our sample average of the Herfindahl
index reaches maxima above 9,500.
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Figure 2.3: Average intermediation spreads for firms and households: regional av-
erage versus Moscow region. Source: own calculations based on CBR. Note: Inter-
mediation spreads are calculated as the diﬀerence between the region’s lending rate
and the region’s deposit rate.
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Figure 2.4: Average spreads between the selling and buying price of Rb in USD:
regional average versus Moscow region. Source: own calculations based on CBR.
Note: exchange rate spreads are calculated as the diﬀerence between the region’s
selling price and the region’s buying price.
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quite often (on average in 0.52 quarters out of 23) and relatively severely (on average
18% away from the standard). Still, on average banks breach the standards rather
infrequently and not terribly severely.
Correlations between the variables are shown in Table 2.3. There is one note-
worthy source of correlation; the compliance variables of liquidity standard N5 seem
to be highly correlated to compliance with other liquidity standards. This is not
surprising given the very general definition of this liquidity standard. Moreover, one
could question the usefulness of such a liquidity standard in the Russian setting.
Indeed, standard N5 only looks at very broadly defined liquid assets and neglects
all aspects of assets/liabilities management. Banks that score high on this standard
typically hold few real bank assets (loans).
Table 2.4 reveals that the more than 19,000 bank quarters cover 1,443 banks (194
of which lost their licenses in the sample period). Most license withdrawals were, ac-
cording to the CBR, due to violations of bank regulations (over 30%) or compulsory
bankruptcy (over 64%). Of course, these two reasons for license withdrawal may
overlap. Economically bankrupt banks tend to violate a number of bank standards.
Hence, compliance and economic variables should do well in picking up these license
withdrawals in the empirical analysis.
2.4 Results
Table 2.5 presents the results for the logit model defined in (2.1). We use as measures
for violation of regulatory standards the discounted number of breaches and the
discounted severity of breaches, defined in equations (2.4) and (2.5). For each of
these two measures, we show estimates that assume the CBR puts increasingly less
weight on past breaches, as defined in equation (2.3), by employing increasing values
of the discount parameter, α.
Our first observation is that the economic variables do reasonably well at ex-
plaining license withdrawal. Less profitable banks, banks with higher costs, banks
with poorer loan quality, and banks with less liquidity are all more likely to lose
their bank licenses. However, high interbank liabilities in themselves do not increase
economic vulnerability as predicted by Calomiris and Mason (2000). Instead, higher
interbank liabilities tend to reduce the likelihood of license withdrawal, but only
significantly in the first specification with the number of breaches as compliance
variable. This suggests that the CBR is more reluctant to withdraw licenses from
banks that are active on the interbank market and provides a first indication that
tacit objectives may also guide the CBR in its licensing policy. Holding a large
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amount of government securities relative to assets tends to increase the likelihood
of license withdrawal. This is probably still the eﬀect of lingering liquidity problems
that follow from the government default on treasury bills in August 1998.
The tacit CBR objectives identified in our study do surprisingly well in explaining
bank de-licensing behavior. While controlling for economic and regulatory failure,
our results indicate that banks in poorly-banked regions are less likely to lose their
licenses as shown by the strongly significant coeﬃcient on the regional Herfindahl
index. The negative coeﬃcient on size indicates that large banks are less likely to
face license withdrawal, suggesting that some banks are either too big to fail or
too large to be disciplined adequately. Finally, as the banking sector as a whole
violates more standards, the CBR is more lenient towards withdrawing individual
bank licenses. This corroborates the “too many to fail” hypothesis developed in
Mitchell (1998).
The coeﬃcients in the lower part of Table 2.5 shed light on the regulatory en-
forcement of prudential bank standards by the CBR. A majority of the compliance
measures show no significance, suggesting regulatory forbearance in the CBR’s de-
licensing policy. The non-reported scores dummy variable is however always sig-
nificantly positively related to license withdrawal. This could mean that the CBR
interprets a bank’s failure to report its scores on some regulatory standards as a sig-
nal of non-compliance. Alternatively, if non-reporting is highly correlated with poor
performance on the compliance measures, it could indicate that a bank that expects
to lose its license in any case, does not bother to report its scores on some bank
standards any longer. The negative correlation between the number and severity of
breaches of the large-credit-risks-to-capital ratio (N7) and the households’ deposits-
to-capital ratio (N11) shown in Table 2.3 suggests the former interpretation. For
a majority of standards however, the number and severity of breaches is positively
correlated with non-reporting, which suggests that banks with more frequent and
large breaches of bank standards more often fail to report, lending support to the
latter thesis. Thus, both hypotheses seem to be valid. If banks breach standards N7
and N11, non-reporting leads to a punishment by the CBR, while banks that already
expect withdrawal because of frequent and severe violations of the other standards,
may not bother to report their scores any more.
We do find consistent indications of enforcement for the quick liquidity ratio
(N2), the current liquidity ratio (N3) and the general liquidity ratio (N5). Indeed, if
these variables show up significantly, it is always with a positive sign, indicating that
a greater number of breaches and more severe breaches of these bank standards relate
to a higher probability of license withdrawal. The broad enforcement of liquidity
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standards is not necessarily good news. It implies that the CBR may be running
behind the facts, by mainly de-licensing already illiquid banks (and possibly illiquid
because of asset stripping in the face of expected de-licensing), at a point where
failure has become convenient to its owners. Moreover, the CBR is more likely
to close banks breaching on quick liquidity, rather than those breaching on long
liquidity. This indicates that if a bank fails on long-term or general liquidity the
CBR allows it to “gamble for resurrection” to avoid losses on selling illiquid assets
(Kane, 1989). Violations of the pocket-bank-related standards (N9.1 and N10.1)
also yield a disciplinary reaction from the CBR, which indicates that the CBR is
not more lenient towards banks that have strong political clout.
While we find some enforcement of the capital adequacy standard (N1), the
coeﬃcient of the ratio of large credit risks to capital (N7) only shows weak indications
of enforcement and the households’ deposits-to-capital ratio (N11) is not enforced at
all. On the contrary, the sign for N11 is consistently negative. This corroborates our
hypothesis that the enforcement of this standard would aﬀect precisely those banks
that are most active on the deposit market, and runs counter to the CBR objective
of securing and restoring depositor trust and systemic stability. A conflict between
two inconsistent CBR objectives is sharply revealed here.
The results in Table 2.5 suggest that the CBR’s licensing policy is guided by
other, more tacit, objectives than compliance with bank standards alone. To test
the second hypothesis, that these tacit objectives conflict with the enforcement of
prudential regulations, we interact them with the regulatory breach variables. We
expect that if the tacit objectives defined in our study conflict with regulatory en-
forcement, observed enforcement will diminish with the degree of bank concentra-
tion, bank size and aggregate non-compliance with prudential regulation. To ease
interpretation, we define a composite liquidity and capital standard that we sub-
sequently interact with the tacit objectives. Definitions and summary statistics of
these variables are included in Tables 2.1 to 2.3.
Table 2.6 shows estimation results for the model defined in (2.2) that reveal the
conflicts between the regulatory enforcement and tacit stability objectives of the
CBR. As the coeﬃcient estimates of the economic variables and tacit objectives
remain largely unaﬀected when using the composite standards, we omitted these to
ease the exposition of results. Since the results for alternative values of the discount
factor do not diﬀer significantly, we only show the results for a discount parameter
of α = 0.5.
The results indicate that the CBR enforces both liquidity and — to some extent
— capital requirements. However, depending on how compliance is measured, capital
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requirements are enforced only when assuming that the CBR investigates the number
of times a bank has breached (columns I to IV ). The results in columns V to IX
however suggest that even though breaches of capital requirements are enforced, the
severity with which these are breached does not matter.18
We further find that liquidity standards are less enforced in regions with low
regional competition, while capital requirements are less enforced for sizeable banks
(columns II and III ). Similarly, while severe breaches of the liquidity requirements
are punished, a bank’s failure probability is reduced when it is operating in a poorly
banked region (VI ).
The evidence for potential biases in regulatory enforcement coming from the
“too many to fail” objective is mixed. On the one hand, the banking sector’s aggre-
gate number of breaches does not systematically reduce the punishment for frequent
breaches of liquidity and capital standards (IV ). This suggests that although in-
dividual bank failure diminishes when too many banks can fail, it does not skew
the CBR’s de-licensing behavior towards forbearance. On the other, more severe
violations of both liquidity and capital requirements are less sanctioned when there
are too many banks to fail (IX ).
2.5 Robustness
We constructed a third compliance variable that captures the total volume of breaches,
rather than the number of breaches or their average severity. This measure should
be interpreted as the one-sided total distance over time for a given bank between
any bank standard n and the bank’s actual score on the standard:
vbreachn,i,t = nbreachn,i,t ∗ sbreachn,i,t.
Again, we discount the past by imposing exponentially decreasing weights to past
volumes of breaches and get:
dvbreachn,i,t =
tX
z=k
't(vbreachz).
This measure is theoretically the most appealing way of assessing compliance
with prudential standards. Imposing that the CBR takes this measure into account
18When assuming that the CBR has a higher discount factor (α = 0.7), we observe some punish-
ment in terms of license withdrawal of severe violations of the capital regulation. These results are
available upon request.
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only corroborates the enforcement of liquidity standards and the capital adequacy
standard (N1), but in general shows even less enforcement compared to the dnbreach
and dsbreach variables.
In stead of gauging the interbank liabilities to total liabilities ratio, the CBR may
want to protect only money-center banks to enhance the stability of the interbank
market. If large banks at the heart of the interbank system fail, the entire banking
system could collapse.19 It is therefore likely that the CBR will want to avoid
this in order to preserve systemic stability.20 To test this hypothesis, we included
the bank’s market share in total interbank liabilities. Similarly, we included the
bank-specific market share in total government securities to investigate whether the
CBR is mainly captured by banks that hold a large absolute amount of government
securities (mainly bonds). If this were the case, the government may be less willing
to liquidate its largest financiers than less influential small banks. These hypotheses
could not be corroborated.
2.6 Concluding remarks
In this chapter, we focus on the potential conflict between the central bank objectives
of individual bank stability (usually assured through the enforcement of prudential
bank standards) and systemic stability and the regulatory forbearance that may
follow from it. We achieve this by conducting an empirical study of the licensing
policy of the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) during the period 1999—2002, a period
with consistent regulatory policy. Russia provides an intriguing opportunity for
analyzing potential conflicts in the objective function of a central bank. The CBR is
a very young central bank that combines a broad swathe of authorities and functions.
Equally important, the period of study involves many banks and many bank failures,
allowing us to study empirically how well the CBR enforced its own bank standards.
Our analysis reveals strong indications of this conflict. First, controlling for eco-
nomic reasons of bank failure (loan quality, profitability, liquidity, eﬃciency, market
power), we find that there are a number of biases in the CBR’s licensing policy.
Specifically, banks in poorly banked regions, banks that are too big to be disciplined
adequately, and banks active on the interbank market seem to enjoy a certain de-
gree of protection against license withdrawal by the CBR. Further, when too many
19See, for example, Wall and Peterson (1990) on the FDIC bail-out of Continental Illinois and
Kapstein (1994) and Davis (1992) on the failure of Herstatt Bank.
20Freixas et al. (2000) show that it may be too costly to close down money-center banks, because
it might trigger the liquidation of all other banks. See also Rochet and Tirole (1996) on this point.
2.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 59
banks can fail at the same time, individual license withdrawal probability is also
reduced. These results suggest that CBR de-licensing activity is not only driven by
enforcement of its own prudential bank standards but also by more tacit objectives
related to the systemic stability of the banking system.
Second, we can neither reject capital adequacy and liquidity standards are en-
forced, nor that tacit objectives induce regulatory forbearance by the CBR. The
finding that some bank standards are enforced is encouraging. On the other hand,
the fact that it are mostly liquidity regulations that are enforced is not particularly
comforting. It suggests that the CBR mainly de-licenses banks that are already
illiquid instead of anticipating future trouble. Moreover there are strong indications
that the presence of tacit objectives in the CBR’s objective function leads to reg-
ulatory forbearance. The results indicate that liquidity standards are less enforced
in regions with low regional competition, capital requirements are less enforced for
sizeable banks and severe breaches of liquidity requirements are forborne when the
bank is operating in a poorly banked region. This sharply reveals how the conflict
between individual bank stability and systemic stability aﬀects license withdrawal
decisions. The CBR was also quite reticent about withdrawing bank licenses from
banks that repeatedly and severely violated the households’ deposits-to-capital ratio,
supposedly because this specific bank standard carries an inherent conflict between
the objective of individual bank stability (as enshrined in the bank standard) and
the tacit CBR objective of securing depositor trust and systemic stability, which
would be endangered by withdrawing licenses from the most active deposit banks.
Hence, we find that tacit objectives in the CBR objective function are incon-
sistent with the rule-based enforcement of bank standards, leading to regulatory
forbearance. This indicates that the conflict between individual bank stability and
systemic bank stability in a central bank’s objective function may be a fundamen-
tal problem that may aﬀect the prudential control of the banking system in ways
that are not fully understood. Further theoretical work is needed to disentangle
under which conditions this conflict may skew supervisory decisions and what the
welfare implications are. It would be of interest to analyze whether this conflict can
also be detected in more stable banking markets and in banking markets where the
supervisory authority is not housed within the central bank..
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2.A Data sources
The bank data were supplied by two well-established Russian information agencies,
Interfaks and Mobile, and by the CBR. Interfaks supplied a database with quarterly
bank data on balances, profit and loss accounts and quarter-specific, bank-specific
scores on a battery of regulatory standards for all Russian banks from 1999 to
2002. Mobile provided monthly bank balances and profit and loss accounts and a
more limited list of quarter-specific, bank-specific scores on regulatory standards
but for a longer period, from mid-1995 (although initially not for all banks) up to
2002. The two databases complement each other as they oﬀer diﬀerent classifications
and a diﬀerent degree of detail of the same data. The financial data employed in
the analysis includes 1,509 banks, i.e. almost all operational banks in the period
under study, covering 16 quarters from 1999:Q1 to 2002:Q4. These financial data
were linked to bank licensing data. From the freely available information on the
CBR’s website, we reconstructed the complete register of bank licenses. The dataset
contains bank license data of all banks from 1988 up to now. For every bank that
ever existed in Russia, we know when it received a license, the specific type of license
it received, when it lost its license (if ever), and the oﬃcial reason for losing it. We
also know from the CBR instructions and regulations how the supervisory standards
evolved in the period under study. Thus, for each bank in every period we know
how the bank should score on a specific standard and how it actually does, which
allows the identification of breaches of regulatory standards. For a highly detailed
overview on all data issues, please consult Karas and Schoors (2005).
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2.B Prudential regulations of the CBR
The regulation that governs our period of study came into force on April 1, 1996
and draws on CBR Instruction No. 1 of January 30, 1996, “On the Procedure for
Regulating the Activities of Credit Organisations.”21 This regulation is issued in
accordance with the Federal Law on the Central Bank of the Russian Federation
(Bank of Russia) and established a set of new prudential bank standards, taking
into account international banking practices. For Russian standards, the new bank
standards were rather strict and the CBR gave banks time to adjust to the new
conditions. Yet the enormous peak of license withdrawals in May 1996 (see figure
2.1) demonstrates that the adjustment process was rather abrupt. We concentrate
on the bank standards (normas as the CBR refers to them) imposed by the CBR.
In addition to minimal capital requirements, the CBR has instituted regulations on
capital adequacy requirements (N1), liquidity requirements (N2, N3, N4, N5), credit
risk requirements (N7, N9, N10, N11, N12, N13), and a host of other less important
regulations and voluntary guidelines.
Capital adequacy ratio (N1) On April 1, 1996, the bank equity capital ade-
quacy ratio (N1) was defined as the ratio of the bank’s equity capital to the overall
risk-weighted assets minus the sum of the reserves created for depreciation of se-
curities and possible losses. Since February 1998, the minimum level of N1 is set
depending on the amount of the bank’s equity capital:
5 million euro 1 to 5 million euro Less than 1 million euro
July, 1996 — 5%
February, 1997 — 6 %
February, 1998 — 7 % February, 1998 — 7 % February, 1998 — 7 %
February, 1999 — 8 % February, 1999 — 9 %
January, 2000 — 10 % January, 2000 — 11 %
Quick liquidity ratio (N2) The quick liquidity ratio (N2) is defined as the ratio
of the sum of the bank’s highly liquid assets to the sum of the bank’s liabilities on
demand accounts. The minimum value of the N2 ratio was set at 10% on July 1,
1996 and at 20% on February 1, 1997.
21For more detailed information on prudential regulations, consult the references for banking
legislation listed in appendix 2.C.
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Current liquidity ratio (N3) The current liquidity ratio (N3) is defined as the
ratio of the sum of the bank’s liquid assets to the sum of the bank’s liabilities on
demand accounts and accounts up to 30 days. The minimum value of the current
liquidity ratio was set at no less than:
20% of total assets as of July 1, 1996;
30% of total assets as of February 1, 1997;
50% of total assets as of February 1, 1998;
70% of total assets as of February 1, 1999.
Long-term liquidity ratio (N4) The long-term liquidity ratio (N4) is defined as
the ratio of the entire long-term debt to the bank, including guarantees and sureties
with a maturity of more than one year, to the bank’s equity capital and liabilities on
deposit accounts, credits received and other debt liabilities with maturities exceeding
one year. The long-term liquidity ratio should not exceed 120%.
General liquidity ratio (N5) The general liquidity ratio (N5) is defined as the
percentage of liquid assets in the bank’s aggregate assets. The minimum value of
the N5 ratio has been set at:
10% of total assets as of July 1, 1996;
20% of total assets as of February 1, 1997.
Large credit risk (N7) Large credit risk (N7) is defined as a percentage of the
total amount of large credit risks in the bank’s equity capital. A large credit is the
total sum of the bank’s risk-weighted claims to one borrower (or a group of related
borrowers) on credits, taking into account 50% of the sum of oﬀ-balance claims —
guarantees and sureties held by the bank with regard to one borrower (or a group of
related borrowers), exceeding 5% of the bank’s equity capital. Note that the decision
to extend a large credit or loan must be made by the board of the bank or its credit
committee, taking into account the opinion of the bank’s credit department. Large
credit risk was not to exceed 12 times the bank’s capital in 1996, 10 times in 1997
and 8 times in 1998.
Risk per borrower-shareholder (N9.1) The risk per borrower-shareholder (N9.1)
is defined as the amount of credits, guarantees and sureties issued by the bank to
one corporate or individual shareholder or to a group of related corporate or indi-
vidual shareholders of the bank divided by equity capital. Related shareholders are
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corporate and individual shareholders connected with one another economically and
legally (e.g. having common property and/or mutual guarantees and/or obligations,
and/or controlling each other’s property, as well as an individual concurrently hold-
ing several senior executive positions), such that the financial problems of one of
the shareholders cause or may cause financial problems for the other shareholder(s).
Since January 1, 1998, N9.1 should not exceed 50% of the bank’s equity capital.
Credit to insiders (N10.1) The aggregate amount of credits and loans extended
to insiders (N10.1) may not exceed 3% of the bank’s equity capital. Insiders comprise
the following individuals: shareholders who own more than 5% of shares, directors
(presidents, chairmen, and their deputies), Board members, members of the credit
committee, senior executives of subsidiary and parent structures, and other persons
who may influence the decision to issue credit, as well as relatives of insiders, former
insiders and other persons participating in outside structures in which insiders also
participate.
Coverage of household deposits by capital (N11) N11 is defined as the ratio
of the sum of household deposits to equity capital. Since July 1996, household
deposits should be 100% covered by equity capital.
Coverage of the bank’s investments in shares by capital (N12) The bank’s
own investments in shares of other legal entities has been limited to:
45% of equity capital as of July 1, 1996;
35% of equity capital as of October 1, 1996;
25% of equity capital as of January 1, 1997.
Bank’s own promissory note liability risk ratio (N13) N13 is defined as
the percentage of the bills of exchange and bills of acceptance issued by the bank
plus 50% of the bank’s oﬀ-balance liabilities arising from the endorsement of bills,
sureties and bill brokerage in the bank’s equity capital. The maximum levels have
been set at:
200% of the balance as of October 1, 1996;
100% of the balance as of March 1, 1997.
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2.C References for banking legislation
Bank of Russia Instruction No. 1 of May 5, 1991, “On the Procedure of Regu-
lating the Activities of Credit Organisations.”
Bank of Russia Instruction No. 1 of January 30, 1996, “On the Procedure of
Regulating the Activities of Credit Organisations.”
Bank of Russia Instruction No. 59 of March 31, 1997, “On Imposing Sanctions
to Credit Organizations for Infringement of Prudential Norms.”
Bank of Russia Instruction No. 1 of October 1, 1997, “On the Procedure of
Regulating the Activities of Credit Organisations.”
Bank of Russia Letter No. 121-T of August 20, 2003 “About Actions Which
Should Be Taken When Facts of Breaching Norms N8, N9, N11, N11.1 and N14 Are
Revealed.”
Bank of Russia Letter No. 124-T of August 21, 2003 “On the Bank’s Own
Promissory Note Liability Risk Ratio N13.”
Civil Code of the Russian Federation, part I.
Federal Law of December 2, 1990, No. 395-1, “On Banks and Banking Activity.”
2.D Tables
TABLE 2.1  
  
Description of Variables and Data Sources 
  
Deflator1 Average monthly inflation (%). 
Moscow Dummy A dummy variable that equals one if the bank is located in 
Moscow, zero otherwise. 
Economic Variables  
Return on assets2 The returns-to-assets ratio of bank i in quarter t (%). 
Cost/assets2 The ratio of personnel costs to two month average of total 
assets of bank i in quarter t (%). 
Interbank liabilities/liabilities2 Interbank liabilities to total liabilities of bank i in quarter t 
(%). 
Government claims/assets2 The ratio of government claims to assets of bank i in quarter t 
(%). 
Regional market share (assets)2 The regional⁴ market share in assets, calculated as the ratio of 
bank i’s individual assets to the sum of bank assets for region 
j in quarter t (between 0 and 100). 
Non performing loans/loans2 The ratio of non-performing loans to total loans of bank i in 
quarter t (%). 
Reserves/assets2 The ratio of total reserves (including excess reserves) to total 
assets of bank i in quarter t (%). 
Tacit CBR Objectives  
Regional Herfindahl (assets)2 The regional⁴ Herfindahl index, calculated as the sum of 
squared regional market shares for each region j in quarter t 
(between 0 and 10,000). 
Size (log assets)2 The log of assets of bank i in quarter t. 
Aggregate number of breaches The banking sector’s aggregate number of breaches of all 
standards in quarter t. 
Compliance with Regulatory Standards3  
Non-reported scores A dummy variable that equals one when information on at 
least one of the regulatory standards 7, 9.1, 10.1, 11, 12 or 13 
is not reported, zero otherwise. The scores on all other 
standards are always reported. 
breachn,i,t A dummy variable that equals one whenever bank i violates 
regulation n in quarter t, zero otherwise. 
nbreachn,i,t The sum of actual breaches - relative to the maximum 
potential - registered by bank i from t0
PR up till t, corrected 
for ’late entry’ (see Figure 2). 
dnbreachn,i,t An exponentially smoothed version of nbreach with varying 
weights for α. 
sbreachn,i,t The average severity of breaches registered by bank i from 
t0
PR up till t. Severity is defined as the relative deviation from 
the prudential standard whenever breach equals one. 
dsbreachn,i,t An exponentially smoothed version of sbreach with varying 
weights for α. 
Composite Liquidity Standardn,i,t The sum of dnbreach or the average of dsbreach for 
regulatory standards 2, 3, 4 and 5. 
Composite Capital Standardn,i,t The sum of dnbreach or the average of dsbreach for 
regulatory standards 1, 7, 9.1, 10.1, 11, 12 and 13. 
1Source: Russian Economic Trends. 2Source: Own calculations based on Interfaks. 3Source: Own 
calculations based on regulatory standards published by the CBR (see appendix B) and bank-specific 
scores on regulatory standards acquired from Interfaks and Mobile. ⁴Note: We use 80 regions for the 
calculation of regional market shares. 
TABLE 2.2a 
       
Summary Statistics: Economic Variables - Tacit CBR Objectives 
       
 Obs. Mean
Std. 
Dev. Min. Max. Freq. 
              
       
Deflator 20136 1.96 1.74 0.46 8.02  
Moscow Dummy 20136 0.49 0.50 0 1  
Economic Variables       
Return on assets 20030 0.57 8.16 -149.61 479.61  
Cost/assets 20103 1.29 2.15 0 76.60  
Interbank 
liabilities/liabilities 20097 10.63 19.12 0 100.00 0.47% 
Government 
securities/assets 20136 1.75 6.15 0 92.4  
Regional market share 
(assets) 20136 5.48 13.38 0.0000173 100 0.15% 
Non performing loans/loans 19699 5.09 13.09 0 100 0.56% 
Reserves/assets 20136 17.62 15.52 0 100 0.14% 
Tacit CBR Objectives       
Regional Herfindahl 
(assets) 20136 1990 1380 847 9830  
Size (log assets) 20136 4.90 1.93 -1.94 11.75  
Aggregate number of 
breaches 20136 0.33 0.15 0 0.68   
Source: Own calculations based on Interfaks, Russian Economic Trends and CBR. 
A detailed description of the variables and data sources is provided in Table 2.1. 
Note: Frequency is defined for the variables that reach a maximum of 100. It 
indicates the percentage of observations between 95 and 100. 
 
 TABLE 2.2b 
      
Summary Statistics: Compliance with Regulatory Standards 
      
  Obs. Mean
Std. 
Dev. Min. Max. 
      
Non-reported scores 20136 0.07 0.25 0 1 
      
  Number of Breaches 
      
Capital adequacy ratio (N1) 19799 0.52 1.66 0 21 
Quick liquidity ratio (N2) 19789 0.72 1.87 0 16 
Current liquidity ratio (N3) 19790 1.04 2.12 0 17 
Long-term liquidity ratio (N4) 19788 0.12 0.60 0 8 
General liquidity ratio (N5) 19796 1.09 2.47 0 20 
Large-risks-to-capital ratio (N7) 19789 0.07 0.40 0 6 
Owner-related-credit-risks-to-capital ratio 
(N9.1) 19787 0.19 0.64 0 6 
Insider-related-credit-risks-to-capital ratio 
(N10.1) 19788 0.16 0.61 0 9 
Individuals’ deposits-to-capital ratio (N11) 19787 1.52 3.37 0 22 
Investment-to-shares-to-capital ratio (N12) 19787 0.16 0.60 0 8 
Issued-promissory-notes-to-capital ratio 
(N13) 19788 0.35 1.15 0 16 
      
Composite Liquidity Standard 19796 2.97 6.15 0 54 
Composite Capital  Standard 19799 2.97 5.01 0 42 
      
  Severity of Breaches 
      
Capital adequacy ratio (N1) 19784 0.18 2.02 0 59.12 
Quick liquidity ratio (N2) 19769 0.15 0.81 0 13.98 
Current liquidity ratio (N3) 19787 0.14 0.96 0 26.38 
Long-term liquidity ratio (N4) 19735 0.01 0.09 0 1.82 
General liquidity ratio (N5) 19777 0.05 0.16 0 2.70 
Large-risks-to-capital ratio (N7) 19697 0.00 0.02 0 0.50 
Owner-related-credit-risks-to-capital ratio 
(N9.1) 19738 0.03 0.18 0 4.18 
Insider-related-credit-risks-to-capital ratio 
(N10.1) 19708 0.05 0.41 0 16.44 
Individuals’ deposits-to-capital ratio (N11) 19758 0.13 0.56 0 8.67 
Investment-to-shares-to-capital ratio (N12) 19769 0.03 0.20 0 4.35 
Issued-promissory-notes-to-capital ratio 
(N13) 19748 0.05 0.29 0 5.66 
      
Composite Liquidity Standard 19796 0.09 0.43 0 9.36 
Composite Capital  Standard 19799 0.07 0.33 0 8.45 
Source: Own calculations based on Interfaks, Mobile and CBR. 
Note: The calculations of the compliance variables are based on the period 
1997:Q2 - 2002:Q4. The estimation sample is restricted to the period 1999:Q1 - 
2002:Q4. More detailed information on variable construction is provided in Table 
2.1. Detailed information on regulatory standards is provided in appendix B. 
 TABLE 2.2b 
      
Summary Statistics: Compliance with Regulatory Standards 
      
  Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
      
  
Discounted Number of Breaches 
(α=0.5) 
      
Capital adequacy ratio (N1) 19799 0.36 1.79 0 23.00
Quick liquidity ratio (N2) 19789 0.51 1.97 0 23.00
Current liquidity ratio (N3) 19790 0.67 2.23 0 23.00
Long-term liquidity ratio (N4) 19788 0.07 0.62 0 15.79
General liquidity ratio (N5) 19796 0.60 2.26 0 23.00
Large-risks-to-capital ratio (N7) 19789 0.08 0.76 0 20.43
Owner-related-credit-risks-to-capital ratio 
(N9.1) 19787 0.07 0.49 0 10.50
Insider-related-credit-risks-to-capital ratio 
(N10.1) 19788 0.09 0.73 0 20.67
Individuals’ deposits-to-capital ratio (N11) 19787 1.98 5.09 0 23.00
Investment-to-shares-to-capital ratio (N12) 19787 0.05 0.54 0 18.93
Issued-promissory-notes-to-capital ratio 
(N13) 19788 0.31 1.69 0 23.00
      
Composite Liquidity Standard 19796 1.85 5.80 0 68.95
Composite Capital  Standard 19799 2.95 6.48 0 73.50
      
  
Discounted Severity of Breaches 
(α=0.5) 
      
Capital adequacy ratio (N1) 19798 0.04 0.54 0 40.49
Quick liquidity ratio (N2) 19774 0.09 0.69 0 19.32
Current liquidity ratio (N3) 19790 0.04 0.25 0 11.84
Long-term liquidity ratio (N4) 19748 0.00 0.04 0 1.33
General liquidity ratio (N5) 19784 0.03 0.15 0 2.50
Large-risks-to-capital ratio (N7) 19699 0.00 0.02 0 0.41
Owner-related-credit-risks-to-capital ratio 
(N9.1) 19756 0.01 0.08 0 2.44
Insider-related-credit-risks-to-capital ratio 
(N10.1) 19753 0.03 0.40 0 13.35
Individuals’ deposits-to-capital ratio (N11) 19752 0.11 0.42 0 6.32
Investment-to-shares-to-capital ratio (N12) 19770 0.01 0.07 0 2.34
Issued-promissory-notes-to-capital ratio 
(N13) 19747 0.03 0.22 0 4.79
      
Composite Liquidity Standard 19796 0.04 0.23 0 5.71
Composite Capital  Standard 19799 0.03 0.13 0 5.78
Source: Own calculations based on Interfaks, Mobile and CBR. 
Note: The calculations of the compliance variables are based on the period 1997:Q2 - 
2002:Q4. The estimation sample is restricted to the period 1999:Q1 - 2002:Q4. More 
detailed information on variable construction is provided in Table 2.1. Detailed 
information on regulatory standards is provided in appendix B. 
TABLE 2.3a 
   
Correlation Matrix of Economic Variables - Tacit CBR Objectives - Compliance variables (dnbreach, α=0.5) 
  Return Interbank Government Regional
  Moscow on Cost/ liabilities/ securities/ market
 Deflator Dummy assets assets liabilities assets
share 
(assets)
Deflator 1  
Moscow Dummy 0.0017 1  
Return on assets -0.0003 -0.0148* 1  
Cost/assets 0.3014* -0.2719* -0.0194* 1  
Interbank 
liabilities/liabilities -0.0285* 0.2497* -0.0225* -0.1438* 1 
Government 
securities/assets -0.0042 -0.1855* 0.0272* 0.0290* -0.0773* 1
Regional market share 
(assets) -0.0208* -0.3919* 0.0098 0.0425* -0.0798* 0.1145* 1
Non performing 
loans/loans 0.1160* -0.1562* -0.0280* 0.2102* 0.0055 0.009 0.0186*
Reserves/assets -0.0571* -0.1118* 0.0586* 0.0703* -0.2996* 0.0968* 0.0064
Regional Herfindahl 
(assets) -0.0052 -0.5965* 0.0104 0.2346* -0.1747* 0.1196* 0.5325*
Size (log assets) -0.1621* 0.2283* -0.008 -0.3489* 0.3171* 0.0724* 0.1567*
Aggregate number of 
breaches 0.6534* -0.0177* 0.0000 0.1736* -0.0659* 0.0215* -0.0018
Non-reported scores 0.1031* 0.0102 -0.0113 -0.0480* -0.0201* 0.0101 -0.0085
N1 0.0397* -0.0204* -0.0096 0.0229* 0.1141* 0.0528* 0.0330*
N2 0.0900* -0.0372* -0.0237* 0.0562* 0.0821* 0.0526* 0.0174*
N3 0.0527* -0.0883* -0.0256* 0.0681* 0.0582* 0.0664* 0.0575*
N4 0.0380* -0.0078 -0.0162* 0.0009 0.0495* -0.0109 0.0124
N5 0.0624* -0.1130* -0.0238* 0.1094* 0.0440* 0.0061 0.0335*
N7 -0.0286* -0.0212* -0.013 -0.0210* 0.0428* 0.0038 0.0187*
N9.1 0.0864* -0.0682* -0.0077 0.0496* 0.0037 0.0380* 0.0210*
N10.1 0.0278* -0.0351* -0.0202* 0.0137 0.0157* 0.0231* 0.0038
N11 -0.0952* -0.1946* -0.0052 0.0138 -0.0781* 0.0620* 0.2240*
N12 0.0193* -0.0300* -0.0092 0.0042 0.0314* 0.0295* 0.0144*
N13 -0.01 -0.0647* -0.0065 -0.0304* -0.0123 0.0106 0.0185*
Composite Liquidity 
Standard 0.0793* -0.0915* -0.0289* 0.0880* 0.0727* 0.0446* 0.0424*
Composite Capital 
Standard -0.0585* -0.1895* -0.0135 0.0125 -0.0234* 0.0745* 0.1952*
           
 Non Regional Size Aggregate Non-
 performing Reserves/ Herfindahl (log number of reported dnbreach
  loans/loans assets (assets) assets) breaches scores N1
Non performing 
loans/loans 1  
Reserves/assets -0.0513* 1  
Regional Herfindahl 
(assets) 0.1295* 0.0959* 1  
Size (log assets) -0.2226* -0.2162* -0.2157* 1  
Aggregate number of 
breaches 0.1291* -0.0438* 0.0094 -0.2031* 1 
Non-reported scores 0.0878* -0.0545* -0.0078 -0.1094* 0.1691* 1
N1 0.2808* -0.1105* -0.0029 0.0995* 0.0783* 0.0422* 1
N2 0.3696* -0.1736* 0.0279* -0.0372* 0.1370* 0.0862* 0.5175*
N3 0.3696* -0.1110* 0.0695* -0.0381* 0.1135* 0.0554* 0.5267*
N4 0.1810* -0.0592* -0.0087 0.0332* 0.0778* 0.0368* 0.2218*
N5 0.4457* -0.1579* 0.0793* -0.1380* 0.0921* 0.0486* 0.4426*
N7 0.0549* -0.0451* -0.0177* 0.0790* 0.0140* -0.0247* 0.4021*
N9.1 0.1038* -0.0261* 0.0420* -0.0350* 0.1208* 0.0614* 0.0925*
N10.1 0.0647* -0.0133 0.0326* -0.0003 0.0549* 0.0199* 0.1101*
N11 -0.0527* -0.0384* 0.1088* 0.2376* -0.1461* -0.0646* 0.0263*
N12 0.0752* -0.0368* 0.0032 0.0156* 0.0336* 0.0127 0.1254*
N13 0.0185* -0.0375* -0.0494* 0.1100* -0.0092 -0.0124 0.1615*
Composite Liquidity 
Standard 0.4606* -0.1695* 0.0662* -0.0775* 0.1345* 0.0731* 0.5745*
Composite Capital 
Standard 0.0688* -0.0823* 0.0768* 0.2508* -0.0754* -0.0379* 0.4159*
           
 dnbreach dnbreach dnbreach dnbreach dnbreach dnbreach dnbreach
  N2 N3 N4 N5 N7 N9.1 N10.1
N2 1  
N3 0.6514* 1  
N4 0.1894* 0.2096* 1  
N5 0.6041* 0.6554* 0.1912* 1  
N7 0.0927* 0.1685* 0.2478* 0.1167* 1 
N9.1 0.1094* 0.1138* 0.1193* 0.1230* 0.0900* 1
N10.1 0.0851* 0.1423* 0.2089* 0.0500* 0.1221* 0.0767* 1
N11 -0.0351* 0.0001 0.0364* -0.0515* 0.0592* 0.0186* 0.0500*
N12 0.1215* 0.1172* 0.0935* 0.1039* 0.1042* 0.0909* 0.0607*
N13 0.0512* 0.1066* 0.0908* 0.0489* 0.2843* 0.0399* 0.0829*
Composite Liquidity 
Standard 0.8460* 0.8837* 0.3262* 0.8672* 0.1682* 0.1416* 0.1253*
Composite Capital 
Standard 0.1674* 0.2274* 0.1829* 0.1318* 0.3787* 0.1525* 0.2286*
           
 dnbreach dnbreach dnbreach Composite Composite 
 N11 N12 N13 Liquidity  Capital 
   Standard  Standard 
N11 1  
N12 0.0421* 1  
N13 0.1303* 0.1671* 1  
Composite Liquidity 
Standard -0.0281* 0.1368* 0.0871* 1  
Composite Capital 
Standard 0.8442* 0.2201* 0.4678* 0.2152* 1   
Source: Own calculations based on Interfaks, RET and CBR. More detailed information on variable 
construction is provided in Table 2.1. 
 TABLE 2.3b 
        
Correlation Matrix of Economic Variables - Tacit CBR Objectives - Compliance variables (dsbreach, α=0.5) 
  Return Interbank Government Regional
  Moscow on Cost/ liabilities/ securities/ market
 Deflator Dummy assets assets liabilities assets
share 
(assets)
Deflator 1  
Moscow Dummy 0.0017 1  
Return on assets -0.0003 -0.0148* 1  
Cost/assets 0.3014* -0.2719* -0.0194* 1  
Interbank 
liabilities/liabilities -0.0285* 0.2497* -0.0225* -0.1438* 1 
Government 
securities/assets -0.0042 -0.1855* 0.0272* 0.0290* -0.0773* 1
Regional market share 
(assets) -0.0208* -0.3919* 0.0098 0.0425* -0.0798* 0.1145* 1
Non performing 
loans/loans 0.1160* -0.1562* -0.0280* 0.2102* 0.0055 0.009 0.0186*
Reserves/assets -0.0571* -0.1118* 0.0586* 0.0703* -0.2996* 0.0968* 0.0064
Regional Herfindahl 
(assets) -0.0052 -0.5965* 0.0104 0.2346* -0.1747* 0.1196* 0.5325*
Size (log assets) -0.1621* 0.2283* -0.008 -0.3489* 0.3171* 0.0724* 0.1567*
Aggregate number of 
breaches 0.6534* -0.0177* 0 0.1736* -0.0659* 0.0215* -0.0018
Non-reported scores 0.1031* 0.0102 -0.0113 -0.0480* -0.0201* 0.0101 -0.0085
N1 0.0690* -0.0248* -0.0098 0.0702* 0.0526* 0.0061 0.0149*
N2 0.1467* -0.0380* -0.0286* 0.0793* 0.0058 -0.001 0.0302*
N3 0.1226* -0.0396* -0.0231* 0.1057* 0.0260* 0.0078 0.0198*
N4 0.0430* 0.0006 0.0004 -0.0001 0.0705* -0.0054 0.007
N5 0.1403* -0.0803* -0.0506* 0.1192* 0.0449* -0.0021 0.0313*
N7 -0.0237* -0.0218* -0.0045 -0.0160* 0.0494* 0.0035 0.0227*
N9.1 0.0886* -0.0424* -0.0142* 0.0499* 0.0077 0.0153* 0.0141*
N10.1 0.0262* -0.0267* -0.0043 0.0139 0.0259* 0.0242* 0.0056
N11 -0.011 -0.1211* -0.0147* 0.0186* -0.0385* 0.0178* 0.1385*
N12 0.0330* -0.0234* 0.0004 0.0021 0.0380* 0.0115 -0.0005
N13 0.0185* -0.0293* -0.0043 -0.0249* -0.0007 0.0018 -0.003
Composite Liquidity 
Standard 0.1630* -0.0507* -0.0346* 0.1040* 0.0214* 0.0007 0.0325*
Composite Capital 
Standard 0.0610* -0.0945* -0.0166* 0.0543* 0.0287* 0.0250* 0.0754*
                
 Non Regional Size Aggregate Non-
 performing Reserves/ Herfindahl (log number of reported dsbreach
  loans/loans assets (assets) assets) breaches scores N1
Non performing 
loans/loans 1  
Reserves/assets -0.0513* 1  
Regional Herfindahl 
(assets) 0.1295* 0.0959* 1  
Size (log assets) -0.2226* -0.2162* -0.2157* 1  
Aggregate number of 
breaches 0.1291* -0.0438* 0.0094 -0.2031* 1 
Non-reported scores 0.0878* -0.0545* -0.0078 -0.1094* 0.1691* 1
N1 0.2003* -0.0408* 0.0332* -0.0365* 0.0766* 0.0334* 1
N2 0.2345* -0.0918* 0.0257* -0.0407* 0.1577* 0.0900* 0.2560*
N3 0.3142* -0.0977* 0.0291* -0.0519* 0.1441* 0.0903* 0.2658*
N4 0.1247* -0.0451* -0.0119 0.0309* 0.0711* 0.0417* 0.0441*
N5 0.4581* -0.1529* 0.0523* -0.1176* 0.1654* 0.0940* 0.2995*
N7 0.0690* -0.0392* -0.0044 0.0630* 0.0051 -0.0248* 0.0453*
N9.1 0.1099* -0.0354* 0.0311* -0.0377* 0.1204* 0.0603* 0.0238*
N10.1 0.0510* -0.0139 0.0364* -0.0331* 0.0500* 0.0177* 0.0228*
N11 0.0348* -0.0448* 0.0386* 0.1613* -0.0104 -0.0047 0.0291*
N12 0.0972* -0.0411* 0.0076 -0.0096 0.0512* 0.0264* 0.0486*
N13 0.0577* -0.0377* -0.0342* 0.0578* 0.0533* 0.0117 0.0277*
Composite Liquidity 
Standard 0.3297* -0.1185* 0.0341* -0.0601* 0.1820* 0.1055* 0.2966*
Composite Capital 
Standard 0.1875* -0.0664* 0.0480* 0.0491* 0.0891* 0.0342* 0.6243*
           
 dsbreach dsbreach dsbreach dsbreach dsbreach dsbreach dsbreach
  N2 N3 N4 N5 N7 N9.1 N10.1
N2 1  
N3 0.7048* 1  
N4 0.1091* 0.1162* 1  
N5 0.5406* 0.7631* 0.1614* 1  
N7 0.0340* 0.0548* 0.1644* 0.0789* 1 
N9.1 0.1232* 0.0806* 0.0472* 0.1479* 0.0270* 1
N10.1 0.0592* 0.0494* 0.1646* 0.0463* 0.0390* 0.0998* 1
N11 0.0858* 0.0569* 0.0900* 0.0794* 0.0918* 0.1781* 0.1038*
N12 0.0681* 0.0809* 0.0934* 0.1257* 0.0712* 0.0815* 0.0941*
N13 0.0582* 0.0622* 0.1128* 0.0808* 0.1607* 0.1074* 0.1081*
Composite Liquidity 
Standard 0.9674* 0.7401* 0.1838* 0.7307* 0.0591* 0.1367* 0.0709*
Composite Capital 
Standard 0.2435* 0.2314* 0.1779* 0.2565* 0.1532* 0.2616* 0.5306*
           
 dsbreach dsbreach dsbreach Composite Composite 
 N11 N12 N13 Liquidity  Capital 
     Standard  Standard 
N11 1  
N12 0.1526* 1  
N13 0.1600* 0.1597* 1     
Composite Liquidity 
Standard 0.0943* 0.0944* 0.0766* 1    
Composite Capital 
Standard 0.5925* 0.2498* 0.3980* 0.2840*     
Source: Own calculations based on Interfaks, RET and CBR. More detailed information on variable 
construction is provided in Table 2.1. 
 
TABLE 2.4 
    
Descriptive statistics 
    
  In Sample of Estimation 
Analysis time 1999:Q1 - 2002:Q4 
No. of banks 1443 
No. of failures 194 
        
    
Reason of Failure Percent Cum. 
    
Violation of bank 
legislation 30.81 30.81 
Compulsory 
Bankruptcy 64.72 95.53 
Voluntary liquidation 4.47 100 
Source: Own calculations based on CBR. Note: The 
calculations of the compliance variables are based on the 
period 1997:Q2 - 2002:Q4. The estimation sample is 
restricted to the period 1999:Q1 - 2002:Q4. More detailed 
information on variable construction is provided in Table 2.1. 
Detailed information on regulatory standards is provided in 
appendix B. 
 
TABLE 2.5 
       
Regression Results for the Logit Model – Coefficient Estimates of Equation (1) 
     
Dependent variable: License withdrawal 
Regulatory violations measured as:    
 (1) dnbreach (2) dsbreach 
 I II III IV V VI 
 (α=0.3) (α=0.5) (α=0.7) (α=0.3) (α=0.5) (α=0.7) 
             
          
       
Constant -4.8568*** -4.2327*** -3.8286*** -2.4839*** -2.3149*** -2.3934***
 [1.1575] [0.9951] [0.8417] [0.5342] [0.5373] [0.6430]
Deflator 0.2101** 0.2478*** 0.2587*** 0.3080*** 0.2957*** 0.2626***
 [0.1047] [0.0889] [0.0828] [0.0743] [0.0769] [0.0827]
Moscow Dummy 1.4742** 1.3252** 1.1280** 0.8439*** 0.8135*** 0.8885**
 [0.5777] [0.5304] [0.4663] [0.2899] [0.2930] [0.3515]
Economic Variables       
Return on assets -0.0065 -0.0061 -0.0054 -0.0152** -0.0111* -0.0067
 [0.0043] [0.0045] [0.0045] [0.0061] [0.0060] [0.0057]
Cost/assets 0.1676*** 0.1377*** 0.1168*** 0.0976*** 0.0933*** 0.0970***
 [0.0517] [0.0437] [0.0389] [0.0236] [0.0246] [0.0307]
Interbank liabilities/liabilities -0.0227** -0.0180** -0.0157** -0.0036 -0.0044 -0.007
 [0.0101] [0.0077] [0.0070] [0.0048] [0.0047] [0.0056]
Government securities/assets -0.0022 -0.0144 -0.0118 0.0360*** 0.0336*** 0.0357**
 [0.0208] [0.0204] [0.0198] [0.0124] [0.0128] [0.0147]
Regional market share (assets) -0.0217 -0.0106 -0.0082 -0.0029 -0.0042 -0.0054
 [0.0252] [0.0234] [0.0213] [0.0145] [0.0134] [0.0162]
Non performing loans/loans 0.0312*** 0.0249*** 0.0220*** 0.0152*** 0.0141*** 0.0184***
 [0.0090] [0.0074] [0.0068] [0.0041] [0.0042] [0.0063]
Reserves/assets -0.1280*** -0.1146*** -0.1049*** -0.1059*** -0.1071*** -0.1186***
 [0.0245] [0.0225] [0.0206] [0.0173] [0.0175] [0.0199]
Tacit CBR Objectives       
Regional Herfindahl (assets) -0.0005** -0.0004** -0.0004** -0.0003** -0.0003* -0.0002
 [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0002]
Size (log assets) -0.3637*** -0.3968*** -0.3877*** -0.1925*** -0.2116*** -0.2925***
 [0.1084] [0.1092] [0.1005] [0.0592] [0.0590] [0.0795]
Aggregate number of breaches -7.0503*** -6.8104*** -6.1828*** -6.2475*** -6.4850*** -6.8531***
 [1.2993] [1.2703] [1.1516] [0.9130] [0.9196] [1.0356]
          
        (Continued)
 TABLE 2.5 CONTINUED 
       
 
       
 (1) dnbreach (2) dsbreach 
 I II III IV V VI 
 (α=0.3) (α=0.5) (α=0.7) (α=0.3) (α=0.5) (α=0.7) 
             
          
     
Compliance with Regulatory Standards    
Non-reported scores 1.3963*** 1.3501*** 1.3510*** 1.5017*** 1.5031*** 1.1451***
 [0.3221] [0.3004] [0.2848] [0.2299] [0.2326] [0.2798]
Capital adequacy ratio (N1) 0.0827 0.1627** 0.1636*** -0.0551 -0.0075 0.2438*
 [0.0635] [0.0668] [0.0482] [0.0698] [0.0588] [0.1286]
Quick liquidity ratio (N2) 0.5289*** 0.3609*** 0.2738*** 0.2343*** 0.1335** 0.0464
 [0.0940] [0.0631] [0.0481] [0.0669] [0.0611] [0.0791]
Current liquidity ratio (N3) 0.1988** 0.1252** 0.0936** -0.5341 0.5205 1.9889***
 [0.0898] [0.0587] [0.0458] [0.3477] [0.4022] [0.6895]
Long-term liquidity ratio (N4) -0.1957 -0.1056 -0.0554 0.5553 1.1216 3.6602***
 [0.1894] [0.1214] [0.0914] [0.8303] [0.9327] [1.2212]
General liquidity ratio (N5) -0.0155 0.0336 0.0485 2.9008*** 1.7809*** 0.8242
 [0.0859] [0.0600] [0.0462] [0.5298] [0.4347] [0.6321]
Large-risks-to-capital ratio (N7) 0.2159 0.1385 0.0863 -1.1979 4.6474 7.9862**
 [0.1501] [0.0999] [0.0742] [3.0678] [3.0297] [3.5809]
Owner-related-credit-risks- 0.5311** 0.2926** 0.1778 1.3059*** 0.9348* 1.0986*
to-capital ratio (N9.1) [0.2151] [0.1482] [0.1172] [0.4339] [0.5432] [0.6470]
Insider-related-credit-risks- 0.3559*** 0.2443** 0.1702** 0.0055 0.0971 0.6097**
to-capital ratio (N10.1) [0.1173] [0.0981] [0.0843] [0.0761] [0.1515] [0.2432]
Individuals’ deposits- -0.0441 -0.047 -0.0493 -0.2952 -0.2254 -0.455
to-capital ratio (N11) [0.0665] [0.0567] [0.0498] [0.2192] [0.2471] [0.3368]
Investment-to-shares- 0.2748* 0.1356 0.0628 -0.1141 -0.7325 0.5381
to-capital ratio (N12) [0.1633] [0.1335] [0.1006] [0.7454] [1.4356] [1.2281]
Issued-promissory-notes- 0.0466 0.0233 0.028 0.0347 -0.2914 -0.435
to-capital ratio (N13) [0.1077] [0.0794] [0.0629] [0.3490] [0.5711] [0.5757]
          
Observations 19122 19360 19360 19086 19122 19145
Number of banks 1366 1366 1366 1355 1355 1358
Log Likelihood -554.83 -534.9 -529.52 -538.68 -523.97 -520.32
Wald chi2 141.33 150.02 168.17 440.38 453.37 209
          
Note: The breach variables in the regression equation are: (1) discounted number of breaches assuming exponential 
smoothing: (I) dnbreach (α=0.3), (II) dnbreach (α=0.5), (III) dnbreach (α=0.7), (2) discounted severity of breaches 
assuming exponential smoothing: (IV) dsbreach (α=0.3), (V) dsbreach (α=0.5), (VI) dsbreach (α=0.7). The 
dependent variable is a dummy variable, license withdrawal, which equals one in the quarter when a bank’s license 
was revoked and zero otherwise. Moscow is a dummy variable which equals one if the bank is located in Moscow and 
zero otherwise. The Herfindahl index is an average over time. All other variables are time-varying. Table 2.1 
provides a more detailed description of all variables. The logit estimations are performed under the RE assumption. 
Robust standard errors are given in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent 
respectively. 
 
TABLE 2.6 
          
Regression Results for the Logit Model – Coefficient Estimates of Equation (2)  (Note: part of estimation output omitted) 
Dependent variable: License withdrawal 
Regulatory violations measured as: (1) Clusters of dnbreach (α=0.5)  (2) Clusters of dsbreach (α=0.5) 
 I II III IV  V VI VII VIII 
              
Compliance with Regulatory Standards    
Non-reported scores 1.4686*** 1.4885*** 1.5388*** 1.7966***  1.3906*** 1.3941*** 1.3986*** 1.1153***
 [0.2862] [0.2765] [0.2871] [0.2706]  [0.2253] [0.2268] [0.2235] [0.2321]
Composite Liquidity Standard 0.1851*** 0.2197*** 0.1408*** 0.0624**  1.2681*** 1.7845*** 0.8420*** 2.9781***
 [0.0316] [0.0339] [0.0368] [0.0297]  [0.1616] [0.2650] [0.2872] [0.5661]
Composite Capital  Standard 0.0616*** 0.0287 0.2879*** -0.0222  0.3142 0.4399 0.121 1.988
 [0.0220] [0.0343] [0.0613] [0.0406]  [0.2861] [0.6505] [0.4926] [1.3273]
Composite Liquidity*Herfindahl -0.0000***    -0.0003***   
 [0.0000]    [0.0001]   
Composite Capital *Herfindahl 0.0000    0.0000   
 [0.0000]    [0.0002]   
Composite Liquidity*Size  0.0083    0.0954
  [0.0057]    [0.0592]
Composite Capital *Size  -0.0458***    0.1164
  [0.0115]    [0.1274]
Composite Liquidity* 
Aggregate number of breaches  0.3243***  -3.1719***
 [0.0708]  [0.9603]
Composite Capital * 
Aggregate number of breaches    0.2024**     -3.2768
    [0.1032]     [2.4641]
Observations 19360 19360 19360 19360   19360 19360 19360 19360
Number of banks 1366 1366 1366 1366  1366 1366 1366 1366
Log Likelihood -554.31 -550.74 -543.37 -530.85  -616.51 -611.73 -614.22 -603.82
Wald chi2 149.71 170.88 157.74 177.31   318.26 319.31 323.73 282
Note: The breach variables in the regression equation are: (1) the sum of dnbreach of standards 2, 3, 4 and 5 (α=0.5), (2) the average of dsbreach of standards 
1, 71 9.1, 10.1, 11, 12 and 13 (α=0.5). The dependent variable is a dummy variable, license withdrawal, which equals one in the quarter when a bank’s license 
was revoked and zero otherwise. Next to compliance with regulatory standards, we also include economic and tacit objectives as in Table 2.5. To ease 
presentation of results, these coefficients are omitted The logit estimations are performed under the RE assumption. Robust standard errors are given in 
brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively. 
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Chapter 3
The sequence of bank
liberalization: Financial
repression versus capital
requirements in Russia.
3.1 Introduction
Reserve requirements are widely used as a tool of monetary policy aimed at maintain-
ing financial stability. Typically, compulsory reserves yield a low or even zero return.
In an economy with high inflation, this return is often negative in real terms, and
consequently causes distorted incentives for bank asset allocation decisions. When
this occurs, reserve requirements become a tool of financial repression.
After the collapse of the Soviet economy, many transition economies embarked
on a process of bank market liberalization that led to increased competition. Gov-
ernments started to abolish or loosen interest rate regulations and asset choice re-
strictions and gradually reduced barriers to entry. Banks were forced to compete
more aggressively in the loan and deposit markets, thereby lowering their current
and future expected profits. This led banks to engage in more risky activities. The
opportunities for increased bank riskiness further expanded as a number of restric-
tions on bank activities were softened or abolished. Activities that were previously
precluded, such as derivatives and foreign currency trading and real estate lend-
ing, further opened up opportunities to shift the profile of banks toward more risky
projects.
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Along with financial liberalization, governments installed new bank regulations
governing the classification of problem loans and mandatory provisions for non-
performing loans. New accounting rules and tighter standards were adopted. Min-
imum capital requirements (following the Basel Accords) were imposed, as were
higher initial capital base requirements and stricter regulations on banks’ exposure
to a single borrower (Gorton and Winton, 1998).
Russia represents a country in which reserve requirements, together with other
financially repressive measures, eﬀectively put a tax on the banking sector. More-
over, a number of prudential regulations aimed at lowering bank risk behavior were
installed.1
Specifically, on April 1, 1996, the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) introduced
a new and revised set of prudential regulations, taking into account international
banking practices.2 The new prudential bank standards include, in addition to min-
imal capital requirements, regulations on capital adequacy requirements, liquidity
requirements, credit risk requirements, and a number of non-compulsory guidelines.
In 1998, a new accounting system came into force that moved away from Russian
accounting standards toward international accounting standards. In April 2004, an
updated version of Instruction No. 1 came into eﬀect, which intended to reduce the
opportunities and incentives for banks to manipulate their accounts. Most recently,
in 2005, the CBR screened and approved all banks that want to participate in the
implementation of a deposit insurance agency (Tompson, 2004). Although the main
motivations for introducing a deposit insurance scheme are to increase public con-
fidence, promote financial stability (prevent bank runs) and enhance competition
(levelling the playing field with Sberbank), it may cause banks to behave less pru-
dently and resort to ‘gamble for their resurrection’ (Kane, 1989). As a result, banks
choose a risky asset portfolio that pays out high profits when gambling is successful,
but leave the deposit insurer with the losses if the gamble fails.
In the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, governments started bringing
down reserve requirements, while at the same time introducing capital requirements.
Financial repression, however, remained high. Table 3.1 shows the evolution of
reserve requirements (β), the return on the reserves (rr) and inflation for four Eastern
1Emerging financial markets often tend to be restricted by rules governing the composition of
bank balance sheets, such as high reserve requirements, interest-rate ceilings, foreign-exchange rate
regulations and other types of explicit or implicit taxes on the financial sector (Denizer et al., 1998).
For an analysis of the optimal degree of financial repression, see e.g. Bencivenga and Smith (1992)
who develop a model in which an increase in reserve requirements represses the development of the
financial system.
2These regulations are summarized in the CBR Instruction No. 1 of January 30, 1996, “On the
Procedure for Regulating the Activities of Credit Organisations”.
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European transition countries for the period 1993-1999. Even when reserves were
remunerated, the return was often negative in real terms. In Russia, the CBR has
set (zero return) reserve requirements varying between 5 and 22 percent for diﬀerent
deposit classes (Figure 3.5). In the EMU countries, reserve requirements are set at
2 percent and are remunerated at the EONIA rate.
Table 3.1: Reserve requirements (β), return on reserves (rr) and inflation (%).
Croatia Estonia
β rr inflation β rr inflation
1993 1446.7 10 0 89.9
1994 5.15 107.3 10 0 47.7
1995 39.5 5.5 4 10 0 28.7
1996 35.9 5.5 4.3 10 0 23.1
1997 32 4.5 4.1 10 0 10.6
1998 30.5 5.9 6.4 10 0 8.2
1999 30 5.9 3.7 13 EONIA 3.3
Hungary Romania
β rr inflation β rr inflation
1993 3 22.6 10 254.4
1994 12 8 18.8 25 137
1995 17 15.5 28.4 9.1 32.3
1996 12 14 23.5 12 38.8
1997 12 14 18.3 15 154.8
1998 12 10 14.4 15 10.25 59.1
1999 12 8.25 10.3 25 9.5 45.8
Source: Schoors (2002).
In an environment characterized by financial repression, the adoption of Western-
style bank regulation and supervision might produce adverse eﬀects. While liber-
alization may increase the riskiness of the banking system and weaken its function
as an intermediary for investment and growth, prudential regulation is especially
designed to reduce such perverse risk incentives. The introduction of new bank reg-
ulation and supervision therefore needs to be optimally sequenced in conjunction
with the process of liberalization and the easing of financial repression, in order to
avoid financial crises and to build a well-functioning credit market.
In this chapter we highlight one particular aspect of financial repression: the
presence of high, but lowly compensated reserve requirements and its eﬀects on
bank risk-taking. We model the interaction between reserve requirements, capital
adequacy rules and risk-taking by banks in a stylized transition-economy environ-
ment. We focus specifically on capital requirements because they are able to oﬀset
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risk behavior due to a loss in franchise value.3 Although we think that our findings
have broad implications for financial regulatory design in emerging markets, we fo-
cus our arguments on the setting in the transition countries of Central and Eastern
Europe.
3.2 The model
Our model builds on the framework used in Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000),
who use a dynamic model of moral hazard in which competition can undermine
prudent bank behavior. They find that while capital requirements may succeed
in reducing gambling behavior, they negatively aﬀect banks’ franchise values, and
thus induce gambling behavior. Therefore, they advocate the use of deposit rate
ceilings to sustain bank franchise value as a Pareto improvement compared to capital
requirements. Repullo (2004) extends the model by Hellmann et al. (2000) and
investigates the eﬀects of introducing a risk-based capital requirement and deposit
rate ceilings in a dynamic model of imperfect competition. Our model builds on the
framework used in Hellmann et al. (2000), but we focus on assessing how bank risk-
taking behavior changes when capital requirements are introduced in a financially
repressed economy. By introducing reserve requirements on the bank’s asset side, we
can analyze the eﬀects of reducing financial repression and simultaneously investigate
the interplay with the introduction of risk-based capital requirements.
Consider an infinite horizon model with N > 2 banks. The balance sheet of each
bank j = 1, ..., N consists of two assets, loans L and reserves R, and two liabilities,
deposits D and capital C. In each period, the bank oﬀers an interest rate rdj in
competition with the other banks who oﬀer rd−j .
4 Depositors are protected by a
deposit insurance scheme, such that the total volume of deposits for bank j can
be denoted by D
³
rdj , r
d
−j
´
, which are increasing in the bank’s own interest rate
and decreasing in the competitor’s rate (∂Dj/∂rdj > 0 and ∂Dj/∂r
d
−j < 0).
5 All
banks are subject to prudential regulation under the form of a risk-based capital
3See for example Rochet (1992), Dewatripont and Tirole (1994).
4We do not model the form of competition explicitly. For an overview on issues concerning
competition and bank stability, see Carletti and Hartmann (2002). Repullo (2004) used the frame-
work of Hellmann et al. (2000) to introduce the eﬀects of imperfect competition via a framework
à la Salop. He finds that imposing deposit rate ceilings do not always guarantee the existence of a
prudent equilibrium.
5While many transition economies adopted an explicit deposit insurance scheme by the mid-
1990s, Russia has only initiated a framework for deposit insurance in 2005. See Demirguç-Kunt and
Sobaci (2000) for an overview of deposit insurance around the world.
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requirement k, 0 < k < 1, such that for all banks j, Cj ≥ kLj must hold.6 Each
bank j chooses the amount of capital Cj = kjLj , subject to kj ≥ k. Further assume
that the opportunity cost of capital is exogenous and denoted by ρ.7 After funds
have been raised, each bank allocates its assets. Banks have to maintain part of
their deposits with the central bank due to the reserve requirement. For each bank
j, Rj = βDj holds, and the reserve requirement R pays an interest rate rr.8 We
assume that rr is below the risk-free rate in order to capture one pervasive aspect
of financial repression still present in many transition economies. In what follows,
we will refer to financial repression as the situation in which rr = 0 and β > 0.
Assumptions Following Hellman et al. (2000) and Repullo (2004), we assume
that banks invest the remaining funds in either of two assets: a prudent loan, which
yields a return of α, or a gambling asset, which yields a return of γ with probability
θ and 0 with probability 1− θ. We further assume that:
γ > α > θγ, (3.1)
ρ > α, (3.2)
α > rr, (3.3)
α > ρk. (3.4)
Condition (3.1) implies that the gambling asset is dominated in terms of expected
return by the prudent loan but yields a higher payoﬀ when the gamble succeeds.
Condition (3.2) captures the problem of moral hazard in banking, namely that bank
capital is costly. If bank capital were not so costly, regulators would be able to
6The capital requirement is risk-based because the minimal capital requirement is a function of
the only class of risky assets, i.e. loans. Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia and the Ukraine have all adopted the Basel I 8%
risk-weighted capital-to-assets ratio, although this does not imply much about its enforcement (see
Claeys et al. (2005) for an assessment of the enforcement of prudential regulation in Russia).
7This implies an elastic supply of capital funds.
8When the rate at which reserves are compensated is lower than the risk-free rate, banks are
assumed not to hold voluntarily more reserves than what is required by the central bank. If the
risk-free rate were lower, a bank could achieve infinite profits by borrowing at a market rate and
holding infinite reserves (Mitchell, 1982). However, even when reserves are not compensated, some
banks in transition economies do hold excess reserves because they have only few alternatives to
allocate their assets or are faced with low enforcement of creditor rights (Denizer et al., 1998).
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force banks to hold suﬃcient capital in order to induce prudent lending without
any protest from the banks. Condition (3.3) unveils a typical feature of financial
repression. Specifically, the return on reserves is lower than the interest rate on the
prudent loan. Finally, condition (3.4) states that the capital cost of loans should
never exceed the return on the prudent loan. If this were the case, no bank would
have an incentive to lend prudently.
Timing Each bank j receives a license from the regulator to operate at an
initial date t = 0. The asset choice of the bank is not observed by the depositors nor
the regulator. At the end of each period, the regulator inspects the balance sheet of
all banks. When a bank is revealed to be insolvent and cannot repay its depositors,
its licence is withdrawn. Following Hellmann et al. (2000), a gambling bank will
earn an insuﬃcient return to repay depositors in case the gamble fails.
Prudential regulation in Russia comprises a number of regulatory standards,
among which capital adequacy and liquidity rules, with which banks need to comply
in order to maintain their bank license. Although enforcement of these regulations is
low in general and often entail only minor punitive fines, some enforcement in terms
of license withdrawal is observed for capital and liquidity regulations (see chapter
2). In contrast to what the model assumptions imply, gambling banks may be able
to repay depositors, even when the gamble fails. Only in the acute case when a
bank’s capital falls below a specified level such that its solvency is at stake, some
regulatory intervention would be warranted.9 We assume that failure of the gamble
implies the forced closure of the bank.
All banks simultaneously choose the level of capital and oﬀer a deposit rate. All
banks maximize their expected discounted profits: V =
P∞
t=0 δ
tπt, hence strategies
will correspond to the infinitely repeated static Nash equilibrium. V is a measure of
the bank’s franchise value, in which higher levels of the discount factor δ result in
higher expected discounted profits. Depositors choose the bank at which they want
to place their funds, after which banks choose to lend prudently or gamble. When
returns are realized, the regulator checks the balance sheet.
9 In this spirit, prompt corrective action rules were introduced in 1991 in the US by the Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) to allow for early intervention in
problem banks to save them from becoming insolvent (Goldberg and Hudgins, 2002). PCA aims
at preventing banks from “gambling for their resurrection” (Kane, 1989) by enabling regulators to
close down failing banks, even at a positive level of capital.
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3.3 Competitive equilibrium
3.3.1 The model with the prudent asset
At each time t, each bank j chooses the optimal amount of capital it wants to hold
via the capital requirement kj and oﬀers a deposit rate rdj . The bank places a fraction
β of its deposits with the central bank to comply with the reserve requirement. The
reserves yield a return rr. The remaining funds are invested in the prudent asset, a
loan which yields a return α. Banks incur a fixed cost µ due to the monitoring of
borrowers’ actions.10 The per-period profits for each bank j are:
πPj (r
d
j , r
d
−j , kj) = αLj + r
rR− rdjDj − ρCj − µj . (3.5)
This can be rearranged via the balance sheet constraints Cj = kjLj , Rj = βDj and
Lj = Dj + Cj −Rj , such that the problem of bank j at date t becomes:
max
kj≥k
πPj (·) =
∙
rrβ − rdj +
(1− β)
(1− kj)
· (α− ρkj)
¸
·Dj
³
rdj , r
d
−j
´
. (3.6)
Diﬀerentiating the objective function (3.6) with respect to kj , and using assumption
(3.2), gives:
(1− β) · [α− ρ] ·Dj(·) < 0, (3.7)
in which the strict inequality follows from (3.2) and we thus have the corner solution
kj = k. Indeed, when the cost of capital exceeds the return on the prudent asset, no
bank has an incentive to hold any capital above the legal requirement. Substituting
this result into the objective function (3.6) and diﬀerentiating with respect to rdj
gives the following first order condition:
−Dj +
∙
rrβ − rdj +
(1− β)
(1− k) · (α− ρk)
¸
· ∂Dj/∂rdj = 0. (3.8)
For a symmetric Nash equilibrium we set rdj = r
d
−j = r
d
P , where r
d
P is the equilibrium
deposit rate when the bank chooses to lend prudently. Let ε = ∂D/∂rd · rd/D, then
the equilibrium prudent deposit rate is given by:
rdP =
∙
rrβ +
(1− β)
(1− k) · (α− ρk)
¸
· ε
ε+ 1
. (3.9)
10One alternative way to incorporate monitoring into the model is to let banks incur a variable
cost depending on the volume of loans. Gropp and Vesala (2004) and Cordella and Yeyati (2002)
let borrowers’ default risk depend on the amount of monitoring.
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From (3.9) and (3.2) we can infer that rdP is decreasing in the capital requirement
k. The higher k, the more solvent a bank becomes and thus the less it has to pay
depositors for the risk they take by entrusting their savings to the bank. When
there is financial repression, one can derive that the intermediation margin increases
with the reserve requirement. Higher reserve requirements impose a tax on deposits
and banks will be induced to pass this tax on to the depositors in the form of lower
deposit rates. This finding is consistent with empirical evidence for Russia (Karas,
Pyle and Schoors, 2005) and Latin America (Brock and Suarez, 2000). If there were
neither capital nor reserve requirements, rdP = α· εε+1 . In this case, when competition
for deposits becomes suﬃciently high (ε→∞), the prudent deposit rate approaches
α and the equilibrium intermediation margin approaches zero. Competition can
thus be seen as one of the main causes of lower intermediation spreads and the
associated erosion of bank franchise value. If this eﬀect starts to dominate, banks
will be induced to gamble.
3.3.2 The model with the gambling asset
Each bank j chooses the optimal amount of capital via kj and raises deposits by
oﬀering a deposit rate rdj . The bank again places a fraction β of its deposits with the
central bank (with a return rr, 0 < rr < α), but now invests the remaining funds in
the gambling asset. The per-period profits for each bank j become:
πGj (r
d
j , r
d
−j , kj) = θ ·
h
γLj + r
rR− rdjDj
i
− ρCj − µj . (3.10)
The bank’s objective function is similar to the one with the prudent loan, but now
the return on the loan is γ instead of α and the total profit depends on whether the
gamble is successful or not. When it is successful, the bank gets a high return and
can repay its depositors. When the gamble fails, the bank will be closed down. As
before we can use the balance sheet constraints to identify the objective function of
each bank j:
max
kj≥k
πGj (·) =
½
θ ·
h
rrβ − rdj
i
+
(1− β)
(1− kj)
· [θγ − ρkj ]
¾
·Dj
³
rdj , r
d
−j
´
. (3.11)
Diﬀerentiating (3.11) with respect to kj and using assumptions (3.1) and (3.2) gives:
(1− β) · [θγ − ρ] ·Dj < (1− β) · [α− ρ] ·Dj < 0, (3.12)
so that kj = k will always hold, similar to the case of prudent lending.
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Substituting this result into the objective function (3.11) and diﬀerentiating with
respect to rdj gives the following first order condition:
−θDj +
∙
θ · [rrβ − rdj ] +
(1− β)
(1− k) · (θγ − ρk)
¸
· ∂Dj/∂rdj = 0. (3.13)
The symmetric Nash equilibrium is again obtained by setting rdj = r
d
−j = r
d
G. Solving
(3.13) for rdG yields the equilibrium deposit rate when the bank chooses the gambling
asset:
rdG =
∙
rrβ +
(1− β)
(1− k) · (γ − ρk/θ)
¸
· ε
ε+ 1
. (3.14)
We again obtain that when there are neither capital nor reserve requirements, com-
petition may lead to intermediation margins that approach zero. Further, as long
as the capital requirement does not exceed k = θ/(1 − θ) · (γ − α)/ρ, the bank is
willing to oﬀer a higher deposit rate than when it chooses to lend prudently. In what
follows, we assume that k < k always holds. This leads to the following condition
for each k > 0:
(θγ − ρk)
θ
> (α− ρk), (3.15)
namely that the (one period) net gain from gambling, conditional on gambling being
successful, should always exceed the (one period) net gain from lending prudently.
Would this condition not be fulfilled, no bank would have an incentive to gamble.
3.3.3 The no-gambling condition: rationality constraint
Now that we have separately analyzed the cases of a prudent and a gambling equi-
librium, we can derive conditions under which either of the two equilibria will occur.
We follow the approach of Hellmann et al. (2000) and derive a critical deposit rate,
rcrit, under which the equilibrium deposit rate has to lie such that banks will not
be tempted to gamble in the asset allocation stage. Each bank compares its return
from gambling or investing safely, conditional on the deposits it has raised. A bank
will choose to invest prudently whenever its discounted expected return from pru-
dent behavior exceeds the discounted expected return from gambling, i.e. whenever
VG(·) ≤ VP (·). This is equal to the following condition:
πG(·)
1− δθ ≤
πP (·)
1− δ , (3.16)
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or after rearranging:
πG(·)− πP (·) ≤ (1− θ) · δ · π
P (·)
1− δ . (3.17)
Condition (3.17) states that the one-period gain from gambling must be less than
the (discounted) franchise value (δVP (·)) that the bank loses whenever the gamble
fails (with probability 1− θ) (Hellman et al., 2000). Plugging in the profit functions
(3.6) and (3.11), condition (3.17) becomes:
rdj ≤ rrβ +
(1− δθ)
(1− θ) ·
(1− β)
(1− k) · α−
(1− β)
(1− k) ·
∙
(1− δ)θ
1− θ · γ + δρk
¸
. (3.18)
Let rcrit be the critical deposit rate for which each bank is indiﬀerent between
gambling and being prudent. From (3.18) we get:
rcrit = rrβ +
(1− β)
(1− k) · {(1− δ) · [(α− θγ)/(1− θ)] + δ · [α− ρk]} . (3.19)
From (3.19) it is straightforward to see that:
∂rcrit/∂α > 0, ∂rcrit/∂γ < 0, ∂rcrit/∂θ < 0 and ∂rcrit/∂rr > 0. (3.20)
The higher the return on the prudent loan and the lower the return on the gamble
and its probability of success, the less gambling will occur. Furthermore, an increase
in the interest rate on required reserves will reduce gambling.
3.4 Financial liberalization and prudential regulation
Central banks use reserve requirements as a tool of monetary policy aimed at main-
taining financial stability. Nonetheless, it does not explain why some governments
resort to financial repression. Empirical evidence shows that countries with high
reserve requirements grow more slowly and have less developed financial systems
than countries with low reserve ratios (Haslag and Koo, 1999). While reserve re-
quirements can function as a means to secure systemic stability, they hinder credit
growth and financial development. Reducing financial repression should however
be optimally sequenced, together with the introduction of prudential regulations in
order to curb bank risk behavior.
In view of the frequent use of reserve requirements in transition economies, often
with a negative real return, we investigate how the softening of financial repression
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and the introduction of capital requirements aﬀect banks’ risk behavior.
3.4.1 Reserve requirements and gambling behavior
Central banks in emerging economies often use reserve requirements as one of their
most important monetary policy tool. We focus specifically on how changes in the
level of reserve requirements impact bank risk behavior. We can show that reserve
requirements may indeed be useful in restricting bank risk-taking. More generally,
in a financially repressed environment, we can show that the following proposition
holds:
Proposition 1 In a financially repressed environment (rr = 0 and β > 0) and in
the absence of a capital requirement (k = 0), a policy of reducing reserve requirements
will increase gambling behavior.
Proof. The no-gambling condition is downward sloping and linear with respect to
β, as long as δ < eδ, eδ ≡ (α−θγ)−rr(1−k)(1−θ)(α−θγ)+(1−θ)·(ρk−α) . For rr = 0 and k = 0, eδ →∞. Given
that δ < 1, δ < eδ and ¯¯¯∂rcrit∂β ¯¯¯ < ¯¯¯∂rd∂β ¯¯¯ will always hold.
Proposition 1 indicates that reducing reserve requirements in the absence of a capital
requirement may increase bank risk behavior. Banks will maintain a low capital
level, such that the capital-at-risk eﬀect is quasi absent and gambling becomes a
straightforward choice. Figure 3.1 illustrates how reducing reserve requirements
may indeed increase gambling behavior of banks. Any reduction in required reserves
leads banks to charge a higher deposit rate consistent with gambling behavior.
Clearly, easing financial repression may not be optimal in an environment charac-
terized by low or badly enforced capital requirements. Before we assess the combined
eﬀect of introducing capital requirements in a banking environment characterized by
financial repression, we replicate the result on capital requirements and risk behavior
by Hellmann et al. (2000).
3.4.2 Capital requirements and gambling behavior
We can summarize the relationship between capital requirements and bank risk
behavior in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 For suﬃciently myopic banks (δ ≤ δ), capital requirements can suc-
cessfully reduce gambling behavior.
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Figure 3.1: Reserve requirements (β) and gambling behavior (k = 0). Note: shaded
area represents gambling behavior.
r
β
dr
critr
Proof. The no-gambling condition is upward sloping and convex with respect to k,
as long as δ ≤ δ, δ ≡ α−θγ(α−θγ)+(1−θ)·(ρ−α) .
Proposition 2 results from the fact that higher capital requirements leave sharehold-
ers with a larger proportion of funds at stake. This should encourage more prudent
behavior. Figure 3.2 graphically shows the result of proposition 2.
The result of proposition 2 hinges upon the assumption that banks are suﬃciently
myopic (0 < δ ≤ δ < 1). One of the main results in Hellmann et al. (2000) is
that for more far-sighted banks (δ > δ), a capital requirement may actually increase
gambling behavior because in this case, the negative franchise-value eﬀect dominates
the capital-at-risk eﬀect. It is important to note that threshold δ is endogenous with
respect to a country’s institutional and regulatory characteristics. Specifically, banks
in countries that are characterized by high levels of loan default risk (proxied by θ)
and a high cost of capital (ρ) - both typical of emerging financial systems - will
be relatively more far-sighted. In such an environment, capital requirements may
hinder prudent bank behavior.
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Figure 3.2: Capital requirements (k) and gambling behavior. Note: shaded area
represents gambling behavior.
r
k
dr
critr
3.4.3 Capital requirements in a financially repressed banking sys-
tem
Proposition 3 In a financially repressed environment (rr = 0 and β > 0) with
a stable capital requirement (k < k), a policy of reducing reserve requirements will
increase gambling behavior.
Proof. The no-gambling condition is upward sloping and linear with respect to β,
as long as δ > eδ, eδ ≡ (α−θγ)−rr(1−k)(1−θ)(α−θγ)+(1−θ)·(ρk−α) . For rr = 0 and a capital requirement that
satisfies condition (3.15): k < k, k = θ/(1 − θ) · (γ − α)/ρ, it follows that eδ < 0.
Given that 0 ≤ δ < 1, δ > eδ and ¯¯¯∂rcrit∂β ¯¯¯ < ¯¯¯∂rd∂β ¯¯¯ will always hold.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the result of proposition 3.
Proposition 4 In a financially repressed environment (rr = 0 and β > 0) with a
capital requirement (k < k), a combined policy of reducing reserve requirements and
increasing capital requirements will only be successful in reducing gambling behavior
as long as banks are suﬃciently myopic.
Proof. The no-gambling condition is upward sloping and linear with respect to β,
as in Proposition 3. For: δ < (>)δ, we can show that ∂r(β)
crit
∂k < (>)0 holds.
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Figure 3.3: Reserve requirements (β) and gambling behavior (k < k). Note: shaded
area represents gambling behavior.
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Figure 3.4: Reserve requirements (β), capital requirements (k) and gambling behav-
ior (0 < k1 < k2 < k3 < k). Note: shaded area represents gambling behavior.
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Figure 3.4 shows how the gambling region changes depending on banks’ “far-
sighted-ness”. This depends on ρ and θ: for a low cost of capital and a relatively
low loan default risk, a capital requirement can sooth the increase in risk behavior
that follows from the easing of financial repression. Vice versa, in countries that
are characterized by a high cost of capital and a high default probability of loans, a
higher capital requirement will induce more gambling behavior and make a reduction
in reserve requirements a less attractive liberalization option. The intuition behind
this result is that for δ > δ, the capital requirement causes the negative franchise-
value eﬀect to dominate the capital-at-risk eﬀect, so that banks prefer to invest the
freed up deposit funds in the gambling asset.
3.4.4 Evolution of capital and reserve requirements in Russia
We can divide the transition period of the Russian banking sector into 3 distinct
periods, according to the evolution of capital and reserve requirements.
1. Period 1: June 1991 - April 1995
In the early years of the transition to a market-based banking system, the Central
Bank of Russia introduced a system of reserve requirements, at that time its single
tool of monetary policy. Reserve requirements were set at 2 percent on borrowed
funds in June 1991, and steadily increased up to 22 percent for short term deposits by
April 1995. With an annual inflation rate of 122 percent for the period January 1995
- April 1995 (Goskomstat), the banking sector potentially faced a heavy tax. One
reason why the CBR resorted to financial repression was to reduce the inflationary
eﬀects of the monetary overhang that followed from large budget deficits in the early
1990s (Schoors, 2001). At that time however, reserve requirements did not impose
a liquidity constraint on banks; banks held on to high excess reserves - 57 percent
by end 1992 - and substituted these with alternative low-risk (and relatively liquid)
assets in the form of treasury bills by the end of 1994, when the Ministry of Finance
started to issue so-called GKO’s (Korhonen, 1997).
Although the CBR did not have an oﬃcial banking supervision department un-
til 1993, in May 1991, the CBR set a capital requirement for low risk assets at 10
percent and for high risk assets at 15 percent (see Table 3.2). These requirements
were however not compulsory and therefore not enforced. In March 1995, the cap-
ital requirements were even temporarily abolished. Given the high level of excess
reserves due to the lack of more profitable investment opportunities, and the lack
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of a proper supervisory framework, we can safely claim that any changes in bank
portfolio composition that occurred in period 1 cannot be attributed to changes in
either reserve or capital requirements.
Table 3.2: Evolution of capital requirements in Russia
May 1991 — 10% to 15% (non-compulsory)
March 1995 — no oﬃcial requirement
July, 1996 — 5%
February, 1997 — 6 %
February, 1998 — 7 %
5 million euro 1 to 5 million euro < 1 million euro
February, 1999 — 8 % February, 1999 — 9 %
January, 2000 — 10 % January, 2000 — 11 %
Source: Central Bank of Russia.
2. Period 2: May 1995 - March 1999
Figure 3.5 shows the monthly evolution of the banking sector aggregate of re-
quired and excess reserves relative to the requirements for the period 1995-2003. In
period 2, reserve requirements were gradually reduced from 22 to 5 percent for short
term deposits. Since all deposits are demand deposits by law (Tompson, 2004), it is
clear from figure 3.5 that even the banking sector’s total reserves were not suﬃcient
to fulfill the short-term reserve requirement at any time before September 1998. We
can conclude that before September 1998, the reserve requirement was not properly
enforced.
Following a peak of 97 bank failures in May 1996 (see figure 2.1), the CBR
introduced a capital requirement of 5 percent in July 1996, and gradually increased
it to 9 percent in February 1999. In chapter 2, we found weak evidence consistent
with enforcement of the capital adequacy standard. According to our model, a
capital requirement should then reduce bank risk behavior.
However, when looking at various risk measures for Russian banks, bank risk
behavior did not decline significantly before April 1999. In August 1998, a bank-
ing crisis unfolded as a result of the devaluation of the rouble and the consequent
government default on its treasury bills. Reported non-performing loans started to
decline only in June 1999 while the share of loan loss reserves to total assets started
to diminish in July 1999 (figure 3.6). These figures seem to indicate that the capital
requirement played at best only a marginal role in curbing bank risk behavior in
period 2.
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Figure 3.5: Monthly average reserve requirements (short- and long-term funds),
banking sector aggregate required and excess reserves in Russia (1995:11-2003:8,
%). Source: own calculations based on CBR and Goskomstat.
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3. Period 3: April 1999 - March 2004
For period 3, figure 3.5 reveals that from April 1999, the banking sector’s re-
quired reserves gradually started to pick up following the increase in the reserve
requirements from 5 to a maximum of 10 percent for funds denominated in foreign
currency. With an average annual inflation rate of 58 percent for the period April
1999 - January 2000 (Goskomstat), it remains unclear why banks additionally pre-
ferred to hold on to a large share of excess reserves (11 percent on average) and
refrained from investing in more profitable assets. In 1994, the Russian banking
sector also suﬀered from a large share of excess reserves. Schoors (2001) argues that
in 1994 this was due to ineﬃciencies in the payments system and excess liquidity.
Between April 1999 and January 2000, capital requirements increased further from
9 to 11 percent. Between January 2000 and March 2004, both reserve and capital
requirements remained unchanged at 10 and 11 percent respectively, while inflation
was, on average, 16 percent (Goskomstat).
Given these characteristics, can we assess how bank risk behavior reacted to the
changes in both capital and reserve requirements in Russia? Figures 3.7 and 3.8 show
the correlation of the banking sector aggregate reserve and capital requirements with
the two measures of bank risk behavior, namely the share of non-performing loans
to total loans and the share of loan loss reserves to total assets. The right panel of
figure 3.7 displays the correlation of non-performing loans with the capital adequacy
ratio as specified in CBR Instruction No. 1 of January 30, 1996. Correlations are
shown for period 2 and 3 separately and for the whole period for which we have data
(top to bottom). Although the scatter plots do not allow us to draw any conclusions
about the causality of the relationship, we find indications of a positive relationship.
On average, higher capital adequacy does not seem to lead to a reduction in bank
risk behavior. Interestingly, the correlation between the simple capital-to-assets
ratio and loan loss reserves is not that clear cut (left panel of figure 3.7). The
data indicate a slightly negative, but convex relation, which suggests that for higher
levels of capital, risk behavior starts to increase again. Taken together, these results
suggest a perverse impact of capital requirements with respect to risk behavior for
the Russian banking sector.
Figure 3.8 shows indications of a negative relationship between reserve require-
ments and both non-performing loans and the share of loan loss reserves. This is in
line with the prediction made in proposition 3. Combined, the data indicate that
the introduction (or better enforcement) of capital requirements did not lead to the
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desired reduction in risk behavior. Therefore, the temporary increase of reserve re-
quirements, and thus increase in financial repression by the CBR in the period after
the crisis of 1998 seems justified in hindsight. The CBR could hereby avoid the sce-
nario in which banks would react to capital requirements by resorting to gambling
behavior. Only when the cost of capital is reduced and loan default probability is
lowered - for example by improving monitoring and screening skills - will a capital
requirement achieve its purpose of reducing bank risk behavior. Consequently, finan-
cial repression can successfully be reduced to enhance credit growth to the economy
without inducing gambling behavior.
3.5 Concluding remarks
The theoretical model predicts that the reduction of financial repression may increase
risk behavior, while the introduction or enforcement of a capital requirement can
be useful in reducing gambling behavior. When introducing capital requirements
into a financially repressed economy, risk taking will be reduced, as long as banks
behave in a suﬃciently myopic way. However, in an environment characterized by
high costs of capital and high default risk of loans, the introduction of a risk-based
capital requirement may not succeed in reducing gambling. This suggests that as
long as capital is costly, financial repression can be more successful in reducing
risk compared to a capital requirement. Before introducing a capital requirement,
measures aimed at lowering the cost of capital should therefore be a primary focus.
Only when capital requirements can successfully reduce bank risk behavior, can
financial repression harmlessly be diminished.
The data for the Russian banking sector revealed that this has not yet been the
case for the period 1995-2003. Simple econometric tests suggest, but do not establish
proof of, a perverse impact of capital requirements with respect to risk behavior
of Russian banks in the past. The temporary increase of reserve requirements of
the CBR after the crisis in August 1998 was therefore useful in curbing bank risk
behavior.
References
Bencivenga, Valerie R., and Bruce D. Smith (1992), “Deficits, Inflation, and the
Banking System in Developing Countries: The Optimal Degree of Financial
Repression,” Oxford Economic Papers 44 (4), 767-790.
Brock, Philip L., and Liliana R. Suarez (2000), “Understanding the Behavior of
100 CHAPTER 3. THE SEQUENCE OF BANK LIBERALIZATION
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Figure 3.8: Required reserves versus non-performing loans (1995:Q4-2002:Q4) and
loan loss reserves (1995:M11-2003:M8). Source: Own calculations based on Interfax
and Mobile.
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Part II
Eastern Europe
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Chapter 4
Determinants of bank interest
margins in Central and Eastern
Europe: A comparison with the
West.1
4.1 Introduction
Financial intermediation is essential for economic development. Some authors have
provided evidence of a causal link between the degree of financial intermediation and
subsequent economic growth (Levine and Zervos, 1998). This issue is particularly im-
portant for the Central and Eastern European transition Countries (CEEC), where
the financial infrastructure had to be reshaped after the collapse of the centrally
planned system. The consensus is that these countries need a stable and eﬃcient
banking system, as well as the gradual development of financial markets, in order
to finance both private and public investment and expenditures. The eﬀectiveness
of the banking system in channelling funds from surplus to deficit actors is often
gauged by examining the spread between lending and deposit rates and by assessing
the degree of operational eﬃciency of the banking industry.2 Although the CEEC
have made some progress since the deregulation of their banking systems, interest
1This chapter appeared as: Claeys, Sophie, and Rudi Vander Vennet, (2003), “Determinants
of Bank Interest Margins in Central and Eastern Europe. Convergence to the West?,” Ghent
University Working Paper 03/203.
2See Fries and Taci, 2004; Weill, 2003; Grigorian and Manole, 2002; Yildirim and Philippatos,
2000.
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margins remain relatively high and the gap with Western banking markets remains
substantial.3
However, the interpretation of relatively high interest margins involves a trade-
oﬀ. On the one hand, high margins are often associated with a low degree of eﬃ-
ciency and non-competitive market conditions. In contrast, high margins may be
a reflection of an inadequate regulatory banking environment and a high degree of
information asymmetry. In such circumstances, high margins are indicative of high
risk premia. If competition increases in this type of environment, it might induce
gambling behavior by banks, causing financial instability (Hellman et al., 2000).
Beck et al. (2003), for example, conclude that highly concentrated banking systems
are less likely to suﬀer from crises. Therefore, in less developed economies relatively
high bank margins may be necessary, at least temporarily, to sustain bank franchise
value and avoid financial instability (Gorton and Winton, 1998).
First, we investigate what determines bank interest margins in the CEEC. We
analyze whether the relatively high interest margins of banks in transition economies
are caused by economic factors, such as an often concentrated market structure and
a lack of operational eﬃciency (structure-conduct-performance versus eﬃciency), or
rather by regulatory factors and underdeveloped banking conditions (business cycle
and institutional factors). If high margins are caused by market power or operational
ineﬃciency, stimulating local competition is desirable. If high margins are caused
by regulatory underdevelopment and asymmetric information, enterprise and bank
reform are a more pressing avenue of public policy. Hence, diﬀerent causes call for
diﬀerent policy actions.
Second, we examine to what extent bank behavior in the CEEC is similar to that
observed in Western Europe. This is especially important for the group of countries
that joined the European Union in 2004 but also for those that are expected to
enter in the future. These so-called “accession countries” have made considerable
eﬀorts to adapt their legal and financial infrastructure to ensure eligibility for EU
accession. This process of regulatory and economic harmonization is expected to
spur macroeconomic and financial convergence with the EU. In this framework it
can also be expected that bank behavior will converge. We systematically compare
banks in the new EU members, the other CEEC banks and the banks operating in
Western Europe to investigate this hypothesis.
Third, we make reform more explicit and explore how changes in the regula-
3See Berglöf and Bolton, 2001 and Riess et al., 2002.
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tory framework may capture the diﬀerences that still persist between margins in
accession, non-accession and Western European banking markets. This enables us
to assess whether the recently observed decline in margins can be attributed to
improved regulation, whereby lower margins reflect lower risk and hence indicate
more financial stability, or to a change in market conditions, whereby low margins
are the outcome of increased competition. The empirical analysis covers the years
1994-2001, which coincide with the period following the deregulation of the CEEC
banking systems. Hence, we are able to assess the eﬀect of deregulation on interest
margins.
In what follows, we use panel data estimation techniques to analyze bank interest
margins for 36 countries in Western and Eastern Europe. In section 2 we outline the
related literature on the determinants of bank interest margins. Section 3 describes
the estimation methodology and the data. Section 4 presents and interprets the
main results of the regression analysis. Section 5 concludes and provides a number
of policy implications.
4.2 Determinants of bank interest margins
Previous studies analyze bank margins empirically, both for developed and devel-
oping countries. One strand of the literature elaborates on the dealership model
introduced by Ho and Saunders (1981) who set up a two-step estimation procedure
to test their model.4 Based on this empirical approach, Saunders and Schumacher
(2000) find that over the period 1988-95 interest margins in six European countries
and the US are aﬀected by the degree of bank capitalization, bank market struc-
ture, and the volatility of interest rates. For seven Latin American countries, Brock
and Suarez (2000) report that bank spreads in the 1990s are influenced by liquidity
and capital risk at the bank level, and by interest rate volatility, inflation and GDP
growth at the macroeconomic level, although the results diﬀer across countries. One
drawback of the Ho and Saunders approach is that, although bank-specific variables
are used to determine pure bank margins, it does not take into account the possible
heterogeneity across banks, both within the same market and over diﬀerent coun-
tries. In this paper we deal with bank-specific variation within the same country, as
well as across countries and over time.
4The first step involves the estimation of a “pure interest spread” by regressing observed margins
on a number of bank-specific characteristics. In the second step, the estimated pure spreads are
explained by macroeconomic and market structure variables.
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An alternative approach found in the literature is a more eclectic single-stage
regression technique based on a behavioral model of the banking firm in which vari-
ous potential determinants of the interest margin are included. Demirgüç-Kunt and
Huizinga (1999) use bank-level data for 80 developed and developing countries over
the period 1988-95 to analyze the determinants of bank interest margins and bank
profitability. Their evidence suggests a role for a large number of indicators next to
bank-specific variables, such as macroeconomic conditions, bank taxation, deposit
insurance regulation, overall financial structure, and several legal and institutional
indicators. Our paper is also related to Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven and Levine (2004)
who assess the impact of bank regulation, bank market concentration and inflation
on bank margins, as well as the role of national institutions in regulation and mar-
ket structure. They use data over the period 1995-99 for a sample of 72 countries.
In examining bank regulations, Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2004) use the database of
Barth, Caprio and Levine (2002), which gives an extensive overview of the existing
bank regulatory and supervisory rules based on a survey over the period 1998-2000.
Notwithstanding its large coverage, the database has the disadvantage that it can-
not be used to capture time variation in the legal and institutional environment.
Therefore, in their analysis of bank margins, Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2004) are com-
pelled to look at the averages over the period 1995-99 of concentration and other
measures. In this paper, we use the European Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment (EBRD) indices of bank and enterprise reform as proxies for the regulatory
environment. Since the EBRD performs a yearly assessment of regulatory reform we
are able to exploit the time-series aspect of these indices. We use a panel structure
at the bank level across countries and try to gauge how market structure and market
conditions as well as the institutional and regulatory environment aﬀect bank mar-
gins. We focus on a sample of transition countries for which we exploit the variation
in the institutional environments across these countries and over time.
Finally, our approach is firmly rooted in the industrial organization literature on
bank structure and eﬃciency. In a similar way as has been done for overall bank
profitability, the relationship between bank interest margins and market structure
can be analyzed within the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) and the eﬃcient-
structure (ES) hypotheses. Berger (1995), Goldberg and Rai (1996), and Vander
Vennet (2002) consider four diﬀerent explanations for overall bank profitability that
we apply to interest margins. First, the traditional SCP hypothesis asserts that the
positive relationship between margins and market structure reflects non-competitive
pricing behavior in more concentrated markets. A second theory is the relative-
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market-power hypothesis (RMP), which states that only those banks with large
market shares are able to exercise market power in pricing and consequently earn
higher margins. Alternatively, two eﬃciency explanations may capture the positive
relationship between interest margins and either market concentration or market
share (Berger, 1995). The eﬃcient-structure (ES) hypothesis asserts that diﬀerences
in interest margins are attributable to diﬀerences in operational eﬃciency across
banks. The X-eﬃciency version states that banks with superior management or pro-
duction technologies have lower costs and subsequently can oﬀer more competitive
interest rates on loans and/or deposits, leading to a negative relationship between
operational eﬃciency and interest margins. Since these firms are also assumed to
gain larger market shares, the market may become more concentrated as a result of
competition. Hence, the correlation between market structure and margins is spu-
rious and runs via higher levels of eﬃciency. One way to deal with this empirically
is to include measures for concentration, market share and operational eﬃciency
simultaneously into the regression. The scale-eﬃciency version of the ES hypothesis
allows that some firms simply produce at a more eﬃcient scale than others, which,
under competitive market conditions, will be translated into smaller margins. Again,
these firms are assumed to increase their market share, which would lead to higher
market concentration.
4.3 Methodology and data
4.3.1 Methodology
We analyze the determinants of bank interest margins in a coherent and encom-
passing framework in order to assess the importance of micro- and macroeconomic
versus regulatory determinants. Our objective is to identify whether the relatively
high bank margins observed in the CEEC are primarily driven by market structure
and bank-specific factors or whether they are caused by weaknesses in the regula-
tory framework in which the banks operate. We extend Berger (1995), Goldberg
and Rai (1996) and Vander Vennet (2002) and include four types of variables in our
regressions: (1) country-specific bank market characteristics, such as the degree of
concentration, (2) country-specific macroeconomic conditions, such as inflation, real
economic growth and the real short term interest rate, (3) bank-specific character-
istics, such as the degree of operational eﬃciency, capital adequacy, market share,
the proportion of loans in total assets and the proportion of demand and savings
deposits in total deposits and (4) regulatory features, such as the (time-varying)
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degree of bank and enterprise reform in the CEEC. We first estimate equations of
the following form for both the CEEC and Western European banks:
NIMi,j,t = α0 + α1 ·CONCj,t + α2 ·MSi,j,t + α3 · SIZEi,j,t + α4 ·EFFi,j,t
+ α5 · CAPi,j,t + α6 · LTAi,j,t + α7 ·DSDEPi,j,t
+ α8 ·GDP Growthj,t + α9 · Inflationj,t + α10 · Interest Ratej,t
+ CFEj + TFEt + i,j,t, (4.1)
with NIMi,j,t the net interest margin of bank i in country j at time t. The NIM
is calculated as the diﬀerence between interest income and interest expenses as a
proportion of total earning assets.5 The first four explanatory variables are included
to test the relative importance of the SCP and eﬃciency explanations. CONCj,t
is either the Herfindahl measure of market concentration, calculated as the sum
of squared market shares in the loan market HERFj,t =
Pnj
i=1
h
(MSloansi,j,t )
2
i
, or
a concentration ratio CRj,t, calculated as the percentage of loans granted by the
largest bank in the country. Based on the structure-conduct-performance argument,
a positive impact of concentration on bank interest margins would be indicative of
collusion. MSi,j,t is a measure of relative market power and is calculated as bank i’s
share of assets at time t in country j’s total bank assets at time t. A positive sign
would support the relative-market-power hypothesis, i.e. banks with a relatively
high market share are more able to set prices autonomously. The eﬃciency ratio
EFFi,j,t is calculated as the inverse of total overhead costs to total assets.6 The
eﬃcient-structure hypothesis predicts a negative relationship between interest mar-
gins and eﬃciency. We try to capture any scale-related cost or revenue advantages
by including SIZEi,j,t, calculated as the share of total assets of bank i in country j
at time t to the assets of the median bank in country j at time t.7 Goldberg and Rai
5Laeven and Majnoni (2003) discuss the use of balance sheet data to construct a proxy for
the intermediation margin. An unbiased measure of the pure intermediation margin would be the
diﬀerence between (actual) lending revenues and deposit costs for each bank, but these data are not
available for the majority of banks in our sample. Our construction of the interest margin implicitly
assumes that the other interest income (e.g. on securities) and interest expenses (e.g. on interbank
borrowings) reflect competitive market conditions across the banks in the sample.
6The cost/assets ratio indicates how much operational costs the bank incurs by managing a given
level of assets. We prefer this variable over the commonly used cost/income ratio because the latter
contains the net interest margin, the dependent variable we attempt to explain. Moreover, total
income also includes non-interest income, which tends to be very volatile and is often unrelated to
the core financial intermediation business of banks.
7Since most banks in the CEEC are relatively small compared to Western European banks we
do not use the log of assets to proxy for size, but take a size measure relative to that of the median
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(1996) fail to find a positive relationship between concentration and profitability and
find weak support for the eﬃcient-structure hypothesis for a sample of large banks
located in 11 European countries for the period 1988-91. These findings are corrob-
orated by those reported in Vander Vennet (2002) for European banks in the 1990s.
For European banking markets Maudos and de Guevara (2004) find a statistically
significant positive correlation between concentration and bank interest margins for
the period 1993-2000. Corvoisier and Gropp (2002) find that higher concentration
may have resulted in less competitive pricing by banks located in the euro area for
the period 1993-1999.
Next, we include three bank-specific control variables that have been shown to be
instrumental in explaining bank interest margins (Saunders and Schumacher, 2000;
Brock and Suarez, 2000). A first variable is the degree of bank capital adequacy,
captured by CAPi,j,t, the ratio of equity to total assets. When a bank holds excess
capital above the regulatory minimum8, two positive eﬀects on the interest margin
can be distinguished. First, since the bank has free capital it has the possibility to
increase its portfolio of risky assets in the form of loans or securities. When market
conditions allow the bank to make additional loans with a beneficial return/risk
profile, this will, ceteris paribus, increase their interest margin. Second, since capital
is considered to be the most expensive form of liabilities in terms of expected return,
holding capital above the regulatory minimum is a credible signal of creditworthiness
on the part of the bank. When depositors exert “depositor market discipline”, this
may enable the bank to lower its deposit funding costs and, hence, increase its
interest margin. Empirical evidence of depositor discipline is reported by Goldberg
and Hudgins (2002) and by Park and Peristiani (1998) for the case of US savings
and loan associations. Martinez Peria and Schmukler (1999) find evidence that
market discipline also exists in developing countries, even in the presence of deposit
insurance. In the CEEC, depositors have few alternatives for bank deposits; yet
they are regularly confronted with information about bad asset quality in some
banks and even outright bank failures. This feature will induce depositors, especially
professional market participants, to act prudently and avoid depositing money in
badly capitalized banks. Another well known feature is that depositors switch to
supposedly safe banks in times of financial crises. Hence, we use the degree of
capitalization as a proxy for all types of arrangements that cause depositors to
bank in the country.
8 In principle, all banks in our sample are subject to BIS-type capital adequacy regulations; all
banks are required to hold at least 8% of capital against their risky assets. In some CEEC, capital
regulations have been more stringent (see Barth et al. 2002).
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regard certain banks as “safer”. We therefore expect that a higher degree of capital
coverage will be associated with higher interest margins.
We include two indicators of the banks’ balance sheet composition in the re-
gressions. The first is the proportion of total loans in total assets, LTAi,j,t. We
expect that a high LTA will be associated with higher interest margins due to risk
and cost considerations. A higher LTA should increase revenues since loans are the
most risky and, hence, the highest-yielding (in terms of expected return) type of
assets. Consequently, LTA is intended to capture the bank’s asset risk.9 Loans are
also the type of assets with the highest operational costs because they need to be
originated, serviced and monitored. When the bank applies markup pricing for its
lending rates, the interest margin will increase. The second balance sheet indicator is
the proportion of demand and savings deposits in total deposits, DSDEPi,j,t (Berlin
and Mester, 1999). Demand and savings deposits are usually relatively stable and
cheap compared to borrowed funds. Hence, a bank with substantial access to this
source of funding through a solid local deposit market penetration should be able to
maintain high interest margins.
In order to control for the macroeconomic environment in which the banks op-
erate, we include real GDP growth to proxy for business cycle fluctuations, the
inflation rate, calculated as the (end of year) change in CPI, and the real short term
interest rate. Boyd et al. (2001) find evidence of a strong negative correlation be-
tween inflation and the amount of bank lending. This suggests that bank margins
will decrease as inflation is lower. The short term interest rate is included to capture
the stance of monetary policy.
Finally, all the estimated equations include year and country fixed eﬀects (CFE
and TFE) and allow for bank-specific unobserved heterogeneity (i,j,t). Country
dummies are expected to capture country-related eﬀects such as diﬀerences in legis-
lation, accounting standards and tax structures, that are only imperfectly measur-
able.
In a next step, we analyze how country-specific regulatory features impact mar-
gins in the CEEC more explicitly. To assess how the changes in regulation of the
last decade have aﬀected bank margins in the CEEC, we include variables related
to regulatory reform in the CEEC. We incorporate two EBRD reform indices that
9A more appropriate measure for risk would be a non-performing loans ratio. Due to data
limitations, no homogeneous proxy could be constructed for all banks.
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vary across countries and over time: the transition indicator for enterprise reform,
EBRDetpj,t and the transition indicator for banking reform, EBRDbankj,t. These
EBRD indices provide a ranking of the liberalization progress and institutional re-
form in the corporate and banking sector respectively. More detailed definitions of
the indices are provided in table 4.10 in appendix 4.A. When we average the EBRD
indices per country over the years in our sample, we find that they are closely re-
lated to the regulatory and institutional indicators used by Demirgüç-Kunt et al.
(2004).10 Not unexpectedly, this confirms that the EBRD indices accurately reflect
the degree of regulatory and institutional reform. Moreover, both indicators vary
over time and provide a ranking between 1 and 4, where 4 represents a level of
reform that approximates the institutional standards of an industrialized market
economy.11 This enables us to analyze how changes over time in institutional reform
aﬀect bank behavior. Fries et al. (2002) use these measures to classify 16 transition
economies into a high reform and a low reform sample and subsequently investigate
bank performance for these two groups. We investigate how reforms have aﬀected
the NIM next to the SCP and ES explanations and analyze how reforms may ac-
count for observed diﬀerences with Western Europe. We therefore estimate a second
set of regressions of the following form:
NIMi,j,t = (4.1) + α11 ·EBRDetpj,t (4.2a)
(4.1) + α11 ·EBRDbankj,t (4.2b)
(4.1) + α11 ·X ∗EBRDetpj,t (4.2c)
(4.1) + α11 ·X ∗EBRDbankj,t. (4.2d)
We first introduce the EBRD indices directly in our equations (4.2a and 4.2b).
Alternatively, we interact them with variables that reflect bank behavior to assess
how diﬀerent levels of institutional reform aﬀect the sensitivity of the NIM with
respect to these variables (4.2c and 4.2d).
In the empirical analysis we exploit three dimensions of the data: time varia-
tion, cross-country variation and bank-specific variation. All the estimations are
10Both EBRDetp and EBRDbank are positively correlated with the “economic freedom”, “prop-
erty rights” and “KKZ institution index” variables. The EBRDbank indicator is also positively cor-
related with “banking freedom” and “foreign ownership” and negatively correlated with the “fraction
entry denied”, “reserve requirements” and “state ownership” variables defined in Demirgüç-Kunt
et al. (2004).
11As expected, for most countries both indicators increase over time, although temporary de-
creases occur, e.g. in Slovakia, Latvia and Lithuania.
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performed using a random eﬀects panel data estimator, i.e. we assume that some
unobserved heterogeneity between banks exists that is not correlated with the other
explanatory variables.12
4.3.2 Data sources
We use a sample of 2279 banks from 36 Western and Eastern European countries
over the years 1994-2001.13 All bank balance sheet data and income statements
are obtained from the BankScope database maintained by Fitch/IBCA/Bureau Van
Dijk. Since we focus on bank intermediation, we use unconsolidated statements
whenever possible, although in some cases we have to rely on consolidated state-
ments because of data unavailability. The institutional bank types included are
commercial banks, savings banks and cooperative banks, since these types of banks
are primarily engaged in financial intermediation.14 To make sure that we do not
omit any banks that are important players in the deposit and/or loan markets,
we also include medium- and long-term credit banks and specialized government
institutions, because they remain important in certain countries. All other types
of banks, such as development banks, central or investment banks are excluded.
Merged banks are considered as separate entities before the merger and as one en-
tity afterwards. All the ratios capturing bank-specific characteristics are calculated
based on the standardized global accounting format provided by BankScope in or-
der to ensure comparability across countries. Data on inflation, GDP growth and
the short term interest rate are taken from the IMF International Financial Statis-
tics. The bank and enterprise reform indicators are obtained from various EBRD
Transition Reports. The final dataset consists of an unbalanced panel with more
than 16000 observations. Although BankScope is one of the most commonly used
databases when dealing with bank characteristics, its coverage diﬀers across coun-
tries, especially for the Eastern European countries. However, in all countries, the
available banks account for a very large proportion (usually more than 80%) of the
deposit and lending activity, on which this paper is focused (see Demirgüç-Kunt and
Huizinga, 1999; Cunningham, 2001; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2004). Table 4.1 reports
the number of banks available in each of the countries and provides evidence on their
size distribution.
12We do not assume unobserved heterogeneity on the country level, since we want to account for
unobserved bank-specific eﬀects such as bank specialisation and ownership structure, for which we
do not have homogeneous information that covers all banks in our sample.
13The countries included in our sample are listed in the Appendix.
14For Germany we excluded the “Sparkassen”. Because of their large number and diﬀerent insti-
tutional character, inclusion of the German savings banks could bias the sample.
4.4. REGRESSION RESULTS 117
4.3.3 Summary statistics
Table 4.2 reports the summary statistics of the variables that we use in the empiri-
cal analysis. All observations more than two standard errors away from the country
mean are deleted. On average, net interest margins in Western Europe are lower
(2.9%) than in the accession countries (4.7%) and in the non-accession countries
(8%). Moreover, margins are much more volatile when moving from Western to
Eastern Europe. The Herfindahl index (on a scale between 0 and 1) in the CEEC
sample is on average twice as large as the index in the West. The eﬃciency mea-
sure exhibits lower values on average for the accession and non-accession countries
compared to Western Europe. Further, banking markets in the CEEC, especially in
the non-accession countries, are characterized by higher and more volatile levels of
inflation and GDP growth.15
4.4 Regression results
4.4.1 Determinants of bank margins
Tables 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 report the regression results for the sample of Western Euro-
pean, accession and non-accession countries. We first report the estimation results
when only including measures for concentration, market share, operational eﬃciency
and scale eﬃciency in order to test the relative importance of the SCP and the ES
hypotheses. In the following set of regressions we then include the bank-specific
control variables CAP , DSDEP , LTA and consecutively control for the macroeco-
nomic environment by adding real GDP growth, inflation and the interest rate.16
Table 4.6 summarizes the average economic impact of the explanatory variables for
the diﬀerent subsamples.
15The correlation matrices for the diﬀerent variables indicate that the variables of interest show a
significant correlation with the net interest margin. Some of the correlations between the variables
are relatively high and might cause collinearity problems in the regression analysis. For example,
in all subsamples the Herfindahl index is highly correlated with market share and inflation. To
assess the collinearity problem this might cause, we estimate all regressions twice using either the
Herfindahl index or the concentration ratio. Correlations do not dissapear when using CR, but go
down in many cases. All subsamples further display a high correlation between market share and
size. We therefore estimate all equations separately for MS and SIZE to avoid collinearity. To
analyze the eﬀect of other correlations (e.g. high correlation between inflation, gdp growth and the
interest rate) we perform some additional regressions as robustness checks. The correlation matrices
are available upon request.
16The coeﬃcients of the time and country dummies have been omitted from the regression output
but are available upon request.
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4.4.2 A comparison with the West
In table 4.7 we analyze whether the determinants of bank interest margins in the
accession countries that joined the European Union in 2004 behave similarly to those
in Western Europe and whether they show significant diﬀerences with the group of
CEEC that have not joined the EU yet. To test this, we interact the determinants
with regional dummy variables that equal one for banks operating in either accession
or non-accession countries. The results indicate that indeed many determinants of
the NIM have a more (less) pronounced eﬀect in the CEEC compared with the
Western European countries. We discuss these results in more detail in the following
paragraphs.
4.4.3 General results
The estimation results for the Western European sample (table 4.3) lend support to
the SCP hypothesis: both coeﬃcients on HERF and CR are positive and highly
significant in all regressions.17 A one standard deviation rise in market concentra-
tion increases bank margins with 10 basis points, on average (see table 4.6). This
suggests that banks in Western Europe were able to exploit a more concentrated
market structure. When turning to the CEEC samples, no clear results on con-
centration eﬀects emerge and most coeﬃcients become negative when controlling
for macroeconomic variables (tables 4.4 and 4.5). These findings seem unexpected
since it is usually assumed that Western European banking markets are competitive,
due to the extensive eﬀorts made in financial deregulation and regulatory harmo-
nization.18 However, our findings only corroborate previous results. De Bandt and
Davis (2000) conclude that European banking markets were characterized by mo-
nopolistic competition before EMU, while Corvoisier and Gropp (2002) find that for
loans and demand deposits, increased concentration due to consolidation in Euro-
pean banking may have resulted in less competitive pricing by banks. For a sample
of six European countries and the US, Saunders and Schumacher (2000) also find
evidence of a non-competitive market structure which materializes in an extra rent
above the pure intermediation spread. The negative and significant coeﬃcient for
SIZE however suggests that the ongoing consolidation process in Western Euro-
17When we control for macroeconomic variables, the coeﬃcient becomes somewhat smaller.
Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2004) find that once they control for regulatory change, the positive re-
lation between the Herfindahl index and margins breaks down. The country dummies and macro
variables capture part of these institutional elements.
18Milestones in the bank market integration process are the Second Banking Directive (1989),
the Single Market Program (1993), the harmonization of capital adequacy rules through various
directives, and the introduction of the euro (1999).
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pean banking may generate scale-related cost advantages that reduce margins. For
the CEEC subsamples, our results contradict Gondat-Larralde and Lepetit (2001),
who find a positive relationship between market concentration of banks and their
performance for a sample of eight CEEC over the period 1992-96.
One explanation for the negative concentration eﬀect found in the CEEC sub-
samples can be the high concentration of foreign banks, which exhibit lower interest
margins (Martinez Peria and Mody, 2004). In many CEEC, entry of foreign banks
has played an important role in the bank reform process by increasing levels of ef-
ficiency (see e.g. Claessens et al., 2001 and Bonin et al., 2005). Since we do not
have comprehensive bank-ownership data that is comparable across countries and
accounts for ownership changes over time, we were unable to test formally for the
eﬀect of foreign ownership on bank margins in both Western and Eastern Europe.
In chapter 5, we look into the ownership structure of foreign banks in 10 CEEC.
To assess how ownership structure may have impacted the NIM , we performed
some extra regressions in which we control for the number of foreign banks and
the asset share of state-owned banks on the country-level, taken from the EBRD
Transition Reports. Our results indicate that a large asset share of state-owned
banks partially explains the negative sign for concentration in non-accession coun-
tries, while in the accession countries a relatively large number of foreign banks
seems responsible for the negative concentration eﬀect.19
The relative-market-share hypothesis (RMP) does not receive much support in
the Western European sample. The coeﬃcient on MS becomes insignificant when
we control for bank-specific and macroeconomic variables. For the non-accession
regressions we find some evidence in favour of the RMP hypothesis (last columns of
table 4.5). A one standard deviation increase in market share results in a 74 basis
points higher interest margin, which indicates that large banks in these markets can
exert some degree of market power (see table 4.6). The coeﬃcient for the eﬃciency
ratio enters the equations negatively and is highly significant in most regressions,
supporting the eﬃcient-structure hypothesis. For a sample of 5 transition economies,
Gondat-Larralde and Lepetit (2001) find that higher levels of eﬃciency improve bank
profitability. Our result is in line with Vander Vennet (2002) who finds that higher
eﬃciency reduces interest margins significantly in a sample of Western European
countries. In accordance with theory, a higher operational eﬃciency induces banks
19This seems to be is in line with Sapienza (2002) who finds evidence that state-owned banks
charge lower interest rates, especially to firms located in regions with strong political clout.
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to pass the lower costs on to their customers in the form of lower loan rates and/or
higher deposit rates, thereby lowering the interest margin. The finding that MS is
insignificant implies that this behavior holds for all banks, also for the largest ones.
Table 4.7 indicates that the eﬃciency eﬀect is significantly larger in the CEEC than
in the West (significant negative interaction terms EFF ∗ Reg). This means that
eﬃciency gains in the accession countries are passed on to the banks’ customers.
The estimates for the subsamples indicate that the eﬃciency eﬀect is present in all
samples, but not (yet) in the non-accession banking sectors (table 4.5). In the non-
accession countries the eﬃciency eﬀect disappears when we control for bank-specific
and macroeconomic variables.20
4.4.4 Bank-specific and macroeconomic conditions
We now consider the bank-specific and macroeconomic control variables. A note-
worthy feature is the role of bank capital. The capital-to-assets ratio enters all
regressions positively and is strongly significant (see also Brock and Suarez, 2000;
Saunders and Schumacher, 2000 and Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2004). This finding is
consistent with the interpretation that capital serves as a signal of the banks’ cred-
itworthiness in both the Western European and CEEC banking markets. In the
non-accession banking markets, however, the capital ratio has a coeﬃcient at least
twice as large as the one reported for Western European banks. Table 4.7 reveals
that this diﬀerence is statistically significant. An increase of one standard deviation
of the capital-to-assets ratio adds, on average, 0.39 percent to the NIM in West-
ern European banking markets compared to 0.63 and 1.49 percent in accession and
non-accession countries (see table 4.6). The higher sensitivity of margins with re-
spect to CAP can be explained by the existence of depositor discipline in transition
banking. This may decrease the deposit cost of well capitalized banks, leading to
higher interest margins. The extra eﬀect in non-accession countries is systematically
higher compared to the accession countries (see the coeﬃcient on CAP ∗Reg in table
4.7). This indicates that in an environment characterized by lower levels of reform
(see the summary statistics for the non-accession countries in table 4.2), depositor
discipline is even stronger. Holding capital in excess of what is required is then
often the only solution to signal solvency and inspire depositor trust. Once the legal
environment improves (in accession countries), depositor confidence grows and the
“credible amount” of capital needed to signal creditworthiness can be reduced. The
20The high correlations between eﬃciency and the other explanatory variables might be an issue
of concern. However, when we re-estimate the equations without EFF , the results with respect to
the other variables remain unaltered.
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findings for Western and Eastern European countries combined illustrate the impor-
tance of capital adequacy rules as an instrument of prudential supervision. Suﬃcient
capital buﬀers are necessary to maintain the stability of the banking system. More-
over, banks with suﬃcient capital can not only expand their deposit base, but are
also able to use these funds to increase their lending to borrowers with varying risk
profiles. This should ultimately stimulate economic growth.
The LTA ratio has a positive and significant eﬀect on the NIM , albeit more
pronounced in the CEEC banking markets. Since loans are the most risky and cost-
intensive asset class, this finding supports the hypothesis that more lending results in
wider margins and reflects the banks’ ability to integrate risk and cost considerations
in their loan pricing behavior. The fact that the coeﬃcient is much larger and
statistically diﬀerent in the CEEC (see table 4.7) indicates that a substantial part of
the interest margin in transition banking can be considered as a compensation for risk
taking. The estimated coeﬃcient for the variable capturing the deposit composition
of bank funding (DSDEP ) is positive and significant for Western Europe and the
accession countries. This indicates that having access to a stable and relatively cheap
source of deposit funding translates into a distinct advantage in terms of realized
interest margins. This is not yet the case for the non-accession banking markets,
where customer savings are often still concentrated at (former) state-owned banks.21
The NIM significantly depends on the prevailing business cycle conditions. The
positive association between the business cycle and bank margins is mainly a char-
acteristic of the Western European banking markets. For these markets, higher
economic growth is associated with higher margins, as a reflection of more lending
and lower default rates. In the CEEC no such relationship is found; the coeﬃcient
on economic growth is negative or insignificant. This can be explained by the rela-
tively high volatility of the business cycle in transition economies, where periods of
economic growth have sometimes been interrupted by periods of crisis. The positive
coeﬃcient on inflation supports the hypothesis that lower inflation (and decreas-
ing inflation expectations) have a more pronounced downward eﬀect on long-term
compared to short-term interest rates, leading to declining intermediation margins.
From the previous sections we conclude that the SCP hypothesis cannot be re-
jected in Western Europe. This corroborates previous results for European banking.
21 In the early years of transition, former savings banks were the most important collectors of
deposits, which they transferred to the credit-granting banks through the money market (Dittus
and Prowse, 1995).
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In the CEEC, however, the results indicate that increased concentration resulted in
a lower NIM . In the accession countries, bank interest margins are primarily deter-
mined by operational eﬃciency rather than market structure, while in non-accession
countries, large banks still succeed in maintaining high interest margins. In both
the CEEC and Western Europe, NIMs are most sensitive to changes in capital
adequacy (CAP ) and lending behavior (LTA) (see table 4.6). The sensitivity is
the highest in the non-accession countries and gradually goes down when moving to
more developed banking markets.
4.4.5 Regulatory and institutional properties
We now analyze how institutional reforms in the bank and corporate sector aﬀect
CEEC bank margins and its determinants and whether they can partially explain the
observed diﬀerences with the Western European markets. The results are shown in
tables 4.8 and 4.9 for accession and non-accession countries.22 When entered directly
into the equation, the EBRD reform indices have a significantly positive impact on
the NIM , but only for non-accession countries. More bank reform (EBRDbank)
is expected to induce sound banking, which in turn will spur lending. The EBRD
index on enterprise reform (EBRDetp) is significantly positive for the non-accession
banking markets, indicating that as asymmetric information problems decline, banks
are more willing to grant more loans (since they can better identify good from bad
borrowers), which leads to higher margins and profitability. This finding stresses
the prime importance of policy measures to diminish the asymmetric information
problems associated with adverse selection and moral hazard in transition banking.
Next, we interact the bank-specific variables CAP and LTA with the two reform
indices to investigate how institutional reforms aﬀect their sensitivity with respect
to the NIM . This allows us to test wether reforms put bank behavior and bank
margins more on a Western European track. Because of the high correlations be-
tween the EBRD indices and the other variables, we introduce the interaction terms
one by one in the regressions (see tables 4.8 and 4.9). The results indicate that in
accession countries, higher levels of enterprise reform reduce the sensitivity of both
CAP and LTA with respect to the NIM . In these banking markets, the NIM
reacts less to changes in capital adequacy or LTA when firms become more eﬃcient
and asymmetric information problems decline. Changes in the capital ratio then
serve less as a signalling device but rather reflect normal risk adjustments. This
22We only report the results that include the Herfindahl index and exclude the size variable. The
results with CR and SIZE are very similar and are available upon request.
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eﬀect is not (yet) present in the non-accession countries. In the non-accession coun-
tries, the interaction terms with LTA enter the equation positively, while in the
accession countries these interaction terms enter negatively or become insignificant.
This indicates that in the accession countries it becomes more diﬃcult for banks
to maintain high lending rates once the corporate sector becomes more competitive
and transparent. This does not necessarily imply that banks take more risk. Fries
et al. (2002) find that in countries with a significant progress in bank and enterprise
reform, there is no evidence of excessive risk-taking behavior by banks. The inter-
action term of LTA with the reform variables may capture part of the shift in the
loan portfolio towards more risky projects or the eﬀects of increased competition.
We find that for lower levels of institutional reform (non-accession countries) more
reform increases bank risk behavior (positive sign on the interaction term) while for
more advanced levels of reform (accession countries) competition in the credit sector
has a downward eﬀect on margins. In the non-accession countries the overall level
of bank and enterprise reform is lower so that the interaction with the LTA and
EBRD variables probably captures the shift in the loan portfolio towards more risky
and high-return loans. This shift will increase the interest margin.
4.4.6 Robustness
To test whether our results are robust to the estimation technique that we employ,
we carry out a set of robustness checks.23 One set of checks is related to the inclusion
of country dummies. When leaving these out we can either 1) estimate the equations
assuming unobserved heterogeneity on the country level (under the assumption of
Random (RE) or Fixed Eﬀects (FE)) or 2) estimate the equations assuming un-
observed heterogeneity on the bank level (under the assumption of RE or FE), for
which the macroeconomic variables and the concentration ratio should then suﬃce
to account for country-specific eﬀects. When performing these four sets of regres-
sions for the diﬀerent subsamples, we find that for the regressions with unobserved
bank heterogeneity all results with respect to concentration, RMP and eﬃciency
are confirmed. The scale-related eﬀects found for Western European banks are not
robust for the bank-specific FE representation. All other conclusions remain valid.
When assuming unobserved country heterogeneity the coeﬃcients for HERF and
MS change for the Western European subsample. This means that HERF partially
captures some of the country-specific unobserved eﬀects such as diﬀerences in legis-
lation, accounting standards and tax structures. For the accession countries, we find
23These results are reported in the appendix of Claeys and Vander Vennet (2003).
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some evidence of an RMP eﬀect. All other coeﬃcients remain qualitatively similar.
For the non-accession sample the coeﬃcients of EFF and SIZE become unstable;
the results for CAP and LTA remain valid.
A second check is related to the inclusion of time dummies. We accounted for
time eﬀects by including time dummies. However, these might not fully account for
the changes that occurred during the 1990s. When we perform cross-country regres-
sions per individual year, we observe changes in coeﬃcient size and sign forMS and
HERF , which suggests that the changing environment in the banking sector during
the 1990s has aﬀected margins dissimilarly over diﬀerent years. The results for the
Western European sample indicate that in the beginning of our sample, concentra-
tion had a positive impact on margins. From 1998 onwards, the positive relation
between concentration and margins disappears. This could be due to the introduc-
tion of the euro, which should have brought more competition and contestability
in the Western European banking markets. For the CEEC subsamples the results
confirm that EFF , CAP and inflation are the most important determinants of the
NIM across time.
A third check assesses the eﬀect of the correlations between the macroeconomic
variables and HERF . When we alternatively include GDP growth, inflation and
the interest rate in the equation, we find that the results for the diﬀerent hypotheses
(SCP, RMP and ES) are largely corroborated. The concentration results in Western
Europe remain valid. In the CEEC, no clear pattern on collusive behavior emerges.
There still remains only weak evidence for the RMP hypothesis in the CEEC. Size
and significance of the bank-specific variables remain unaltered in all but one regres-
sion over all subsamples. Size and significance of the macroeconomic variables may
change depending on the specification used. The positive inflation eﬀect remains
valid in all estimations and even emerges for the non-accession regressions when
leaving out the interest rate or GDP growth.
4.5 Concluding remarks
In this chapter we pursue two goals. First, we investigate the determinants of bank
interest margins in Central and Eastern European countries. We assess to what ex-
tent the relatively high margins of banks in transition economies can be attributed
to a low degree of eﬃciency and non-competitive market conditions (eﬃciency ver-
sus structure-conduct-performance), or to changes in the regulatory environment
in which the banks operate (business cycle and institutional factors). Second, we
provide a systematic comparative analysis of the determinants of interest margins
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of CEEC banks versus banks operating in Western European economies. This en-
ables us to assess to what extent the determinants of interest margins in the CEEC
are similar to those found in Western European banking markets. Furthermore, we
assess whether institutional reform, proxied by the EBRD indices of bank and en-
terprise reform, has aﬀected the determinants of bank interest margins in the CEEC
and can help explain some of the observed diﬀerences with the West. We produce
separate results for the group of accession countries that joined the EU in 2004. Our
main findings can be summarized as follows. The structure-conduct-performance
(SCP) hypothesis cannot be rejected in the Western European banking markets,
whereas we do not find evidence supporting the concentration hypothesis in the
CEEC. Higher operational eﬃciency is reflected in lower bank interest margins in
both Western European and accession countries, but not (yet) in the non-accession
banking markets. Hence, the eﬃcient-structure hypothesis is only corroborated in
the more developed banking markets. Capital adequacy is an important determi-
nant of bank margins, both in developed and transition banking markets. But the
positive eﬀect of capital adequacy on bank margins is at least twice as large in the
transition countries. The pricing of lending risk plays an important role in explain-
ing high interest margins in the CEEC. However, as reform in the corporate sector
proceeds, better screening and monitoring and increased competition tend to erode
interest margins.
In general we only find weak evidence in favor of the structure-conduct-performance
or relative-market-share hypothesis hypotheses in the Eastern European banking
markets, while eﬃciency eﬀects show up significantly and are comparable to the
West, especially in the accession countries. The finding that interest margins are not
so much determined by bank market structure is probably a reflection of the rapid
development of bank lending in transition economies and increased competition fol-
lowing the entry of foreign banks. The evidence supporting the eﬃcient-structure
hypothesis is good news for depositors and borrowers, since the improvement of op-
erational bank eﬃciency is, at least partly, passed on to the customers. Capital turns
out to be an important determinant of bank margins, both in Western European
countries and the CEEC. We interpret this finding as evidence of the disciplining
role of capital, but the quantitative eﬀect is much larger in the CEEC. Our results
also stress the importance of binding capital adequacy rules as a means to prevent
banks from taking excessive risks and as a tool for maintaining depositor confidence.
Combined, these results indicate that banking in the transition economies of the
CEEC is on a virtuous path: increasing eﬃciency benefits customers, while capital
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adequacy ensures systemic stability. In the absence of banking crises, this type of
banking environment should stimulate economic growth.
We further find that reform in the regulatory and institutional environment may
initially increase the net interest margin sensitivity with respect to risk behavior in a
situation of underdeveloped banking conditions (non-accession countries). However,
for more advanced countries (accession countries), competition eﬀects in lending
tend to lower interest margins. We also find that banks can hold lower levels of
capital and still maintain depositor confidence in countries with a higher degree of
institutional reform (accession versus non-accession countries). Our results imply
that the behavior of banks in Central and Eastern Europe gradually converges to
the one observed for their Western European counterparts. As the quality of bank
and enterprise reform progresses, this finding becomes more pronounced. Hence, the
policy implication is that regulators and financial supervisors in transition economies
should foster reform in the corporate sector in order to reduce asymmetric informa-
tion. Consequently, banks will be able and more willing to screen, lend and monitor,
which will lead to increased credit availability. If a suﬃcient degree of competition
in the banking markets can be maintained, interest margins will probably converge
to Western European levels.
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4.A Tables
TABLE 4.1
Average number of banks per country (1994-2001) and distribution of assets
country No. of banks mean(assets) sd(assets) p25(assets) p75(assets)
(average)
Albania 3 160,0 329,0 24,1 109,3
Austria 112 2128,6 5783,8 176,4 1108,8
Belarus 8 258,4 284,2 41,5 346,6
Belgium 51 5271,5 18976,0 209,4 2051,4
Bosnia 9 57,2 59,6 20,3 71,1
Bulgaria 17 193,9 283,8 32,7 215,6
Croatia 34 290,4 551,7 48,2 258,0
Czech 18 2557,0 4108,9 312,1 1707,6
Denmark 81 636,4 1890,4 78,0 432,2
Estonia 4 788,0 1040,9 116,8 987,6
Finland 5 22315,4 41677,3 1598,0 24903,7
France 294 5568,7 17783,5 413,0 4317,2
Germany 188 8349,4 23036,2 232,3 3099,0
Greece 11 6868,6 10262,0 382,8 10316,6
Hungary 22 949,3 1403,2 191,9 1226,7
Iceland 6 990,3 992,5 268,9 1340,9
Ireland 27 5869,5 10741,3 1108,7 4282,9
Italy 304 2451,9 6297,5 172,0 1807,7
Latvia 16 150,7 211,5 33,3 165,8
Lithuania 7 240,9 364,8 32,4 310,8
Luxembourg 89 3886,2 6624,9 384,5 4164,3
Macedonia 9 102,9 144,9 19,4 108,9
Netherlands 37 6809,0 19859,2 490,2 4711,8
Norway 34 2496,7 4889,8 334,3 2179,2
Poland 30 1642,4 3165,3 144,4 1490,7
Portugal 21 5276,4 9304,1 536,2 4711,3
Romania 12 277,7 473,4 36,0 338,8
Russia 54 398,0 810,4 39,1 309,3
Slovakia 14 926,6 1299,2 167,5 777,0
Slovenia 16 648,1 913,7 144,1 757,5
Spain 131 3835,7 7730,0 338,4 3923,9
Sweden 14 16472,7 22982,8 1257,5 34143,4
Switzerland 217 1738,4 7160,4 95,9 792,7
United Kingdom 100 9332,4 28210,8 234,5 3774,1
Ukraine 20 136,3 200,4 23,1 131,9
Yugoslavia 8 246,6 255,2 47,3 267,0
Note: Data taken from Bankscope. All variables are averaged over the years 1994-2001 and are
expressed in million euro.
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TABLE 4.6
Coefficient Impact
standard deviation average coefficienta) average impactb)
West Acc NonAcc West Acc NonAcc West Acc NonAcc
HERF 0.07 0.07 0.12 1.37 -12.68 -18.32 0.10 -0.89 -2.20
CR 0.1 0.08 0.14 0.92 -0.58 -12.03 0.09 -0.05 -1.68
MS 0.03 0.09 0.09 -0.69 2.18 8.26 -0.02 0.20 0.74
SIZE 1147 311 461 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.11 0.22 -0.90
EFF 0.88 0.34 0.18 -0.22 -1.50 -1.54 -0.19 -0.51 -0.28
CAP 6.42 6.5 11.58 0.06 0.10 0.13 0.39 0.63 1.49
LTA 23.78 16.02 16.97 0.02 0.06 0.07 0.37 0.93 1.12
DSDEP 31.33 24.83 25.34 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.09 0.52 0.37
GDP Growth 1.43 2.59 8.47 0.07 0.07 -0.25 0.10 0.18 -2.15
Inflation 1.09 7.41 91.19 0.15 0.23 0.07 0.17 1.69 6.16
Interest Rate 1.27 5.61 74.24 0.14 0.15 0.03 0.17 0.82 2.05
a) Average based on the regressions coefficients of tables 3 to 5 (last four columns).
b) Numbers in bold indicate significance at least at the 10 percent level.
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TABLE 4.8
Panel Estimations for Bank Margins for the Sample of Banks in Accession Countries
- Regulatory Variables and Interactions
regulatory controls regulatory interaction: CAP regulatory interaction: LTA
Variables
HERF -13.0714* -10.5335 -9.0991 -13.0827* -10.9736 -12.0441
[7.9298] [7.8901] [8.1290] [7.7423] [7.6931] [7.7884]
MS 2.2503 2.0488 2.9283 2.1579 2.4844 2.1141
[2.9925] [3.0374] [2.9590] [3.0415] [2.9861] [3.0391]
EFF -1.4818*** -1.4451*** -1.5072*** -1.4717*** -1.5353*** -1.4541***
[0.3746] [0.3725] [0.3739] [0.3734] [0.3701] [0.3730]
CAP 0.0944*** 0.0945*** 0.4548** 0.1574 0.0965*** 0.0956***
[0.0259] [0.0260] [0.2144] [0.1912] [0.0257] [0.0260]
DSDEP 0.0210** 0.0194* 0.0199** 0.0216** 0.0254** 0.0201**
[0.0100] [0.0101] [0.0100] [0.0101] [0.0100] [0.0101]
LTA 0.0578*** 0.0585*** 0.0540*** 0.0582*** 0.2747*** 0.0102
[0.0112] [0.0110] [0.0111] [0.0110] [0.0685] [0.0526]
GDP Growth 0.0772 0.0478 0.1047 0.0812 0.1132* 0.0625
[0.0663] [0.0668] [0.0660] [0.0643] [0.0640] [0.0657]
Inflation 0.2387*** 0.2254*** 0.2060*** 0.2394*** 0.1802*** 0.2332***
[0.0514] [0.0459] [0.0492] [0.0453] [0.0483] [0.0455]
Interest Rate 0.1458*** 0.1410*** 0.1333*** 0.1446*** 0.1369*** 0.1442***
[0.0411] [0.0401] [0.0411] [0.0401] [0.0398] [0.0401]
EBRDetp 0.026
[1.0765]
EBRDbank 1.1646
[0.7961]
CAP*EBRDetp -0.1258*
[0.0741]
CAP*EBRDbank -0.0198
[0.0610]
LTA*EBRDetp -0.0768***
[0.0240]
LTA*EBRDbank 0.015
[0.0161]
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 487 487 487 487 487 487
Number of banks 122 122 122 122 122 122
R-squared 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.31 0.3
Note: The dependent variable is bank net interest margin. The explanatory variables are the Herfindahl index, concentration
ratio, market share, size and efficiency. Control variables are the capital-to-assets ratio, the loans-to-assets ratio, the share
of demand and savings deposits in total deposits, yearly change in gdp, inflation and the short term interest rate. Standard
errors are given in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively.
TABLE 4.9
Panel Estimations for Bank Margins for the Sample of Banks in Non-Accession Countries
- Regulatory Variables and Interactions
regulatory controls regulatory interaction: CAP regulatory interaction: LTA
Variables
HERF -17.0330*** -25.5628*** -20.8415*** -22.4557*** -17.5570*** -25.7965***
[6.0523] [6.6706] [6.2099] [6.2103] [6.1203] [6.5126]
MS 7.3076* 10.3173*** 10.5229*** 10.0809*** 8.2067** 9.9047**
[3.9063] [3.8814] [3.9593] [3.8903] [3.9174] [3.8760]
EFF -2.5864 -2.2873 -2.3682 -2.2151 -2.3938 -2.4667
[2.2373] [2.2538] [2.2240] [2.2577] [2.2478] [2.2457]
CAP 0.1285*** 0.1399*** 0.1654 -0.0385 0.1350*** 0.1387***
[0.0297] [0.0300] [0.1503] [0.1367] [0.0298] [0.0299]
DSDEP 0.0104 0.0143 0.0159 0.0161 0.0145 0.0163
[0.0124] [0.0126] [0.0126] [0.0126] [0.0124] [0.0125]
LTA 0.0525** 0.0700*** 0.0712*** 0.0685*** -0.2031** -0.1101
[0.0237] [0.0234] [0.0237] [0.0235] [0.0991] [0.0887]
GDP Growth -0.2075* -0.2035* -0.2654** -0.2205* -0.2112* -0.1686
[0.1151] [0.1221] [0.1176] [0.1218] [0.1167] [0.1252]
Inflation 0.0641 0.0492 0.0557 0.064 0.0639 0.0585
[0.0657] [0.0671] [0.0682] [0.0673] [0.0663] [0.0669]
Interest Rate 0.0097 0.004 0.0127 0.0201 0.0145 0.008
[0.0604] [0.0618] [0.0626] [0.0618] [0.0609] [0.0615]
EBRDetp 8.1151***
[2.2257]
EBRDbank 3.0193*
[1.7408]
CAP*EBRDetp -0.0092
[0.0652]
CAP*EBRDbank 0.0684
[0.0507]
LTA*EBRDetp 0.1163***
[0.0408]
LTA*EBRDbank 0.0700**
[0.0331]
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 354 354 354 354 354 354
Number of banks 109 109 109 109 109 109
R-squared 0.28 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.27 0.25
Note: The dependent variable is bank net interest margin. The explanatory variables are the Herfindahl index, concentration
ratio, market share, size and efficiency. Control variables are the capital-to-assets ratio, the loans-to-assets ratio, the share
of demand and savings deposits in total deposits, yearly change in gdp, inflation and the short term interest rate. Standard
errors are given in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively.
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Chapter 5
Foreign banks in Eastern
Europe: mode of entry and
eﬀects on bank interest rates.1
5.1 Introduction
Many emerging economies are hesitant about letting foreign banks enter their mar-
ket. When deciding on the liberalization of the banking sector, policy makers weigh
the costs and benefits of foreign bank entry for the domestic banks and for the cor-
porate sector. On the one hand, governments fear that foreign banks will engage
in cherry picking, leaving the domestic banks with bad loans in their portfolio. On
the other, the local banking market can benefit from the better technologies that
foreign banks use through learning and spill-over eﬀects. Through an increase in
bank competition, domestic firms may gain by paying lower interest rates for their
loans.
The empirical facts about bank market entry diﬀer substantially between regions.
In the new EU member states, the share of foreign banks in total banking sector
assets amounted to about 55 percent in 2003. This was at a time when foreign banks
were almost absent in the large EU-15 countries (ECB, 2005). This is surprising,
because there are no formal restrictions on bank market entry. Interestingly, the
1An adapted version of this chapter will appear in the Conference Proceedings of the OeNB
Conference on European Economic Integration: Financial Development, Integration and Stability
in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, Edward Elgar, UK, 2006. This chapter is based on:
Claeys, Sophie, and Christa Hainz (2006), “Acquisition versus greenfield: The impact of the mode
of foreign bank entry on information and bank lending rates. Theory and evidence,” ECB Working
Paper, May 2006.
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foreign-owned banks in more developed countries have a lower profitability than
domestic banks (Claessens et al., 2001).
Rather the opposite situation is found in emerging economies. In these markets,
foreign banks are often more profitable and eﬃcient than domestic banks (Demirgüç-
Kunt and Huizinga, 2000, Bonin et al., 2005, Martinez Peria and Mody, 2004). More
importantly, foreign bank presence may improve access to credit for creditworthy
firms (Giannetti and Ongena, 2005). In Eastern Europe, foreign bank entry has
increased competition and improved lending technologies so that lending to small
and medium-sized enterprises and retail markets gradually increased (De Haas and
Naaborg, 2005).
Policy makers do not only decide on the liberalization of bank entry but often also
on the mode of entry. Depending on their evaluation of the entry mode, governments
provide incentives that encourage foreign bank entry either through a greenfield
investment, by establishing a foreign de novo bank, or through acquisition. However,
while empirical evidence shows that foreign de novo banks are more profitable and
eﬃcient than foreign-acquired banks (Martinez Peria and Mody, 2004, Majnoni et
al., 2003), the diﬀerential impact of the mode of entry on domestic bank lending
conditions and competition remains unclear.
In this chapter, we shed light on how foreign bank entry impacts the host coun-
try’s banking market, depending on the entry mode. We analyze the impact of the
mode of entry on competition. Specifically, we analyze the eﬀects of the mode of
foreign bank entry on the lending rate in markets where firms heavily depend on
bank financing. We investigate whether bank lending rates are higher if foreign entry
predominantly happens through the establishment of a de novo bank or through the
acquisition of a domestic bank. Neither the theoretical nor the empirical literature
provides complete answers to this question.
We focus on the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe, where
foreign banks are now dominating the market (foreign bank market shares went up
from approximately 10 percent in 1995 to almost 64 percent in 2003, on average).
Furthermore, these markets are characterized by heterogeneous forms of market
entry, which moreover vary over time. This allows scope to analyze the direct or
initial impact of foreign entry.
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5.2 The impact of the mode of foreign bank entry on
creditor information
In Claeys and Hainz (2006), we develop a theoretical model in which domestic banks
possess private information about their incumbent clients but foreign banks have
better screening skills. We argue that, after foreign bank entry, information on old
and new firms’ creditworthiness is unevenly distributed between the foreign and
the domestic banks. First, the domestic bank has access to soft information about
those firms with which it has already established a relationship in the past. This
generates an absolute information advantage for the domestic bank about these old
firms’ creditworthiness. Second, in an emerging market context, the foreign bank
is assumed to possess better screening skills than the domestic bank. This implies
that the foreign bank will be able to better process hard information about new
firms that apply for credit through credit evaluation. We show that this information
advantage allows the foreign bank to oﬀer slightly lower rates than the domestic
bank. However, the information advantage also enables the foreign bank to extract
rents from firms that apply for credit for the first time while oﬀering them credit
contracts. Foreign banks will therefore be able to oﬀer more competitive rates to
new credit applicants than the domestic banks. As a result, foreign bank entry will
drive down a country’s average interest rate for new loans.
The foreign bank’s scope for extracting rents from new applicants depends on the
mode of entry. A foreign greenfield bank will only enter the market if its advantage in
screening new firms compensates the disadvantage it has compared to the domestic
banks with respect to soft information about old firms. If a foreign bank acquires
a domestic bank, it also acquires the credit portfolio which contains information
about the quality of client firms. In addition to this acquired information, the
foreign-acquired bank possesses superior screening skills compared to the domestic
bank. The distribution of information between domestic and foreign banks and
consequently the degree of competition depend on the mode of entry. We refer to
this diﬀerential eﬀect as a “competition eﬀect” that depends on the mode of entry.
This argument indicates that interest rates for new creditors will be lower when
the foreign bank enters the market by establishing a foreign de novo bank compared
to acquiring a domestic bank. However, the average interest rate that a bank de-
mands depends on a bank’s portfolio composition of newly applying and old firms.
Therefore, we additionally analyze what we refer to as the “portfolio composition
eﬀect”. Old firms might get more favorable rates from their incumbent bank, such
that the average lending rate demanded by acquired banks may still be lower than
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the one from a foreign de novo bank.
5.3 Entry policy in Central and Eastern Europe
The heterogeneous process of deregulation in the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe led to an uneven reduction of the barriers to entry. The countries that
we analyze are Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia for the period 1995—2003. These
countries have shown widely diﬀerent policies towards the mode of foreign bank
entry. Foreign bank entry was sometimes allowed already early in transition - with
changing restrictions on the mode of entry.
The example of Poland illustrates how government policy has changed during
the last 15 years. In the very beginning of the transition process, bank entry was
not regulated. Foreign banks were even given tax holidays. After many small,
undercapitalized banks had entered, the minimum capital requirement increased
and tax holidays for foreign banks were eliminated. Starting in 1992, the Polish
government preferred selling its domestic banks to foreign owners over issuing new
bank licenses to foreign banks. The aim of the politicians was to sell (often weak)
domestic banks to foreign banks, which brought in new capital and had the expertise
to restructure these banks. A few banks were privatized between 1993 and 1997, but
at the time the government was mainly selling minority shares to foreign investors.
In 1999 the government started to sell majority shares of the state-owned banks
to foreign investors and allowed foreign banks to open branches without restraints
(NBP, 2001).
5.3.1 Data on ownership structure
We want to determine and compare what average lending rates look like if a foreign
bank enters either through a greenfield investment or through acquisition. For this
purpose, we create a database that captures the time-varying ownership structure
of individual banks in Central and Eastern Europe.
We use yearly data of about 200 individual banks in 10 Eastern European tran-
sition countries, for the period 1995—2003. For each country, we gather commercial
banks’ balance sheets and income and loss accounts from the BankScope database
maintained by Fitch/IBCA/Bureau Van Dijk. Consolidated statements were pre-
ferred but unconsolidated statements were used when the consolidated ones were
not available. We obtain historical bank-specific ownership data from central and
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commercial banks’ annual reports. Each bank is classified as either domestically- or
foreign-owned, whereby a foreign bank can be the result of a cross-border acquisition
or a de novo investment. A bank is classified as foreign when at least 50 percent of
its shares is foreign-owned. We distinguish between banks that were foreign-owned
since the start of the sample in the year 1995 and banks that became foreign-owned
from 1995 onwards. Each foreign bank can enter the sample either as a foreign de
novo bank or as a foreign-acquired bank.
In order to capture the diﬀerences in information distribution and screening
skills as described above, we assume that for each bank the following events related
to acquisition can occur during the sample period:
(1) foreign de novo bank acquires a domestic bank;
(2) foreign-acquired bank acquires domestic, foreign-acquired or foreign de novo
bank;
(3) foreign de novo bank acquires foreign de novo bank;
(4) domestic bank acquires domestic bank.
For case (1), the merged bank is classified as having entered via acquisition from
the date of acquisition onwards. For case (2), banks remain classified as foreign-
acquired banks. This classification enables us to distinguish between banks which
have (a) access to soft information but have inferior screening skills (domestic banks),
(b) soft information and a superior screening ability (foreign-acquired banks) and (c)
only screening ability (foreign de novo banks). For cases (3) and (4) we assume that
these mergers lead to bigger banks, without generating an impact on information
distribution. A detailed overview of the ownership history of all the banks included
in our analysis is provided in Claeys and Hainz (2005).
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Table 5.1: Foreign bank presence and market share by mode of entry (%).
Year Foreign bank Foreign MA Foreign De Novo
Foreign bank Market Foreign bank Market Foreign bank Market
presence share presence share presence share
1992 15.96 2.66 13.3
1993 18.47 3.15 15.32
1994 20.73 2.85 17.89
1995 22.39 10.82 3.47 0.82 18.92 10
1996 27.05 8.02 5 2.48 22.14 5.54
1997 32.75 16.28 10.14 9.76 22.73 6.53
1998 36.65 25.36 12.59 16.74 24.46 8.62
1999 41.25 35.23 15.75 25.38 25.98 9.85
2000 47.03 45.48 21.79 34.18 25.64 11.3
2001 50.66 55.37 25.33 40.64 25.78 14.73
2002 52.63 62.36 29.47 46.65 23.67 15.71
2003 56.93 63.94 33 48.34 24.5 15.61
Average 35.21 35.87 13.77 25 21.69 10.88
Note: Foreign MA: a foreign bank that acquires a domestic bank and obtains a majority ownership
share. Foreign De Novo: a foreign bank that enters the market as a de novo bank that has a
majority foreign ownership share. Foreign bank presence is the number of foreign to domestic
banks. Foreign bank market share is the share of foreign loans to the country total. The sum of
values for Foreign MA and Foreign De Novo can diﬀer from the value for Foreign Bank due to
rounding diﬀerences. Source: Own calculations based on Bankscope and central bank and bank
annual reports.
5.3.2 Summary statistics
Table 5.1 presents the average percentage of foreign bank presence and market share
in total loans by mode of entry for the period 1992—2003.
Foreign bank participation has increased dramatically. In 1992, about 16 percent
of the banks in our sample were foreign-owned. Foreign bank presence rose to 57
percent in 2003, the year in which they possess a market share of 64 percent. In the
beginning of the 1990s, the majority of foreign bank entry is via the establishment
of a de novo bank. While foreign greenfield banks represent almost 22 percent of the
market on average, foreign bank acquisitions account for about 14 percent. However,
foreign-acquired banks gradually increase their presence over the years and account
for 33 percent of all banks in our sample by 2003. Foreign acquisitions eventually
became the dominant mode of entry: banks that were foreign-acquired between 1992
and 2003 have a market share of 25 percent, on average, while foreign banks that
entered the Central and Eastern European banking markets through a greenfield
investment have on average a market share of 11 percent. Since foreign-acquired
banks buy a customer base, their market share grows much faster than that of de
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novo banks. In 2003, foreign-acquired banks possess a market share of 48 percent
whereas foreign de novo banks only have 16 percent of the credit market.
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show how foreign bank presence varies over countries and
over time, by mode of entry. Figure 5.1 presents the percentage of foreign bank
presence, Figure 5.2 shows market shares starting from 1995.
The figures reveal some important diﬀerences between the countries. The figures
show that countries that joined the European Union in May 2004 diﬀer from those
applying for membership in 2007. In Bulgaria and Croatia, the neighbors of the
enlarged European Union, the market share of foreign banks is about 46 percent
and 36 percent respectively in 2003 and hence remains significantly lower than in
the eight other countries.
In Hungary, foreign banks already out-numbered domestic banks in 1993. Due
to the Hungarian liberalization strategy that started in the early 1980s, the share of
foreign banks has gradually risen and now represents more than 70 percent of the
market. In the beginning of the 1990s, the Czech and the Polish banking sector were
also characterized by a large inflow of foreign de novo banks. The cumulative market
share for de novo banks is, however, relatively small (7 and 17 percent) compared
to the market share for de novo banks in Hungary (24 percent). In 1999 the Polish
government started to sell majority shares of domestic banks to foreign investors.
This resulted in the number of foreign banks in Poland exceeding the number of
domestic banks in 1999. Foreign banks dominate the market in terms of market
share since 2000.
The Baltic countries started liberalizing market entry into the banking sector
relatively late. Therefore, the changes observed are even more dramatic. Estonia,
for example, has only three foreign-owned banks (AS Sampo Pank, Hansabank and
Eesti Uhispank), but Hansabank alone accounts for over 70 percent of assets since
2001 (see Claeys and Hainz, 2005). Thus, banking in Estonia can be considered as
a predominantly foreign aﬀair.
In Slovakia, foreign banks already entered in the early 1990s but they did not
become significant players before the year 2000. In contrast, although Slovenia is
characterized by a relatively low percentage of foreign bank presence, foreign banks
obtained over 60 percent of bank loans by 2002. These loans are almost exclusively
granted by foreign-acquired banks. Foreign de novo banks hardly play a role on the
credit market in Slovenia.
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 illustrate that there is a considerable amount of foreign
entry occurring in most countries included in our sample. Furthermore, the market
shares of foreign banks have gradually risen and are starting to dominate the market.
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Figure 5.1: Foreign bank presence by mode of entry (%). Source: Own calculations
based on Bankscope, central banks and bank annual reports.
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Figure 5.2: Foreign bank market share by mode of entry (%). Source: Own calcula-
tions based on Bankscope, central banks and bank annual reports.
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Figure 5.3: Evolution of bank lending rates (right scale) and foreign bank market
share (left scale) (%). Note: Bank lending rates (%) are calculated as interest income
over (two year) average loans (3 year moving average). Foreign bank market share
(%) is the ratio of foreign loans to the country-total. Source: Own calculations based
on Bankscope and central banks and bank annual reports.
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
Foreign Bank share Lending Rate
Together with the increase in foreign acquisitions, banking markets became more and
more concentrated. This resulted in an average market share of almost 60 percent
held by the top 3 banks per country.
5.3.3 Evolution of bank lending rates by ownership structure
Figure 5.3 presents the evolution of average bank lending rates and foreign bank
market shares between 1995 and 2003. Compared to Western Europe, bank interest
rates are still relatively high, but decreased significantly from 22 percent in 1995
to 13 percent in 2003. At the same time, foreign bank market shares increased
dramatically to about 64 percent.
This figure gives a first indication that a higher foreign bank share in loans is
associated with a lower average lending rate, which would support the competi-
tion eﬀect that we describe above. We investigate this hypothesis further by using
regression analysis.
Since we cannot disentangle individual bank-firm relationships through bank
balances, we cannot observe the share of old and new firms that apply for credit
at the bank. We do however observe the average interest rate that banks charge
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Figure 5.4: Average lending rates by mode of entry: evolution per year after entry.
Note: Bank lending rates (%) are calculated as interest income over (two year)
average loans (3 year moving average). Foreign MA: a foreign bank that acquires a
domestic bank and obtains a majority ownership share. Foreign De Novo: a foreign
bank that enters the market as a de novo bank that has a majority foreign ownership
share. Domestic: a domestic bank. Source: Own calculations based on Bankscope
and central banks and bank annual reports.
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to both types of customers. Figure 5.4 graphs how the average lending rate evolves
per year after the foreign bank has entered the market, by mode of entry. Figure
5.4 also shows the evolution of domestic bank interest rates over the years after
entry. From the figure it is clear that on average, foreign banks charge lower interest
rates than domestic banks (15.5 and 18.5 percent respectively). However, in the first
year after entry, foreign and domestic banks’ lending rates do not diﬀer significantly.
Furthermore, domestic banks have been operating relatively longer in the market
compared to foreign banks. One corollary of this is that in the first year after entry,
foreign banks may be charging higher rates than domestic banks that have been in
the market longer at that time. However, foreign banks reduce their lending rates
much faster compared to domestic banks. We analyze these issues in more detail in
the following section.
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5.4 Regression analysis
5.4.1 Estimation strategy
We empirically verify the following hypotheses for observed lending rates:
• Hypothesis 1: Foreign banks charge lower rates than domestic banks, on av-
erage. Due to better screening skills, foreign banks are able to undercut the
domestic banks’ lending rates, irrespective of their mode of entry.
We include a variable Foreign Bank to test whether foreign and domestic bank
lending rates significantly diﬀer. Foreign Bank is a dummy variable that is one
for banks that are already foreign owned at the start of the sample (1995).
• Hypothesis 2: Acquired banks oﬀer higher lending rates to new applicants than
greenfield banks. The acquired bank lending rate oﬀered to incumbent firms
is however below the rate oﬀered to new applicants. Therefore, depending on
the loan portfolio composition of the acquired and the domestic banks, the
average expected repayment of foreign greenfield (E(RG)), domestic (E(RD))
and foreign-acquired banks (E(RA)) can be ranked either as
— E(RD) < E(RA) < E(RG) or as
— E(RD) > E(RA) > E(RG).
The higher the share of successful firms the more likely it is that the lending
rate of the greenfield bank is higher than the average lending rate of both the
domestic and the acquired bank. To test whether foreign-acquired and foreign
greenfield banks charge lower rates compared to domestic banks, we include
Foreign MA and Foreign Greenfield. Foreign MA is a dummy variable that is
one from the moment that a foreign bank acquires a domestic bank within the
sample period and obtains a majority ownership share. Foreign Greenfield is
a dummy variable that is one from the moment that a bank entered during
the sample period as a foreign de novo bank. We interact the mode of entry
variables with the age of the bank to account for age dynamics. As foreign
banks become more acquainted with the market, diﬀerences in information
asymmetries will gradually disappear. Moreover, domestic banks will benefit
from positive spill-over eﬀects following entry and invest in better screening
technologies. We therefore expect that lending rates converge as banks grow
older.
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• Hypothesis 3: Foreign bank entry negatively impacts domestic bank lending
rates, irrespective of the mode of entry.
Due to increased competition, lending rates for new applicants decrease and
the hold-up problem that old firms face will be significantly reduced. We
include Foreign bank share, the ratio of foreign loans to total market loans,
to test for the competition eﬀect. We expect a significant negative impact of
foreign bank market share on domestic bank lending rates.
• Hypothesis 4: The negative impact of foreign bank entry on domestic bank
lending rates is more pronounced when a majority of foreign banks entered via
a greenfield investment.
Domestic banks reduce their interest rates more for both good old firms and
new applicants when foreign banks enter through a greenfield investment. To
test this diﬀerential competition eﬀect, we diﬀerentiate foreign bank market
share in loans and define Bank share of Foreign MA versus Bank share of
Foreign Greenfield. We expect a larger negative impact on domestic bank
lending rates following entry via greenfield investment.
In what follows, we analyze the impact of the mode of foreign bank entry on
a measure for the lending rate, while controlling for a number of variables. In
particular, we estimate regressions of the following form:
rLi,j,t = β0 + β1 · Foreign Banki,j +
β2 · Foreign MAi,j,t +
β3 · Foreign Greenfieldi,j,t +
β4 · Foreign Bank Sharej,t +
β5 · CONTROLS +
γj,t · [CountryFE · Y earFE] + εi,j,t. (5.1)
The dependent variable is the (nominal) lending rate, defined as:
rLi,j,t =
RIi,j,t
1
2(Lt−1 + Lt)
,
with RIi,j,t interest income and Li,j,t the volume of loans for each bank i in country j
at time t, taken from the Bankscope database. Since we are dividing a flow variable
by a stock variable, we use the average of the stock variable between t and t−1. Next
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to variables that capture the mode of entry, we control for a number of bank and
country-specific variables that are expected to determine bank lending rates similarly
across banks. To account for the macroeconomic developments within a country, we
include measures for GDP growth, inflation and the real short term interest rate. We
include the EBRD index for enterprise reform to control for the share of successful
firms in a country. This index provides a ranking of the liberalization progress
and institutional reform in the corporate sector. Finally, all regressions include the
interactions between country and year dummies. In comparison to using country
and time fixed eﬀects additively, we do not have to assume that year eﬀects are the
same for each country. Instead, we assume that the average interest rate is fixed
for all banks in each country-year while it can diﬀer across countries and over time.
Definitions and sources of all the variables are described in Table 5.2.
5.4.2 Descriptive statistics and sample properties
We use yearly data of about 200 individual banks in 10 Eastern European tran-
sition countries, namely Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia for the period 1995-2003. Table 5.3
presents the means of the variables used for estimation. Foreign bank participation
in the sample encompasses 15% of foreign banks that are foreign from the start of
the sample (with an average market share of 41%), 20% of foreign acquisitions (with
a market share of 28%) and 5% foreign de novo banks (with a market share of 5%).
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 indicated that in the beginning of the 1990s, foreign entry pre-
dominantly happened via establishing foreign de novo banks. Figure 5.1 indicated
that a large proportion of the original foreign banks in our sample were initiated as
de novo investments. Figure 5.2 showed that foreign-acquired bank market shares
however dominate de novo bank market shares since 1997. Together with a wave of
foreign acquisitions, bank markets became more and more concentrated. On aver-
age, the market share of the top 3 banks per country amount to almost 60 percent.
The mode of entry variables used for estimation are defined within the sample, such
that we can adequately assess the impact of entry, depending on the mode. This
additionally enables us to interpret age dynamics appropriately.
5.4.3 Identification strategy
Before estimating equation (5.1), we need to control for a potential endogeneity
problem, namely that foreign banks may (a) enter markets that oﬀer high expected
profits and (b) ex-ante choose the most profitable mode of entry.
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First, observing a positive correlation between either mode of entry and lending
rates does not provide a conclusive answer about the direction of causality. To alle-
viate doubts on causality, we instrument Foreign bank share (also diﬀerentiated by
mode) with a number of preset, country-specific regulatory features that facilitated
foreign bank entry in Central and Eastern Europe.
The countries under analysis have shown widely diﬀerent policies towards (the
mode of) foreign bank entry.2 Even when foreign bank entry was sometimes allowed
already early in transition - with changing restrictions to the mode of entry - there
was a continuing reduction to the barriers of (the mode of) entry during the years
we consider. After abolishing formal restrictions to entry, other obstacles gradually
vanished: creditor right enforcement improved and credit registries - either private
or public - were introduced to alleviate asymmetric information problems in lend-
ing (Djankov et al., 2005). We assume it is unlikely that foreign bank presence
systematically impacted these changes in regulation which therefore oﬀer legitimate
candidates to instrument and exogenously determine foreign bank presence.
The instruments that we use for Foreign bank share are the following. First, we
use a dummy variable for the incorporation of a credit registry, taken from Djankov et
al., 2005. Given that bank entry is allowed, information sharing on borrower history
may make entry in general and entry via a greenfield investment in particular more
attractive. Second, we use the Creditor Rights Index taken from Djankov et al., 2005.
An improvement in the legal protection of creditors has been shown to be positively
related to banks’ willingness to lend, especially for foreign banks (Haselmann et
al., 2005; Giannetti and Ongena, 2005). Third, we include factors of the Index
of Economic Freedom (Heritage Foundation) that capture a country’s institutional
aptitude to foreign bank entry.3 The higher the score on a factor, the greater the
level of government interference in the economy and the less economic freedom a
country enjoys. It is therefore expected that foreign bank entry will be lower for
countries that score high on these factors. Fourth, we include the number of banks
that can be considered as potential targets by foreign banks to control for takeover
potential. We expect this to be positively (negatively) correlated with Bank share
of Foreign MA (Bank share of Foreign Greenfield).
Second, we instrument the mode of entry dummy variables. Foreign banks may
2For an overview, see Bonin et al., 1998. For a detailed listing of foreign de novo entry, foreign
and domestic mergers and acquisitions between 1990 and 2003 in Central and Eastern Europe see
Claeys and Hainz (2005).
3Specifically, the factors are related to: Trade Policy; Fiscal Burden of Government; Government
Intervention in Economy; Monetary Policy; Capital Flows and Foreign Investment; Banking and
Finance; Wages and Prices; Property Rights; Regulation; Informal Market Activity.
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acquire domestic banks that either have high profits (and high lending rates), im-
plicating a positive reversed causality, or foreign banks may acquire domestic banks
that are most eﬃcient (and have low lending rates), leading to a negative reversed
causality between lending rates and Foreign MA. From the theoretical model we ar-
gue that if Foreign MA leads to lower average lending rates, this is due to a relatively
large presence of successful firms in the market (the portfolio composition eﬀect).
Vice versa, a positive relation would result when many firms apply for credit for the
first time relative to the share of successful firms. In order to be able to draw these
conclusions, we need to instrument Foreign MA. A foreign bank may alternatively
choose to enter as a de novo bank, because it wants to avoid bearing the cost of
potentially inheriting bad customers. Indeed, a greenfield bank may be better able
to control the costs of entry (because it can start with a clean balance sheet, has no
uncertainty related to acquiring an existing bank) and can therefore charge lower
lending rates compared to its competitors.
We instrument Foreign MA and Foreign Greenfield by first estimating a logistic
model and then plugging in estimated probabilities in our second stage regression.4
Next to the current an lagged exogenous variables, we include the lagged lending
rate as instruments.
5.4.4 Results
Table 5.4 presents the estimation results for equation (5.1) that includes all banks.
The first three columns show estimates that are based on ordinary least squares
regressions. The last three columns show the results when controlling for endogeneity
by using instrumental variable estimation.
The explanatory power of the first stage regressions is relatively high. On av-
erage 85% of Foreign bank share can be explained by country-specific institutional
characteristics, while the logistic model for the Foreign MA and Foreign Greenfield
dummies correctly classifies 90% of the observations by mode of entry. We first show
results without controlling for age dynamics in columns I and IV. We subsequently
include linear (II and V) and quadratic (III and VI) age dynamics in the regressions.
Once we control for endogeneity, the quadratic eﬀects that were found for greenfield
banks disappear. Therefore the baseline results that we further refer to are shown
in model (V).
First, it follows that foreign banks, on average, charge lower lending rates -
4The estimated probabilities are set to zero if smaller than 0.5, one otherwise.
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about 2.55% less than domestic banks.5 Second, foreign-acquired and foreign de
novo banks do not charge significantly less than domestic banks, on average. The
age dynamics however indicate that both acquired and de novo banks respectively
charge 0.14% and 2% more than domestic banks in the first year after entry. Both
types of banks however significantly reduce their lending rate a couple of years after
entry. This observation would be consistent with an increase in the share of new
applicants over time, such that the competition eﬀect starts to dominate the portfolio
composition eﬀect.6 Third, a higher foreign bank share in loans has a significantly
downward impact on the average lending rate, which supports the competition eﬀect.
This finding corroborates previous empirical literature (Martinez Peria and Mody
(2004), Claessens et al. (2001)).
In order to be able to fully disentangle the impact of foreign greenfield banks on
bank lending rates, we include the number of banks as a control variable. The results
indicate that a higher number of banks leads to higher bank lending rates. This is
surprising at first, but can be explained as follows. Even though the countries in our
sample have been characterized by an inflow of greenfield banks in the early 1990s,
most bank entry happened via foreign acquisitions afterwards (see Figures 5.1 and
5.2). Moreover, a number of failures and mergers led to a gradual reduction of the
number of banks in the later years of our sample. The process of consolidation has
therefore likely led to a reduction in lending rates, due to eﬃciency gains.
The index of enterprise reform is always positive and significant. Progress in the
corporate sector will likely lead to a larger share of new firms that need to be credit
financed, leading to higher lending rates.
In Table 5.5, we investigate hypothesis 4, namely whether there is a diﬀerential
competition eﬀect on domestic bank lending rates, depending on the mode of entry.
We present separate regression results for the group of domestic and foreign banks.
The coeﬃcients for Foreign MA and Foreign Greenfield now show the diﬀerence in
average lending rates relative to banks that were already foreign owned in 1995.
First, the results in columns (II) and (IV) indicate that neither foreign de novo nor
foreign-acquired banks charge significantly diﬀerent lending rates than the original
foreign banks. Second, when we control for endogeneity, the competition eﬀect can
be corroborated for domestic banks. The results in model (III) indicate that a one
percent increase in foreign de novo market share leads to a reduction in domestic
5This finding is in line with the result by Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2004), who show that if a
foreign bank with lower costs enters, the incumbent bank reacts by lending more to firms in opaque
sectors. As a result, the domestic bank demands higher rates then the foreign bank.
6We additionally investigated the impact of mergers between two foreign banks on lending rates,
but this was never significant. These results are available upon request.
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bank average lending rates of 0.19% compared to a reduction of 0.10% following a
one percent increase in foreign-acquired market share. These results indicate that
competition is more intense when entry predominantly happened via a greenfield
investment, although the two coeﬃcients diﬀer only marginally significantly.
The results in Table 5.4 revealed a significant positive impact of market concen-
tration on average lending rates. The results in Table 5.5 however show that a highly
concentrated market does not impact foreign interest rates but it increases domestic
banks’ lending rates. On the one hand, highly concentrated markets may render
competition less intense, which may lead to higher lending rates (Berger, 1995). On
the other, highly concentrated markets may be the result of a consolidation process
in which banks with superior management or production technologies have lower
costs and subsequently can oﬀer more competitive interest rates on loans, leading
to a negative relationship between market concentration and lending rates. Thus,
while foreign entry increased competition, especially via the entry of foreign de novo
banks, the ongoing consolidation process may eventually hamper competition and
lead domestic banks to charge higher lending rates.
5.5 Concluding Remarks
Credit markets in many Eastern European countries are now dominated by foreign-
owned banks. This ownership structure resulted from the liberalization of foreign
bank entry in the early 1990s and the privatization of state-owned banks, mainly by
selling majority shares to foreign investors. The majority of loans from foreign banks
is granted by acquired banks. The presence of foreign-acquired banks as measured
by their relative number among the banks in our dataset increased somewhat slower
than that of foreign de novo banks. However, since market entry through acquisition
allows acquiring a credit portfolio and a customer base, acquired banks were able
to expand their market share much faster than the foreign de novo banks. Our
data indicate that the interest rate decreased after foreign bank entry. Indeed, using
regression analysis, we find that a higher foreign bank share in loans negatively
impacts the average lending rate, which supports the competition eﬀect. Moreover,
we document that an increase in foreign de novo market share leads to a greater
reduction in domestic bank average lending rates compared to the reduction following
an increase in foreign-acquired market share. This indicates that competition is more
intense when entry predominantly happened through foreign de novo investments.
Our empirical analysis indicates that the competition eﬀect is indeed stronger
when entry happened predominantly through a greenfield investment. Initially, the
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portfolio composition eﬀect dominates the competition eﬀect. As a result, both for-
eign acquired and foreign de novo banks charge higher lending rates than domestic
banks in the first year after entry. After a couple of years, both banks significantly
reduce their interest rates, below the domestic one. This follows from the competi-
tion for new firms - which subsequently impacts the competition for old firms, that
are able to get lower interest rates as well.
Our analysis does not explicitly address the question which entry mode is opti-
mal. However, our model suggests that the optimal entry mode depends crucially on
the characteristics of the host market and the costs of entry. Market entry by green-
field investment is unlikely to be attractive in established market economies where
only few firms are new entrants on the credit market. Market entry by acquiring
an existing bank may be subject to considerable uncertainty since it is diﬃcult to
determine the quality of the target bank’s credit portfolio. These arguments already
point out that the optimal mode of entry depends on whether the host country is
an established market economy or an emerging market. Although the results in the
previous literature highlight the existence of these diﬀerences, so far, there is hardly
any explanation for them.
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5.A Tables
Table 5.2: Variable definitions and sources. 
 
 
Variable Description Source 
1. Dependent variable 
  
   
The (nominal) lending rate The share of interest income (flow variable) 
over loans (stock variable). Since we are 
dividing a flow variable by a stock variable, 
we use the average of the stock variable 
between t and t-1. (%). 
Fitch/IBC
A/BvD/B
ankscope. 
2. Ownership/mode of entry variables. 
   
a)      Foreign Bank  A dummy that is one for banks that were 
already foreign-owned before the start of 
the sample. These include all the greenfield 
banks or foreign acquisitions (that resulted 
in majority foreign ownership) that 
happened before or in 1995. Foreign Bank 
indicates the own effect of bank origin or 
the own effect of foreign bank presence. 
Claeys and 
Hainz 
(2005). 
b)      Foreign MA A dummy that is one from the moment 
that a foreign bank acquires a domestic 
bank within the sample period and obtains 
a majority ownership share. 
Claeys and 
Hainz 
(2005). 
c)      Foreign Greenfield  A dummy that is one from the moment 
that a bank entered during the sample 
period as a de novo bank with a majority 
foreign ownership share. 
Claeys and 
Hainz 
(2005). 
d)     Foreign bank share (%)  The ratio of foreign loans to a country’s 
total volume of loans. This variable 
measures the competition effect following 
foreign bank entry. 
Fitch/IBC
A/BvD/B
ankscope. 
3. Bank-specific control variables.  
   
a)      Liquidity (%)  The ratio of liquid to total assets. Liquid 
assets comprise cash and bank deposits, 
including central bank deposits. High cash 
holdings represent an opportunity cost of 
holding higher-yielding assets (e.g. loans) 
that can increase lending rates. 
Fitch/IBC
A/BvD/B
ankscope. 
b)      Costs (%)  The ratio of total expenses to  average 
assets. Higher costs will lead banks to 
charge higher lending rates. 
Fitch/IBC
A/BvD/B
ankscope. 
c)      Market share (%)  The share of loans to a country’s total 
bank loans. Market share intends to 
capture market power. More market power 
can result in higher lending rates. 
Fitch/IBC
A/BvD/B
ankscope. 
d)      ∆ Loan loss reserves The log difference in loan loss reserves with 
respect to the previous year is intended as 
a proxy for credit risk. A rise in credit risk 
will lead banks to increase their lending 
rates. 
Fitch/IBC
A/BvD/B
ankscope. 
e)       Capital (%)  The capital-to-assets ratio. Banks need to 
hold regulatory capital as a buffer against 
credit risk; however, large capital holdings 
are costly for banks. A high capital ratio 
may consequently lead to high lending 
rates. 
Fitch/IBC
A/BvD/B
ankscope. 
4. Country-specific control variables.  
   
a)      Top 3 bank share (%)  This variable captures the concentration in 
the loan market. 
Fitch/IBC
A/BvD/B
ankscope. 
b)      Total number of banks A country’s total number of banks. This 
variable is included to control for the 
increase in the number of banks following a 
de novo entry. 
EBRD 
Transition 
reports. 
c)      Credit registry A dummy variable that equals one from 
the year of the incorporation of a credit 
registry onward, zero otherwise. The 
incorporation of a credit registry induces a 
downward shift in the overall degree of 
information asymmetry in the banking 
market, which is expected to lead to lower 
lending rates. 
Djankov, 
McLiesh 
and 
Shleifer 
(2005). 
d)      Inflation (%)  Changes in inflation will be paralleled by 
changes in the nominal lending rate. 
EBRD 
Transition 
reports. 
e)     GDP growth (%)  The real growth in GDP captures the 
business cycle and represents another loan 
demand factor. 
EBRD 
Transition 
reports. 
f)      Real short term interest 
rate (%)  
The real short term interest rate defines a 
lower bound for bank funding and 
represents another cost. 
 
f)      EBRD enterprise reform 
index 
Index based on the amount of budgetary 
subsidies, the efficiency of tax collection for 
social security, the share of industry in 
total employment and the change in labor 
productivity in industry (between 1 and 4). 
EBRD 
Transition 
reports. 
5. Instruments.   
   
a)      Creditor rights index An index aggregating creditor rights, taken 
from Djankov et al. (2005).  The index 
ranges from 0 (weak creditor rights) to 4 
(strong creditor rights). 
Djankov, 
McLiesh 
and 
Shleifer 
(2005). 
b)      Factors of Economic 
Freedom 
Factors related to: Trade Policy; Fiscal 
Burden of Government; Government 
Intervention in Economy; Monetary Policy; 
Capital Flows and Foreign Investment; 
Banking and Finance; Wages and Prices; 
Property Rights; Regulation; Informal 
Market Activity. Each factor ranges from 1 
(free) to 5 (repressed). 
Heritage 
Foundatio
n. 
c)      Takeover target The relative number of potential (domestic) 
takeover targets to the total number of 
banks in a country.  
Fitch/IBC
A/BvD/B
ankscope. 
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Table 5.3: Descriptive statistics (808 observations).
Variable Mean
Lending rate 17.62
Foreign bank 0.15
Foreign MA 0.2
(Foreign MA)*(Age) 3.34
(Foreign MA)*(Age2) 14.64
Foreign Greenfield 0.05
(Foreign Greenfield)*(Age) 5.59
(Foreign Greenfield)*(Age2) 34.18
Foreign bank share 40.8
Bank share of Foreign MA 27.91
Bank share of Foreign Greenfield 4.86
Liquidity 27.44
∆ Loan loss reserves 45.79
Costs 10.4
Market share 7.18
Capital 11.98
Credit Registry 0.56
Top 3 bank share 59.39
Total number of banks 37.44
Inflation 6.17
GDP growth 3.98
Real interest rate 4.15
Enterprise reform index 2.83
Note: Countries included are Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Detailed information on variable construction is provided
in Table 5.2.
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Table 5.4: The impact of the mode of entry on bank lending rates.
I II II IV V VI
Dependent variable Lending rate
OLS Regressions IV Regressions
Foreign bank -2.48*** -2.53*** -2.57*** -2.36*** -2.55*** -2.52***
[0.81] [0.82] [0.81] [0.80] [0.81] [0.82]
Foreign MA -0.34 0.74 -0.19 -0.16 0.43 0.09
[0.64] [0.84] [0.98] [0.58] [0.72] [0.87]
(Foreign MA)*(Age) -0.35** 0.28 -0.29* 0.15
[0.17] [0.52] [0.17] [0.56]
(Foreign MA)*(Age2) -0.08 -0.07
[0.06] [0.07]
Foreign Greenfield -0.91 2.66 -7.8 -0.32 1.12 0.31
[0.93] [2.40] [4.89] [0.84] [0.80] [0.95]
(Foreign Greenfield)*(Age) -0.65* 3.41* -0.34** 0.51
[0.34] [1.80] [0.14] [0.66]
(Foreign Greenfield)*(Age2) -0.36** -0.11
[0.16] [0.08]
Foreign bank share -0.06** -0.06** -0.06** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.07***
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
Liquidity 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.15***
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
∆ Loan loss reserves 0 0 0 0 0 0
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
(Continued)
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Costs 0.25*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.25***
[0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08]
Market share -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
Capital 0.01 0 0 0.01 0 0
[0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03]
Credit Registry -7.98*** -7.94*** -7.99*** -4.52* -4.33* -4.43*
[2.91] [2.92] [2.93] [2.60] [2.59] [2.59]
Top 3 bank share 0.16** 0.17** 0.16** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22***
[0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08]
Total number of banks 0.24*** 0.25*** 0.24*** 0.28*** 0.29*** 0.29***
[0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07]
Inflation -0.19 -0.2 -0.2 -0.23 -0.23 -0.23
[0.14] [0.14] [0.14] [0.14] [0.14] [0.14]
GDP growth -0.23 -0.23 -0.24 -0.14 -0.14 -0.15
[0.43] [0.42] [0.42] [0.37] [0.37] [0.37]
Real interest rate -0.3 -0.31 -0.31 -0.45 -0.46 -0.46
[0.33] [0.33] [0.33] [0.28] [0.28] [0.28]
Index of enterprise reform 8.14** 8.13** 8.21** 7.39** 7.22** 7.29**
[3.86] [3.86] [3.86] [3.27] [3.26] [3.25]
Constant -17.76 -17.93 -17.88 -21.61** -21.25** -21.39**
[11.61] [11.57] [11.58] [10.60] [10.58] [10.56]
Country*Year Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 808 808 808 808 808 808
R-squared 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.55 0.55
N banks 206 206 206 206 206 206
Note: Coeﬃcient estimates are based on ordinary least squares or instrumental variable regressions.
Standard errors are robust and clustered on banks. Variable definitions are provided in Table 5.2.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 5.5: Competition eﬀect depending on the mode of entry.
II II III IV
Dependent variable Lending rate
OLS Regressions IV Regressions
Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign
Foreign bank -1.74 -1.04
[1.12] [1.80]
Foreign MA 0 0.95
[0.00] [1.74]
(Foreign MA)*(Age) -0.16 -0.19
[0.18] [0.18]
Foreign Greenfield 0.83 0.52
[2.60] [0.79]
(Foreign Greenfield)*(Age) -0.34 -0.14
[0.40] [0.29]
Bank share of Foreign MA -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.10*** -0.02
[0.03] [0.01] [0.03] [0.02]
Bank share of Foreign Greenfield -0.28*** -0.14* -0.19** -0.13
[0.08] [0.08] [0.09] [0.10]
Liquidity 0.12*** 0.18*** 0.12*** 0.18***
[0.02] [0.04] [0.02] [0.04]
D Loan loss reserves 0 0 0 0
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
(Continued)
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Costs 0.15* 0.69*** 0.15* 0.69***
[0.08] [0.12] [0.08] [0.12]
Market share -0.03 0.05** -0.03 0.05**
[0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.02]
Capital -0.01 0.11** -0.01 0.11**
[0.04] [0.05] [0.04] [0.05]
Credit Registry -0.26 2.82*** 0.05 4.36***
[2.62] [1.05] [2.65] [1.01]
Top 3 bank share 0.06*** 0.05 0.06*** -0.06
[0.02] [0.04] [0.02] [0.05]
Total number of banks 0.01 0.11*** 0.02 0.01
[0.08] [0.03] [0.09] [0.04]
Inflation 0.1 -0.18* 0.09 0.28***
[0.06] [0.10] [0.06] [0.07]
GDP growth 0.99*** -0.23 0.90*** -0.95***
[0.27] [0.15] [0.26] [0.25]
Real interest rate 0.18 0.03 0.18 0.27**
[0.15] [0.09] [0.15] [0.11]
Index of enterprise reform -2.64* 0 -2.23 10.16***
[1.55] [0.00] [1.56] [1.81]
Constant 15.03* 0.89 14.39* -22.26***
[8.34] [4.05] [8.60] [6.34]
Country*Year Dummies yes yes yes yes
Observations 480 328 480 328
R-squared 0.51 0.73 0.51 0.73
N banks 139 97 139 97
Note: Coeﬃcient estimates are based on ordinary least squares or instrumental variable regressions.
Standard errors are robust and clustered on banks. Variable definitions are provided in Table 5.2.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
